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SU1tlI·1.ARY
This thesis is divided into five cha.-pters. It was
not thought helpful to further sub-divide the chapters, and
footnotes are used nrincipally for the citation of authority
and not for lengthy discussions. In view of the specific
nature of the tonics discussed, such introductory remarks
to the subject as are necessary are dealt with in the
Preface.
Chanter I is an analysis of the nature of the bank's
security over documents of title "pledged" to it; the
concept of "pledge" in this connection is discussed in
detail. North Western Bank focuses the issue and the Scots
and English authorities, and their particular relevance,
are dealt with in turn. The English concept of "special
property" is examined as is the statutory authority. The
conclusions are then apnlied to the commercial credit
situation, the particular difficulties of which are noted
and discussed.
Chapter II is the logical sequel, examining the
realisation of the bank's security under the letter of credit.
Just as pledge is discussed at some length in Chapter I here
the notion of "hypothec" is examined. The major proposition
is that the nature of the security and its realisation in
due course are, and must be, logically consistent; realisation
does not depend on a device of mercantile genius. Early
English authorities are discussed in detail and it is seen
that many of them turn on specialities of English terminology
or/
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or equity. The position in Scotland is examined and it is
suggested t.ha t despite theoretical differences the
practical positions in the two countries are not dissimilar.
Chapter III is a detailed examination of the 3rd
security concept, that of "lien", in the banking context;
and in this part of the thesis the discussion is not limited
to the commercial credit. It is in two parts: an examination
of the early Scottish authorities and those English
authorities which are helpful (pointing out the technical
specialities of which Scots lawyers must beware) in
clarifying the principles applicable to what is conventionally
thought of as the banker's lien; and a detailed analysis of
the recent case of Halesowen v. Westminster Bank and the
earlier authorities discussed therein. It is submitted
that a definitive judgment is still required.
In Chapter IV a very uncertain area of the law
relating to commercial credits - the problems of false and
forged documents - is discussed. The documents tendered
under the letter of credit are of great concern to the
bank as it relies on them for security for advances while
at the same time having very little knowledge of the trade
concerned. The documents concerned: bills of exchange,
documents of title, i.e., tendered under the credit, and the
letter of credit itself - are examined in turn from the
point of view first of forgery, then of falsity, particular
attention being paid to helpful American authorities,
especially Sztejn's case.
In/
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In the final Chapter, Chanter V, the bank's role
under the credit system comes in for close scrutiny.
Inevitably the bank has to exercise its discretion in
dealing with the credit - but to what extent, and what are
its obligations as opposed to its entitlements? The position
varies with the type of credit established and the effects
of this are noted, as are the difficulties inherent in
trying to define the credit. So too when a bank is called
on to accept documents, the way in which it exercises its
discretion may be very critical for its customer. Such
questions as: what is a clean bill? are usual bills
acceptable? should an indemnity be accepted? are
discussed in the concluding paragraphs.
PREFACE AND IHTRODUCTORY COMNENTS
Content
This thesis is princiually concerned with the nature
and extent of the bank's security under the commercial
credit.
No attempt has been made in this thesis to provide
a comprehensive treatise on the law of bankers' commercial
credits. Although not considered from a Scots law standpoint,
the general treatments of Gutteridge and r~grah and Davis are
of great assistance. /The various topics precised in the
chapter headings are examined from the bank's point of view.
By virtue of the framework in which the credit operates
the bank's role as security-holder is by no means passive;
its involvement in the transaction is considerable and its
responsibilities rather greater than those shouldered by
mere financiers wishing to safeguard their investment. It
must be remembered that while the bank are financing the
operation, their role should not be misunderstood - basically
they are providing a banking service.
The nature of the bank's security and the realisation
of that security form the basis of the first two chapters.
Two particular aspects are then treated separately: banker's
lien and the problems posed to the bank in dealing with
false documents. Banker's lien is one of the 3 main concepts
of central importance in this field (the others being hypothec
and pledge) and on which there has recently been a fair
amount/
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amount of judicial comment. It was thoueht necessary in
considering this topic not to confine the discussion to the
narrower field of commercial credits. In contrast to
banker's lien the problems posed by the presentation of
false documents are only now being analysed in any depth -
nor are the solutions propounded necessarily legal; in
many cases they are practical. The concluding chapter
is an attempt to draw together the various themes developed
elsewhere in a relatively comprehensive look at the
discretionary role of the bank in the credit mechanism.
The concepts of lien, hypothec and pledge are of
central importance in this discussion and the specialities
of the bank's lien and the recent judicial pronouncements
on it are the basis of the third chapter.
Authorities and Scope
The work on this thesis has been done principally
at the University of Glasgow, and the authorities cited are
mostly those available to me from the University's library
shelves. I have also from time to time consulted authorities at
and used the facilities of the library of the Faculty of
Procurators, Glasgow.
In January, 1972 I was fortunate enough to receive
a Rotary Fellowship which allowed me to spend 4 months
studying at the University of Virginia in America (not
exclusively in connection with this thesis) where I had
access to their excellent library facilities and was able
tol
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to consider in detail some of the more pertinent American
decisions.
I have made reference to such general works, both
English and Scottish, as seem to me to have a bearing on
the subjects discussed. No bibliography has been attached,
such acknowledgement as is customary being made by way of
footnote. English authorities are cited without apology
although specialities of Scottish or English law and
consequential limitations on the bearing which the
authorities may have are underlined. Even greater care
must be exercised in dealing with American authorities, many
of which are extremely helpful.
In a field such as this, any responsible discussion
of the problems must be of assistance but care must be
taken not too readily to assume that judicial attitudes in
the various countries are and have been interchangeable.
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tedious job of comparison in the final stages.
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The treatise is submitted on the basis that the
opinions expressed and the statements of principle reflect
the authorities available to me as at 1st January, 1973 and
where possible all relevant precedents prior to that date
have been considered.
Chapter I.
THE NATURE OF THE ]Arne'S SECURITY
OVER DOCUMENTS TSNDERED IN THE
COURSE OF THE CREDIT TRANSACTION
1
There is no doubt that the Bank has a security right
over the documents tendered to it in the course of the commercial
credit transaction. It is on this fundamental nremiss that the
whole international system of financing commerce by the letter
of credit is based. Although the existence of the security right
has constantly been assumed, its nature has only been analysed
imperfectly, and often only in passing. For example,
(2)
Scrutton L.J. in Rosenberg v. International Banking Corporation
said:
"Bankers' liens or bankers' pledges, effected in such a
way give, according to the views of merchants, the
bankers a right of sale. Whether you talk about it as
an express nledge or •••••••• as an implied nledge, in
my view such a transaction gives an indenendent right or
right of property to the bank to secure the amount which
they have advanced •••••••• "
, (3)
Gutteridge and Higrah accentihe nature of the security as
/
being/
(1) In this thesis "the bank" is the issuing bank; differences
in the position of the intermediary bank will be discussed
as and when they arise.
(2) (1923) 14 Ll.L.Reu.344 at 347.
(3) The Law of Bankers' Commercial Credits 3rd Edition.
All subsequent footnoted references to this work will be
abbreviated thus: G. and M.
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(4)
being pledge without examining it closely. But that is
exactly what this chapter is intended to do - to examine the
authorities, the situations and the theories propounded to
ascertain whether or not there is a logical consistency to this
section of the law.
Theoretical soundness is an essential pre-requisite of
consistency of decision and confidence in mercantile dealings.
And although the merchant may feel reassured by the common
acceptations of the business world, this confidence has frequently
been misplaced. The reconciliation of practice and legal theory
is, moreover, and this is not the least consideration, a matter
of academic satisfaction. On the other hand, it must be admitted
that there are many problems in this field of law which simply
do not have a solution. This must not be overlooked. There is a
great danger of attempting to achieve artificial reconciliations
of theory and practice.
The security of the bank is of paramount importance in
assuring the commercial viability of the bank's role in this field
of law. It is the only assurance that the bank has in many cases
when making its facilities available to its customers in foreign
trade.
Most of the general pronouncements judicial and otherwise,
including the above dictum relate, of course, to English law.
They/
(4) G. and H. p.137
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They require rather closer examination before they are extended
to Scots law. The Scots law of pledge is not the same as the
English - this is quite clear, e.g., the pledgee's right of sale.
The security may also vary according to ·the circumstances in which
it is created and the forms of the documents which are held.
Central to the argument on the present topic must be
(5)
North Western Bank v. Poynter Son and Macdonalds. This case is
quoted with authority in all the major text-books on the subject,
cited frequently in both Scots and English courts, applied at
least in the latter, and has never been seriously called in question
as to its actual decision.
The facts of this case are well-known:
Page & Co. asked the bank if they were willing to advance to
them £5,000, security being provided by way of pledge of 1,629 tons
of phosphate rock then in the process of being shipped. The
bank agreed and the relative bills of lading were delivered,
indorsed in blank, to the bank. Thereafter the bank wrote to
Page & Co. setting out the terms on which they held the documents;
these included a power of sale.
Before the 2nd Division of the Court of Session in an
action of multiple-poinding the bankers pleaded that they had
property rights in the phosphate rock represented by the bills of
lading and although they apparently continued to use the word
"pledge" they obviously viewed themselves as having fuller rights
(6)
than those traditionally associated with pledge. The other
claimants/
(5) (1894) 22 R(HL)l
(6) See further infra.
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claimants in the multiple-poinding argued that
"it depended on the contract upon which the bills of
lading were transferred whether the property in the
goods in the full sense passed. If it was sale it did.
(7)
Here it was pledge".
Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald in his judgment certainly talks of
pledged goods and at page 51B says:
the
"The bank's case is that they were in/ownership of the
goods •••••••• but this can only be maintained if the
written contract is ignored .•••••.• its express words
indicate that the bank receive the bills of lading as a
security only for an advance".
The alternative theories were clearly before the Lord Justice-
Clerk at this point. His decision was based on an unwillingness
(B)
to distinguish Tad and Son v. Merchant Banking Company, not
on any broader theoretical disagreement with the House of Lords'
(9)
reasoning at the appeal stage. Lord Young's dissent which was
later upheld by the House of Lords also clearly envisages a
pledge situation. Lord Trayner, supporting the Lord Justice-
Clerk, also faces the choice squarely; he supports the argument
of Poynter Son & Macdonalds, in particular the distinction
between pledge and sale:
"IfI
(7) (lB94)21 R 513 at 5~7.
(B) (lBBo)10 R 1009.
(9) (lB94)21 R at 519.
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"If the contract, however, be pledge, not sale, then the
delivery of the indorsed bill of lading completes the
contract just as if the goods themselves had been
deposited with the pledgee, but gives the pledgee no
greater or higher right to the goods than delivery of
(10)
the subject of pledge to the pledgee gives him".
He does not distinguish the English from the Scots law of
pledgeo In neither case does the pledgee obtain property rights.
His decision rests on a strict application of the Institutional
authorities and, of course, Tod's case. In essence, the bank
lost its real right in exchanging it for a personal one.
The principal appeal judgment in the House of Lords was
(11)
given by Lord Herschell LC 0 He wa s content, as were the
,.
parties, to base his decision on Scots law. There was no
question of it being based on English law; in fact, he said that
if English law were applied the point at issue would not be
arguable for a moment. Lord Herschell approaches the problem
as one of pledge, not of ownership:
"I do not understand it to be disputed thr:ttif in fact
the goods sold were the property of the North Western
Bank, then, although the sale may have been ronde by
Page & Co. to Cross & Co., yet being made by Page & Co.
on behalf of the bank as owners~ it could not be attached
(12)
by a creditor of Page & Co."
It/
(10) ibid at p.524.
(11) ~_895) A.C. at p.64.
(12) ibid.
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It hQS been suggested that, despite this apparently clear
statement of :E>rinciple,the House of Lords' decision was based
(13)
on ownership. Lord Herschell's only difficulty arose in
disputing Lord Trayner's assertion that the bank's security
was lost with possession passing out of its hands. The issue
(14)
vms clearly fixed. The authorities cited are three in
number: Erskine's Institutes, Bell's Commentaries and Tad's
(15)
case. These will be discussed at length later. Erskine
is dismissed as not covering the point; Bell, too, although
this is much more doubtful; and Tod is distinguished. One
suspects that the basis of the decision, however, lies in the
following statement: speaking of 'Lord Trayner's rule', Lord
Herschell says:
"It does not seem to me to be a reasonable rule. If
the rule exists, it is one wh i.chruns counter to
every-day commercial understanding of commercial
(16)
transactions".
The fact that 'commercial understanding' supports what he
considers an undisputed English rule is considered conclusive.
(17)
Lord Watson's short judgment merely re-iterates the
proposition/
(13) Gow: The Mercantile and Industrial Law of Scotland
(hereinafter referred to as "Gow") pp.274 and 2780
(14) [1895J AC at p.68.
(15) Ersk. 3.1.33.
(16) [1895] AC at p.69.
(17) ibid p.75.
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nronosition that the Scots and English laws apulicable are the
same and supnorts Lord Young's dissent in the 2nd Division.
The decision in North Western Bank has been set forth in
some detail at this point in the argument, because it is,
paradoxically, both of limited heln in settling the problem and
yet of central importance in summarising and focussing it. It
is a useful basis on which to build a further analysis.
Particular factual distinctions in the case which must be
considered are the form of the bill of lading, i.e., the lack
of indorsement at any stage in the transactions, the intention
clearly stated that pledge was to operate, and the very fact
(often overlooked) that the framework in which the litigation
arose was not that of a commercial letter of credit.
(18)
Although the "degree of pronerty" passing may vary
according to the circumstances it might be argued that the
bank deals with the documents as if it had complete ri~ht
of ownership. North Western Bank does not altogether
contradict this nractical nroposition, though in theory it
clearly points to its limitations. The House of Lords' decision
gives the pledgee very extensive rights closely analogous to
those of an owner. It is noticeable that Tod was the only case
discussed in either of the two anpeal courts. The Institutional
writings which were discussed are only of guidance on the
general law of pledge, not on the construction of a snecial type
ofl
(18) Paget: Law of Banking 8th Ed. p.581
(hereinafter referred to as Paget)
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(19)
of security. And Gloag and Irvine ,to which any student of
the peculiarities of the Scots law of security rights inevitably
turns for guidance, must be examined critically in view of the
special field we are studying, one presumably not in mind at the
time of their writing. The English decisions are of considerable
help in that they envisage more closely analogous problems and
cover a multiplicity of situations. Again, there are limitations:
the specialities of the Scots law, the differences in the basic
concepts of the two systems.
NorthWestern Bank itself must be examined in two lights:
as an authority on pledge or ownership, and as an authority on
commercial credits. The former must be discussed before its
relevance to the latter can be considered. This is essentially
the task of defining the ratio of North Western Bank. This in
turn revolves around the pledge as against the ownership
(20)
argument. Gloag and Irvine are quite clear ,at least at one
part of their treatment:
"the right given to the indorsee in security of a bill
of lading in Scotland is of the nature of an absolute
right of property qualified by an obligation to
reconvey . "
As we shall see, there is no statutory authority for this
dogmatic/
(19) Law of Rights in Security
(hereinafter referred to,when footnoted, as G and I.)
(20) ibid p.278 footnote 2.
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dogmatic contradiction of the professed ratio of North Western
Bank, a decision regarded as authoritative at least on the
(21)
merits of the case by Gloag and Irvine. They indicate that
the Scots position must not be identified with that in England.
This can only be so on the basis of cases decided prior to
(22)
North Western Bank, Hayman v. McLintock only being decided
in 1907. Before examining these cases, however, some attention
should be paid to the terms in which Gloag and Irvine give
their point of view. The categorical statement above quoted
is in fact a footnote referring to the application in Scotland
(23)
of Sewell v. Burdick. Elsewhere they decline to commit
themselves. At page 274 they say:
"the effect of the indorsement and delivery of the bill
of lading depends upon the contract between the indorser
and the indorsee ••••••.. It may not be intended to
pass the property outright, but only to transfer the
goods in security".
At the very least this is an ambiguous approval of the ownership
theory. There then follows, however, an acceptance of Bowen JIS
(24)
judgment in Sanders v. Maclean, widely regarded as the
locus classicus of the symbolic theory of the bill of lading.
Partl
(21) ibid at p.288.
(22) 1907 S.C.936.
(23) Sewell v. Burdick (1884) 10 App.Cas.74.
(24) (1883) 11 QED 327.
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Part of this, quoted in full by Gloag and Irvine is to the
effect that
"property in the goods passes by such indorsement and
delivery of the bill of lading, whenever it is the
intention of the parties that such property should
pass, just as, under similar circumstances, the
property would pass by an actual delivery of the
(25)
goods"
Expanded by Bowen L.J. in the Court of Appeal during
(26)
his dissent in Sewell v. Burdick ,this reasoning forms the
basis of the House of Lords' decision in that case. And it is
Sewell, of course, which Gloag and Irvine refuse to follow or
approve. (27)
At page 284, the "leading case of Lickbarrow v • .lVla§.Q!!"
is discussed as follows:
"From some expressions in the judgment of Buller J it was
at one time thought that the indorsement passed the
property, whatever was the contract between indorser and
indorsee; but this difficulty has now been cleared up,
and it is settled that the property only passes if that
was the intention of the parties in the contract upon
which the indorsement was made".
In support of this, Gloag and Irvine cite Lord McLaren's note to
Bell's Commentaries, and the cases of Sewell v. Burdick and
(28)
Sanders v. Maclean. While admittedly this contradiction is
when/
(25) (1883) 11 Q.B.D.327, at 341.
(26) (1884) 13 Q.B.D. 170.
(27) 1 Smith's L.C. lOth Ed. p.674.
(28) These cases are cited infra and discussed more fully.
.-11-
when discussing the right of the seller to stop in transitu,
the conjunction of conflicting authorities is clearly unfortunate.
Gloag and Irvine eventually reach their consideration of
the conflict of the 'pledge' and 'ownership' theories at page 287:
"As the effect of the indorsement of a bill of lading
in transferring the property of the goods depends, as
has already been shown, on the contract in pursuance of
which the indorsement was made, it might appear that the
indorsee in security does not become the owner, but only
the possessor, of the goods. That is to say, that his
right is of the nature of a pledge, and not of an
~ facie absolute transfer".
They go on to say that, despite this, the ownership theory was
(29)
assumed in Tod and Son v. Merchant Banking Co. but that this
decision was in turn doubted in NorthWestern Bank. Their
conclusion is not at all dogmatic:
"the point may still be held to be open. It is also
doubtful whether the indorsement of a bill of lading
to one who takes it merely in security gives the indorsee
any power to sell the cargo, if such a power is not
(30)
expressly given, as it usually is"
I have criticised Gloag and Irvine not because their
treatment of the subject is unhelpful but to illustrate that the
theoretical analysis of the problems involved has frequently
been imperfect and has been accompanied by an indiscriminate
reliance/
(29) supra cit.
(30) at page 287.
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reliance on English authorities in a field where the English
and Scots positions have frequently been asserted to be at
variance. Too often the decision and the ratio of an English
judgment have been artificially separated. We must now turn to
the Scottish authorities which Gloag and Irvine had available
pri or t0 _Ha~ym=a=n:.......;.v..::.--=..:IvI::.=:c;;::;L;.;:i;,;:;n~t~o~c=k.
Hamilton
(31)
v. Western Bank of Scotland, acknowledged
as a leading case on the law of securities, dealt s~ecifically
with delivery orders. It held that where the bank agreed to
give a borrower an advance and in security obtained a delivery
order, intimated the transfer to the warehouse keeper and had
the nronerty registered in its name, in these circumstances the
bank was not the pledgee but the owner of the goods. In other
words, the bank is the ex facie absolute proprietor, whose real
right is only qualified by an obligation to restore the security
subjects on the satisfaction of the debt.
The fact that the document in this case was a delivery
order, and not a bill of lading, is of paramount importance.
In one the delivery in question is constructive, in the other
" symbolical. Lord President McNeill accepts this distinction in(32)
Hamilton and stresses that in cases of constructive delivery
the essential characteristic of pledge, namely custody, is lacking.
He stresses intention and finds in it support for the ownership(33)
theory. Lord Ivory also stresses intention but only as a
means of construing the rights of the parties inter se when the
transfer/
(31) (1856) 19D 152.
(32) ibid at p.159.
(33) ibid at p.164.
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transfer is not pledge.
(34)
Lord Curriehill as indicative of property rights while Lord
The right to sell was regarded by
Deas said:
"actual delivery if stipulated for and given, would,
I think, have constituted the different and inferior
(35)
right of pledge"
There are, therefore, two ways of construing the contract:
by examining the incidents of the contract (e.g. the rights
of the parties and the nature of the delivery), and by
examining the intention of the parties. On either basis the
decision in Hamilton is probably acceptable on its facts. But
where the professed intention of the parties and the incidents
of the contract clash, the case seems to authorise a disregard
of the former. It is not willing +ore cogmse a pledge plus an
added right of sale by virtue of an express term of the
contract; it does not, however, go so far as to say that no
In Ha.¥!Il@;n v ,
l36)
Lord McLaren explains the decision thus:
document of title can be pledged. McLintock,
"The result of that decision is that where documents
of title were taken in security of advances, the
contract to be inferred was not strictly a contract
of pledge, but the transference of a proprietary
right, under which the bank was held entitled to
retain the goods until the advances were repaid".
There/
(34) ibid at P.164.
(35) ibid at p.165.
(36) 1907 S.C. 936 at 952.
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There are two points about this precis that must immediately
be questioned. Constructive delivery was contrasted with
symbolic delivery in Hamilton and the consequences of each
are clearly different. The extension of the ratio from
delivery orders to all documents of title is therefore
unjustified without further argument. Moreover, Lord
McLaren talks of the bank being entitled to retain the goods. (37)
until the advances were repaid While this is an
inaccurate description of the situation regarding delivery
orders, and may be forgiven as such, it does focus the point
that it is a realistic description where bills of lading are
involved. And since the whole basis of Hamilton is the
inability of the bank to retain the goods in any real sense
as pledges, it can not be extended to bills of lading.
Within the judgments in Hamilton there are indications
that the implications of pledge were not fully appreciated by
the judges. There is a certain lack of consistency in their
judgments. For instance, Lord President McNeill talks of the
(39)
absence of custody ,which he terms the necessary
characteristic of pledge. In contrast, Lord Ivory distinguishes
the custody of a carrier or a workman from the 'possession' of
(38)
'proper pledge' He explains the latter as being 'that
which in England is said to confer a special property in the
article itself'. This approach removes at once the mystique of
the English 'technicality'. The differences in the two
judgmentsl
.----------------_....-------._...-------------------------------------------___..----- __ -----___..___
(37) ibid p.952.
(38) (1856) 19 D at 161.
(39) ibid at p.159.
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judgments mayor may not be dismissed as differences in
terminology. What can not be so dismissed, however, is the
Court's attitude to the intention of the parties.
162, Lord Ivory says:
"It is by force of law, and not by the intention of
At page
the parties, that the ultimate right of parties
arises";
and Lord Deas at page 165:
"That the parties intended to pJeqge it I have very
little doubt".
There are two ways of looking at this apparent disregard
of the parties' intentions: either the incidents of the
contract and the powers of the parties thereunder are decisive,
or there is some legal disability preventing a document of
title being pledged in any circumstances. Lord Curriehill
clearly supports the former:
"Moreover, if the right had been merely a pledge, the
defendants could not have sold the goods without
(40)
judicial authority".
This approach does not find favour with Gloag and Irvine but in
any case it certainly stops short of the latter view that a
document of title can not be pledged. Justification for the
view may be sought in the Lord President's judgment. If
pledge were possible, he says, "it would tend to complicate
(41)
transactions and create confusion". Unfortunately he does
not!
----------------------------___;,:
(40) ibid p.164.
(41) ibid p.159.
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not elaborate this theme, and apart from a division of
possessory and proprietary rights, the very basis of pledge,
it is difficult to see what objections can be taken on these
grounds as between the parties to the contract. The effect
on third parties is, of course, a matter of separate concern
and one which will be discussed later.
The decision in Hamilton is, of course, only binding in
any real sense on the position of delivery orders. Too much
can not be read into obiter discussions of theory. A delivery
order can only be effectively transferred by delivery plus
intimation unlike a bill of lading which differs from a
negotiable instrument only as regards the position of a holder
in due course. While it is a document of title in terms of
(42)
the Factors Acts, a delivery order is not a symbol of the
goods. It is the latter disability which prevents the
approximation of constructive and symbolic delivery. Third
And while
(43)
Hamilton may be considered fairly conclusive on its merits,
party notice is required for effective transfer.
it is this which allows us to distinguish the position of a
bill of lading. Gloag and Irvine point out the de-merits and(44) -
consequences of Hamilton and Lord McLaren expressed his
(45)
disapproval of it in a Note to Bell's Commentaries. The
arguments/
(42) Factors (Sc) Act 1890 53 & 54 Vict c40 extending the
English Factors Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict c45) to Scotland.
(43) as it is by Gow, Gloag and Irvine and in Hayman v. McLintock
J
all cited previously.
(44)
(45)
at p.256.
Bell's Comm.ii 21. (7th Edition). Further references to
Bell will be, unless otherwise stated, to this Edition.
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arguments, complex and confusing as they are,can alone scarcely
justify the widespread extension of theories of law proferred
in a case where the law as laid down is in clear conflict
with the usual understanding of business men.
Hamilton has nevertheless found considerable supnort and
(46) ..
was followed in Mackinnon v. Max Nanson and Co., where the
document in issue was again a delivery order. It must be
noted in passing that the terms of a delivery order vary
considerably in contrast to those of a bill of lading which
are fairly uniform at least in lay-out and content. Lord
President Inglis spoke of Hamilton as 'establishing very
clearly and satisfactorily a great principle of mercantile
(47)
law'. The emphasis on actual possession is again repeated
and Lord Deas saw no reason to doubt the opinions expressed in
Hamilton. Six years earlier the possibility of pledging the.. (48)
title-deeds of heritage was discussed in Christie v. Ruxton.
This case has been cited by Gow in support of his statement
that 'Scots law does not recognise as a concept the pledge of a
(49)
document of debt or obligation'. In fact, however, the
ratio of Christie does not bear this construction and has a
very narrow application, unless a very restricted meaning is
given/
(46) (1868) 6 M 974.
(47) ibid at p.975.
(48) (1862) 24 D 1182.
(49) Gow,Page 284.
_"
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given to the term 'document of debt or obligation'. Certainly
Christie does not point to any difference between the Scots
(50)
and English law. Lord Benholme's judgment is as follows:
"title deeds and documents of debt having no
intrinsic value in themselves are truly extra
commercium. Their only value is relative to or as
adjuncts of and accessory to, separate rights, whether
of property or of obligation, with which rights the
supposed pledgee, ex hypothesi, has no concern".
A bill of lading could by no stretch of the imagination be
described as extra commercium. All that is meam is that the
title deeds of property can not be transferred independently
of the property, whether in sale or security. The security
over the titles of heritage is merely that of nuisance value
by way of lien. A bill of lading is in no sense merely an
accessory of the property; for practical purposes, recognised
at law, it is a symbol of and represents the property.
Lord Benholme does, however, indicate a further criterion
of pledge. Referring to a lecture of Baron Hume:
"In Scotland those moveables only can become the
subjects of pledge which are in their own nature
valuable or substantially serviceable, and therefore
(51)
would fetch a price when brought to market".
Bills of lading certainly satisfy this criterion. And far
from/
(50) supra cit at page 118,.
(51) quoted at p.1186.
_.
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from distinguishing the English position, Lord Benholme points
out that as regards title deeds exactly the same position
exists there.
Two of the earlier cases on security rights over delivery
orders and documents of title are Pochin and Co. v. Robinows
(52) (53)
and Marjoribanks and Mitchell v. Heys. In neither of
these is there any close analysis of the position of the
security-holder, but several of the judgments do talk rather
loosely of pledge. In Pochin and Co., Lord President Inglis
shows the same approach as was later to be used in Tad and Son
v. I1erchant Banking Company:
"If a creditor in return for his advance, receive a
transfer of property, or an assignation of a debt or
personal obligation of any kind, in terms absolute and
unqualified, such as would be employed in a transfer to
a purchaser of the nronerty or right of credit, he has
all the powers of a proprietor or absolute assignee
for the purpose and to the effect of enabling him to(52)
recover his advances".
Apart from this statement, there is little discussion of theory,
Lord Ardmillan merely mentioning the "very imnortant and delicate
questions of law ••••••.. which do not require to be(54)
decided".
Mitchell v. Heys was decided on the facts at issue and
an application of nrinciples of personal bar. The Lord
Ordinary/
(52) (1869)7 M 622 at 630.
(53) (1893)21R 600.
(54) supra cit at page 634.
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(55)
Ordinary cited London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons in
these terms:
"The decision, therefore, goes no further than this,
that the bona ~ pledgee for value of a negotiable
instrument can retain it for the debt for which it
was pledged against the true owner. The same rule,
I apprehend, also applies to the impledging of
documents of title, such as an indorsed bill of
lading •••••••• "
This typifies the very loose usage of the term 'pledge' but
certainly shows that there was at that time no fixed rule (56)
Inglis v. Robertsonexcluding the pledge of bills of lading.
was yet another case which talked of the pledging of delivery
orders. This House of Lords' decision is significant in the
present context for the unwillingness of the Earl of Halsbury(57)
to distinguish the Scots and English laws of pledge and for
Lord Watson's opinion that North Western Bank was properly a
(58
decision on English law.
There is, then, no consistent line of Scots authorities
to guide us on the theoretical difficulties of the 'pledge' of
a bill of lading. It is only in 1883 that the ownership theory
was first fully canvassed in a case concerning bills of lading,
(59)
namely, Tod and Son v. Merchant Banking Co. of London. The
facts/
(55) SUpra cit at p.6Q4.
(56) (1897)~5R(R.'L.) 70 - discussed further infra.
(57) ibid at 72.
(58) ibid at 73.
(59) (1883) lOR 1009.
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facts were similar to those in North Western Bank:
bills of lading, blank indorsed, were held as security by
the purchaser's bankers in exchange for the latter accepting
the shipper's drafts for payment of the cargo. The security
subjects were then released to the purchaser on the undertaking
that the purchaser would obtain from the party to whom he had
subsequently sold the goods an obligation to pay them, the
bankers. The price was arrested in the hands of the sub~
purchaser prior to this obligation being obtained and the
Court preferred the arrester's right to that of the former
security-holder, the bank. At first instance, Lord IvlcLaren
(60)
said:
"it is plain from the negotiations .••••••• that it
was not intended that the bankers should have anything
to do with the disposal of the cargo by mercantile
contract" but despite this, he held that
"there was a title of property with an equity to reduce
that right to a security on a settlement of accounts
(61)
between them and their bankers".
On appeal the bank argued for the adoption of the
ownership theory, relying on Hamilton. The respondents on the
other hand ar~ued on a rosis of pledge. Lord Westbury in Barber
(62)
v. Meyerstein was cited for the following proposition:
"It/
(60) ibid Page 1012.
(61) ibid Page 1015.
(62) (1870) LR 4 E & lApp 336.
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"It is unquestionable that the handing over of the
bill of lading for any advance 0 ••••••• as completely
vests the property in the pledgee as if the goods had
been put into his own warehouse".
The Lord President's appeal judgment rather fell between the two
although none of the reasoning is completely unambiguous:
"No one disputes, at the same time, that the true nature
of the transaction between Bryant, Ridley and Company
and the lJIerchantBanking Company was simply this, that
the bank held the bill of lading of the cargo and hadtruly
under it a title of property, but that they/held it in
security for the advances they had made and that when
Bryant, Ridley and Company were in a condition to pay
these advances the title to the cargo would revert to
(63)
them" .
This sanguine approach to the alternatives put before the
Court does not further the analysis of the nature of the
security. The reason for this approach was probably the
acceptance that whether pledge or ownership correctly described
the security-holder's title, the result was the same.
When Tod was considered by the House of Lords in
North Western Bank it was on the basis of pledge. The method
by which the case was distinguished is interesting. Lord
Chancellor Herschell emphasised that the delivery to the
eventual purchaser was not accomplished via the bank's
customer.
(63) supra cit at p.IOI8.
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customer. In these circumstances, he refused to hold that the
pledger sold on the bank's behalf; "he made these sales on
(64)
his own account in the course of his own business".
Surely this assessment of the practical situation is equally
true of that in North Western Bank. The only distinction was
the existence of a letter purporting to appoint the pledgors
agents for the limited purpose of sale. The practical
background was identical.
Nevertheless, Tod may still be authoritative on the
(65)
particular facts of that case. It certainly can not be
given the wider consequences to which it pretended. Moreover,
if, as was suggested, Tod followed the ownership theory, it is
submitted that the decision should be reconsidered. If the
bank were the owners, it would surely be irrelevant that
Bryant, Ridley and Company obtained the purchaser in their
normal course of business.
There are several other cases which throw some light on
the nature of the rights of the holder of the bill of lading.
These, however, do not consider the position of the security-
(66)
holder. They merely re-inforce the symbolic theory.
Until/
(64) &895]AC at 72.
(65) as Gloag & Irvine suggest at p.288.
(66) Cowdenbeath Coal Co. (1895) 22R 682;
(1871)
Pirie & Sons v .Warden/9M 525.
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Until Hayman v. McLintock in 1907, there could be no
conclusive decision in favour of the ownership theory. It is
mainly on this case that Gow's theoretical assertion must be
based. The facts of Hayman's case, although providing the
opportunity for airing the problem of the 'pledge' of bills
of lading, are not closely related to those of a commercial
credit transaction.
The argument in favour of the 'pledge' theory was clearly
brought before the court, although the authority relied upon
(67) {68)
was principally Sewell v. Burdick. The Lord Ordinary
distinguished this case on the facts and stressed that the
indorsees in Sewell were bankers who would not in their
normal course of business take possession of or deal with the
goods. He continued by saying:
"But we are here dealing with the Scots law of pledge"
and talked of this as apparently involving "absolute property
(69)
with reversionary right".
It is, therefore, to the appeal court that we must look
for a consistent statement of principle. The Lord President's
treatment of the argument based on Sewell emphasises that it
was an English case. His approach to the concept of special
property is, however, extremely unusual:
"There/
(67) (1884) 10 A.O.74
(68) 1907 so at p.942.
(69) 1907 s.o. at p.949.
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"There is no such thing in Scots law as the term
special property, and there cannot be according to the
law of Scotland a distinction between the property
and thespecial property. But the form of security
effectuated by what in the law of England is called
a special property is perfectly well-known in the
law of Scotland. There is a very well-known leading
authority upon the matter, namely, the case of
(70)
Hamilton v. Western Bank".
So far as it goes, this is at least an arguable legal
proposition. Expanding this, however, he continues:
"the law of Scotland is certainly this, that the
condition of affairs in which a pledgee may lose his
rights by losing possession applies only to the
proper case of corporeal moveables. It is very often
a confusion of ideas or a quibble of words to talk of
losing possession where what is given to you is not
the property itself but documents which transfer the
property. You cannot lose possession of the moveables
(71)
unless you lose the document".
In other words, the Lord President construes the
'special property' concept of Sewell not as the possession
required by the Scots law of pledge but as equivalent to the
transfer of the absolute right of property under the
obligation!
(70) ibid.
(71) supra cit; ibid.Po950.
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obligation to reconvey on satisfaction of the security.
(72)
The term pledge is used loosely and seems to infer that
the form which pledge takes with incorporeal moveables is
the absolute ownership concept. The whole criterion of
possession on which pledge is commonly said to rely and on
which Hamilton is decided is undermined. The Lord President
accepts that the only possession of the goods which is
possible is possession of the documents, and then denies
that this has any significance.
Neither of the judgments above can really be accepted
as satisfactory justification for the extension of the ratio
of Hamilton to the situation involving bills of lading. In
one case the facts are treated as crucial, and in the other
the basis of Hamilton is undermined. Lord McLaren, giving
(73)
the only other lengthy judgment returned to the criterion
of possession to say:
"Under the Roman law of pledge there must be actual
perception of the subject of pledge"
and that the result of Hamilton, as the ratio is laid down
by Lord President McNeill, is that
"where documents of title were taken in security of
advances, the contract to be inferred was not strictly
a contract of pledge, but the transference of a
proprietary right, under which the bank was held
entitled to retain the goods until the advances were
(74)
repaid" .
This/
(72) perhaps the only characteristic common to all the
authorities.
(73) Lords Kinnear and Pearson concurred.
(74) 1907 SCat 952.
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This right of the security holder is identified in all
substantial respects with the right of a holder of a security
over heritable property constituted by ~ facie absolute
disposition.
Again, Lord McLaren is content to use the word 'pledge'
to describe this transaction although it is quite clear in
this instance that it is not nledge, properly sneaking, to
which he is referring. His uncritical extension of Hamilton
is not justified by him apart from his bare assertion of the
state of Roman law. In fact, he is earlier at pains to (75)
distinguish the delivery order from the bill of lading.
As we have seen, Hayman is regarded in some circles as(76)
conclusive authority in favour of the ownership theory.
Gloag and Irvine had, however, suggested that the point
would earlier be settled in the case of Inglis v. Robertson(77)
and Baxter. The fact that it was not is partly due to
the fact that the case dealt with delivery orders and partly
because it eventually reached the House of Lords after having
been considered by the whole Court of Session. On matters
of theory pertaining exclusively to Scots law it is perhaps
to be regretted that this situation can arise.
In the House of Lords, Lord Chancellor Halsbury would
not/
(75) ibid.
(76) Gow supra cit.
(77) 1896 3 SLT NO.326; on appeal: (1897) 24 R 758;
and in the House of Lords: (1898) 25 R (H.L.) 70.
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not commit himself to the existence of any differences between
(78)
the English and Scots laws of nledge. Lord Watson was
rather more specific regarding the nature of the security
right created:
"I can see no reason to doubt that, by Scottish law
as well as English, the indorsement and handing over
of delivery-orders in security of a loan, along with
a letter professing to hynothecate the goods
themselves, is sufficient in law, and according to
mercantile nractice, to constitute a pledge of the
documents of title, whatever may be the value and
(79)
effect of the right so constituted".
The real right in the goods is denendant in the case of
delivery orders on the comnletion of the security by
intimation to the custodier. It is this speciality of
intimation which is under close scrutiny in this case and in
examining the learned judgments this must be borne in mind.
Intimation is, of course, unnecessary when bills of lading
are at issue and it is only lack of intimation which nrevents
Lord Watson giving full effect to the statutory statements
. (SO)
in the lS89 and 1890 Factors Acts.
Fori
(78) (1898) 25R (H.L.) at 72.
(79) ibid at 73.
(80) these will be examined ad longum below.
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For a perceptive treatment of the theoretical
difficulties, we must turn to the Court of Session's
judgments. At first instance Lord Kyllachy underlined the
point which is crucial when we come to consider the general
apnlication of the theories put forward on anpeal, namely,
the inherent differences of the bill of lading from other
documents of title. He describes the suggestion that bills
of lading be equated to other documents of title as 'a
(81)
startling proposition'.
With this in mind, we must examine the appeal judgments.
Lord McLaren, in contrast to his opinion later given in
Hayman v. McLintock, seems to support the nossibility of pledge,
provided it is based on possession created by constructive
delivery perfected by intimation. He would construe section
three of the Factors Act with reference to the first section
defining 'pledge' as including 'any contract pledging or
(82)
giving a lien or security on goods'; the general effect
of this is left to the general law of contract; but at no
pOint does he limit the concept of pledge by reference only
(83)
to corporeal moveables.
On the construction of the concept of possession, several
of the other judgments are extremely revealing. For instance,
Lord Kinnear:/
(81) 1896 SLT 326.
(82) (1898) 24R 777.
(83) This judgment was supported by the Lord President and
Lord Adam.
- 30 -
Lord Kinnear:
"But at all events it is not by the law of Scotland
a pledge of the goods; because there can be no
comnleted pledge ,vithout transfer of possession, and
the pledgee has not been put in nossession, inasmuch
as the transfer of the warrant was not intimated to the
(84)
warehouse -keener'.
This restricted definition would not discriminate against
the nledge of bills of lading; nor would it justify the
Court in Hayman v. McLintock following Hamilton v. Western Bank.
Unfortunately this concept of possession is not discussed at
length elsewhere, the issue before the Court being a narrower
one involving the right of the holder of an unintimated
delivery order. Possession is passed over without discussion
(85)
of its nature in the judgments both of Lord Kyllachy and
(86)
Lord Kincairney, the latter specifically approving
Hamilton v. Western Bank and McKinnon v. Nanson.
(87)
Lord Stormonth-Darling points out that the suggested
construction of section three would put pledges of delivery
orders in an anomalous and privileged position compared with
other contracts involving these documents. It is largely this
which is the basis of the unwillingness to hold pledge as being
created, not the conceptual difficulties of possession and
custody. This does not extend to bills of lading. Lord Low
is/
(84) at p.780.
(85) ibid p.782. This judgment seems to favour pledge as a
conceptual possibility.
(86) ibid p.785.
(87) ibid p.789.
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is clear as to delivery:
"Neither in England nor in Scotland is a pled2:e of goods
possible w ithou t delivery". And he f'oll.owsLord Kinnear's
interpretation of what is required to constitute the possession of
(88)
the pledgee, namely, intimation.
The maj or d ifficul ty which most of the judges felt "Then
dealing ivi th the question of possession was that of conferring the
(89)
'real' right which is to a certain extent the criterion of pledge.
The judgments in this case have been treated selectively.
There is no alternative in view of their variety and verbal
distinctions. On the other hand, it is open to others to select
differentlyo The salient points, however, are these: whether or
(90)
not Inglis is binding or even persuasive authority where bills
of lading are an issue; the attitude of the court to the concept
of possession; and the meaning attributed to the term 'pledge'.
Inglis. is of course pr-Lnc Lpa lLy concerned with the requirement
of intimation to complete a security right in the light of
section 3 of the Factors Act. To this extent it is not in point;
and it is on this basis that the judgments must be evaluated. So
far as possession is concerned, there are dicta in the judgments
wh i.chgo far in recognising that constructive delivery completed
by intimation is an acceptable equivalent. If this is so, there
is a clear conflict with Hayman. And, in any event, there is
nothing in the judgments which goes further than Rami.Iton v.
Western Bank in denying the conceptual possibility of the pledge
of bills of lading.
The/
(88) ibid p.792.
(89) e.g. Lord Pearson at p.797.
(90) (1897) 24R 758; (1898) 25R (H.L.) 70.
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The broad snan of the cases thought to be of help in
a Scots law context have been discussed. Dogmatic conclusions
would be naive and could at best only be opinions of probabilities,
if not mere possibilities, of future judicial approaches. The
feasibility of the extension of the concept of pledge to
documents of title has never been satisfactorily denied. The
position still awaits clarification. Prediction, of course,
does not rely solely on judicial precedent. In this field,
especially, there are several subsidiary sources to which appeal
may be made; 'subsidiary' not in the sense of being less
valuable, but in the sense of requiring to be examined with
an awareness of their built-in limitations, limitations existing
partly because of their professed field of influence and
partly because in certain cases they merely bear to be
opinions.
Of the Institutional writers, Bell alone gives any
specific guidance in his Commentaries, a guidance which is made
even more specific under the editorial footnotes of McLaren.
Bell confirms the judicial emphasis on the possession of the
creditor under the nledge:
"The creditor who receives a pledge, holds the
possession for the debtor; but the property in the
goods remains unchanged. The creditor is said indeed in
English law to have a special property in the thing
pledged; but the meaning of this is only that he is
entitled to keep possession till the claim, in security
of which he received it, is satisfied; and that in
order to protect himself in the enjoyment of his right,
hel
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he has all the remedies by which a proprietor is
(91)
protected".
This would support what has been maintained earlier in
this discussion, namely, the refusal to accept that the
English 'special property' is a technical division of property
.(92)
in any real sense. Special property is used elsewhere in
(93)
Bell's Commentaries to describe the fiduciary duties of
the shipmaster in the course of the carriage of goods. No-one
can doubt that in this context at least, the term is merely a
convenient short-hand description. Too rigid adherence to the
independence of Scots theory in the field of pledge is,
moreover, unrealistic. Perhaps such authorities as Lickbarrow
v. Mason are relied upon rather too readily by Bell. But when
the identity of the Scots and English positions could find
(94) .
judicial support as late as 1895, it does suggest that
Bell's approach has at least some justification.
McLaren, in his footnotes to the Commentaries, mentions
that 'there may be cases, however, of sale QQm pacto ~
retrovendendo which are difficult to be distinguished from
(95) .
pledge'/
(91) Bell's Commentaries i 278 - this is when Bell is talking
about 'possession'.
(92) See supra especially pp.21, 24 and 25.
(93) Bell's Commentaries i 591.
(94) N.W. Bank supra cit.
(95) Bell's Commentaries i 2?8 footnote 5 (7th edition).
nledge' and
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(96)
refers to Stair and to the case of Latta
(97)
Co. The latter was largely decided on itsv. Park and
facts. It concerned the transfer of moveables in security and
the choice before the court was clearly that of nledge or
naction de retrovendendo. Imnortance vlas attached to the
intention of the narties as illustrated by the written
(98)
agreement and it is thought that the decision is beyond
criticism on this basiso The significance of the case is,
however, in highlighting the role of intention and in showing
that the device of security by transfer of ownership of
moveables is no sense the special domain of documents of title.
Latta should be regarded as an authority of similar
(99)
significance to the English case of Barber v. Meyerstein.
Dealing with the nroblem of the pledge of documents of
title, Bell has this to say:
"In the contract of nledge, a moveable subject, or the
title-deeds, vouchers or muniments of a jus incornorale
or debt are delivered to the creditor, in security
of debt, to remain with him, and be detained in his
possession, till the debtor shall redeem them ••••• 0
(96) Stair i.14.4.
(97) (1865) 31'15ct3,.
Inglis
(98) Ibid at P.5l1 per/LJC and P.513 per Lord Cowan.
(99) cited infra.
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it is in the law of Scotland, a real right, but not
attended with any other effect than the power to retain
the pledge, and to anply judicially for a warrant to
(100)
have it sold for the debt".
By title-deeds it is, I think, clear that Bell did not(101)
have in mind any exception to the rule in Christie v. Ruxton
or any extension of the rules above discussed. But it is
noticeable that delivery and detention in possession are
emphasised in terms which dictate a reference to Bell's
description of the transfer of a bill of lading:
"The effect of the endorsement of a bill of lading
is to vest the indorsee where he is a holder for
value and bona fide with authority to receive
(102)
the goods beyond recall or countermand".
Does this not satisfy the criterion necessary for pledge?
McLaren faces the nroblem squarely when discussing constructive
delivery, and what he has to say merits a full quotation:
"And as there seems to be no legal necessity for the
opinion that a pledge may not be constituted by
constructive delivery, so there is not only no mercantile
convenience, but much mercantile inconvenience in it, as
there always is wherever the law from mere theoretic
subtleties needlessly sets itself to deny effect to the
real intention of the contracting parties. It is
mischievous/
(100) iL19.
(101) (1862) 24D 1182.
(102) Bell's Comms. i.594.
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"mischievous to trade and commerce to say that no real
right less than dominium can be acquired or held
through an agent, because it nrevents merchants from
dealing with their goods in warehouses according to their
real intention, and forces on them a fictitious form of(103)
transaction they do not mean to enter into."
A fortiori where the bill of lading is in issue and 3rd party
intimation is unnecessary; also where the document is only in
use because, by force of circumstances, the goods themselves
are out of commission by reason of their being in transit by
sea. The practicality of McLaren's argument obviously commends
itself in any discussion of the situation arising out of the
use of the letter of credit.
As is to be expected, the legislature has committed
itself only to interstitial intervention, in the first section ~
(104)
the Bills of Lading Act 1855 and in the FRctors Act 1889 as
(105)
apnlied to Scotland by the Factors (Sc) Act 1890. Both of
these have led to leading cases and in no sense can be said
to have clarified the issues - not that the statutes were ever
so intended.
The first section of the Bills of Lading Act 1855
states:/
(103) ibid ii. 21 footnote 1 (7th Edition)
(104) 18 & 19 Vict c Ill.
(105) 53 & 54 Viet e 40.
- 37 -
states:
"Every consignee of goods named in a bill of lading
and every indorsee of a bill of lading, to whom the
"1')ropertyin the goods therein mentioned shall pass
upon or by reason of such consignment or indorsement,
shall have transferred to and vested in him all rights
of suit, and be subject to the same liabilities in
resnect of such goods as if the contract contained in
the bill of lading had been made with himself".
This legislative affirmation of the symbolic theory of the
bill of lading led to the adoption in Sewell v. Burdick of
the "technicality" of special nroperty. Whether this is
necessary for Scots lawyers is doubtful. The Act only refers
to indorsees to whom the nr-oper'ty passes. It does not
dictate that the property must pass to every indorsee. If
possession only Dasses as it would in pledge the Act does
not apply. The ownership remains with the proprietor. In
(106)
J3arberv. T.feyerstein, Lord Westbury snoke of "both the
right of pro"1')ertyand the right of possession passing by a
symbol, the bill of lading, which is at once both the symbol
of the property and the evidence of the right of possession".
This comes very close to the suggestion in the judgments of(107)
Lord Kinnear and Lord Low in Inglis v. Robertson and Baxter,
and can be expressed simply as follows: the owner of the
property does not require a badge to Drove his rights of
ownership (the owner of corporeal moveables has no such badge
if he chooses to pledge them); the possessor, on the other
hand,
(106)' (1870) LR 4 HL 317; Lord \'iestburyat P.337.
(107) supra cit at P.24 & 25.
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hand, does require some tangible evidence of his right and
this is ~rovided by either the bill of lading, or by
constructive delivery comnleted by intimation.
The Bills of Lading Act 1855 did not refer to the
~ledge of bills of lading; it is not clear that pledge was
ever envisaged. If it had been there would not have been the
problems that were ex~erienced by the judiciary in Sewell v.
Burdick. The Factors Actsdid, however, refer to both of the
basic concepts we are here discussing, possession and pledge.
As to possession, the definition in section one is of
very limited help because it is so phrased as to cover both
the nossession of goods and the documents of title to goods.
In any case it identifies custody with possession, an
unjustifiable extension for Scots law. When defining a document
of title, however, there is included "any other document
used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the
(108)
possession or control of the goods". This definition, in
every sense couched in practical terms, is not so very far
removed from the theories of Scots law. And, of course, it }s,108a)
anplied to Scotland by the Factors (Scotland) Act 1890.
It is scarcely satisfactory to conceive that such
legislation, ill-considered from the noint of view of its
application to Scots law, could fundamentally alter or
dogmatically re-state such delicate conceptual notions. 'vlhile
it is unwise to talk of legislation by inadvertence there
have been no judicial comments in Scots authorities suggesting
that/
(108) SI 1889 Acto (52 and 53 Vict. c45)
(108a) supra cit.
- 39 -
that this legislation is other than ne r-auaa i.ve, and the
judicial tendency has been to limit its anplication.
The third section is the one around which the
arguments in Inglis v. Robertson and Baxter revolved:
"A pledge of the documents of title to goods shall be
deemed to be a nledge of the goods".
In the House of Lords it was accented that this section(109)
ap1')liedonly to "Disnositions by IvIercantileAgents" ; and
in the Court of Session the judiciary were at pains to limit
its effect. Lord Kinnear, for instance, said:
"its only effect •••••• is that, as against the owner
of the goods, a pledge by an agent intrusted with
documents of title is as effectual when made by
pledging the document as it is when made by pledging(110)
the goods themselves".
There seems to be general agreement with Lord Kyllachy that
"section three neither declared nor introduced any doctrine
or rule of general law",although not necessarily with his
interpretation that the section "provided only that, for the
purposes of the Act [note this limitation] , a pledge of goods -
that is to say, a contract of pledge of goods - may be
constituted by a contract im~ledging the document of title
(Ill)
representing the goods".
Apart/
HL
(109) (1898) 25R/at 76 and 71.
(110) (1897) 24R at 779.
(Ill) ibid at 782.
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( ,
Anart from the construction of the term pledge as meaning a
contract of nledge which causes Lord Kyllachy to exnand on this
statement at a later noint, this statement would seem to go
far to recognising as viable the concept of oledge of
documents of titleo The introduction of the complication of
the tivOapparently coincident terms "pledge" and "contract of
pledge" is explained by referring to the terms of the earlier
Factors Act of 1842 where the reference in section four was
(112)
to "contracts pledging 0 ••••• documents of title". :4ord
Kyllachy makes the point that the 1889 Act was not in its
terms concerned to create a different effect. Lord Kincairney
(113)
confirms this approach.
Lord Low's distinction of the two terms is rather more
critical. According to his interpretation, there can be a
contract of pledge without possession i.eo a contract
undertaking to pledge, whereas the pledge contracted for
. (114)
requires possession. Desoite this, section three is
construed as serving the same purpose as the earlier section
four, and the distinction is justifiable particularly in the
context of a discussion of the need for the perfection of the
real right in constructive delivery by intimation. The
restricted interpretation accorded to section three is merely
to prevent the creation of an anomaly in the treatment of the
(115)
pledge of delivery orders.
The
(112) 5 & 6 Vict c 39 s4.
(113) ibid at p.785.
(114) ibid at p.792.
(115) See Lord Pearson at p.BOO.
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The very fact that the judiciary agree that section
three introduced neither new doctrines nor effected a change
in the basic concent of pledge confirms that little guidance
can be received from the legislative interventions. They
do, however, seem to presunpose the existence of the concept
for the purposes of documents of title - an assumption
certainly acceptable for English law, and nrobably also
acceptable for Scots law, at least in the light of our
interpretation of the authorities above discussed. The
doubts left unresolved after our examination of the judicial
precedents have not been dispelled by our further consideration
of Bell's Commentaries and the relevant statutes.
Our conclusions on the purely Scottish authorities
can, therefore, be no more dogmatic than before. We have
discovered no criterion on which to exclude documents of
title from pledge other than a very restricted interpretation
of possession. And it is contended that this restricted
interpretation is unrealistic and would not find support in
future judicial considerations. There may, of course, remain
many situations in which the intention of the parties - for
our hypothesis reaffirms the role of the parties' intentions -
may dictate that the relationship is not that of pledgor and
pledgee, but that arising from qualified sale. We shall have
to consider the implications of the latter, namely, paction de
retrovendendo, at a later stage against the peculiar background
of the commercial credit.
One consequence of our interpretation of the above
authorities is that the English cases have much to offer by way
ofl
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of expanding the imperfect treatment of the Scots cases. It
must not be thought that there have been no differences of
opinion in England concerning the theoretical analysis of the
relationship between the indorser and the indorsee of the
bill of lading. R.P. Colinvaux in British Shipping Laws(116)
indicates that the older view was that the proprietary rights
inevitably followed the possessory.
"On the other hand, the view nO>-I established is that
the bill of lading merely represents the goods, not
the right to them; and that possession of it is only
equivalent to a physical possession of them. The
right of property in the goods depends upon the
transaction between the narties, of which the transfer
of the bill of lading mayor may not have been an
accident. Such a transfer indicates nothing more than
a delivery of the goods would do".
This statement of principle is both accurate and helpful., - (117)
Barber v. IJIeyerstein is indicative of the older
attitude. At first instance, \villes J said that the case vlaS
(118)
not one of sale, but simply of pledge. The House of Lords,
however, held that the "whole and complete ownership of the
(119)
goods passed". This case is now commonly regarded merely
asl
(116) R.P. Colinvaux: Vol.) - British Shipping Laws:
Carriage by Sea, para.1075.
(117) (1870) LR 2 CP 38,661.
(118) ibid at 51.
(119) (1870) 1R 2 CP 326 - Lord Hatherley.
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as an example illustrating that intention may vary the legal
(120)
consequences of a transfer in security.
Similar difficulty was obviously exuerienced in(121)
Glyn v. East 8.nd\vest India Dock Comnany where in the
Court of Appeal Brett LJ said that the property was transferred
subject to
and
"an equitable rif,ht to resume the legaJ/ absolute
ownershin of the sugar on repayment of the advance,
and an equitable right that the plaintiff should not
for a specified time exercise any rights of ownership
over the sugar, but that Cottam, Horton and Co.
(the pledgors) might exercise any such rights, which
would not be inconsistent with the validity of the
(122)
plaintiff's security."
On this basis ownership is certainly not the solution
to the "confusion and uncertainty" of pledge. Indeed these
the
characteristics would appear to be/domain of ownership in
English law at least. Just what could the pledgors do in
intromitting with the property? And what would justify the
exercise of ownership rights by the latent proprietor? Would
the documents be security for further advances not made
specifically on that basis? Bramwell L.J. avoided these
uncertainties by holding that "what took place was a pledge at
(123)
common law", albeit with a right of sale in certain
circumstances/
(120) G and M p.138.
(121) 6 Q.B.D.475; 7 A.C.591.
(122) 6 Q.~.D.at 480.
(123) supra cit. at 490.
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circumstances and a right to redeem in the pledgors. He
identifies the symbolical delivery of the bill of lading with
the actual physical delivery of corporeals. The House of
Lords avoided the problem by barely stating that both the
rights of property and possession were with the bankers.(124)
It was not until 1884 that Sewell v. Burdick finally
seems to have laid down that the effect of an endorsement on
a bill of lading must be ascertained, in each case, by reference
to the intention with which it was made. In this case the (125)
ownership theory was again advanced by the Court of Apneal
with the dissent of Bowen L.J. whose judgment was later adonted
by the House of Lords - a House containing Lord Bramwell who
had earlier dissented in Gl~n's
(12 )
must be cited ad longum:
case. Bowen L.J.'s judgment
"what property passes •••..• apnears to me to be a
question of fact in each case that depends, so far
as the rights between themselves of the immediate
parties are concerned, on the express or imnlied
agreement between them".
He woul.d nrotect the "freedom of disposition" of the owner
while the goods were at sea. He continues:
"the cargo being at sea, no actual delivery of it is
possible before the ship arrives. During this neriod
of flotation and transit, the bill of lading becomes
andl
(124) (1884) 10 App Cas 74.
(125) 1884 3 Q.E.D. 159.
(126) 1884 13 Q.B.D. at 170.
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and remains the token or symbol of the goods and the
delivery and endorsement of the bill of lading is
equivalent, so far as the passing of property is
concerned, to a symbolical delivery of the goods.
Upon principle and reason, therefore, apart from
authority, one would supnose that it is to the
agreement between the original parties that we ought
as
to look if we wish to discover the effect/between
indorsed
themselves of a delivery of the/bill of lading, just
as it is to the agreement between them that we should
look to determine the legal consequences that follow
(126a)
on the corporate delivery of the goods".
To Scots lawyers, this is undoubtedly the most
convincing and succinct reasoning in favour of the pledge
theory available in an English decision. There is no question
of it being a technical treatise on the "special property"
basis rejected in Scots law. It is a theory dictated by basic
principle and reason, and it must be noted that throughout
the judgment, Lord Bowen emphasises that he is dealing with
the position as between the parties to the security transaction
and not viz-A-viz third parties.
In the latter context,the law of personal bar may well
onerate in one of its many guises. At the very least the
technicality of the theory of special property was formulated
to circumvent a difficulty created by the Bills of Lading
Act 1855, a difficulty wh.ich we have already considered and
judged to be illusory.
Where/
(126a) ibid at 171.
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Where 8e\vell's decision goes too far along the road to
(127)
"special nroperty" is where Lord Selborne says that an
indorsee who is not entitled to the benefit of the contract
(of carriage) in the first instance might become so by
obtaining the possession of the goods under the bill of lading.
This reasoning would anpear to neatly circumvent the problem
posed in Sewell. His opinion is, however, criticised in, (128)
Brandt v. Liverpool, Brazil etc. Steam Navigation Co., (129)
and the better view now appears to be, as Co1invaux says,
that the pledgee can only sue or be sued in contract if a new
contract between him and the ship-owner can be inferred, as
will generally be the case where the pledgee presents the bill
of lading and accepts the goods. In this instance personal
bar might well anplyo
It is not considered that the earlier English cases
(130)repay detailed examination. \'1emust, however, rely on
certain of the leading authorities to supplement the limited
guidance given by the Scots cases. In common with many of
the earlier Scottish decisions, Barber v. Meyerstein is guilty
of using such terms as "ownership", "pledge" and "constructive
(131)
delivery" very loosely. The Lord Chancellor refers to
the/
(127) (1884) 10 AC at 86.
(128) [1924JlKE 575.
(129) supra cit.
(130) for instance, Lickbarrow v. ~Bson 1 Sm.L.C. 753 and 5 T.R
683 which although cited by Bell and in Sewell can not be
described as a satisfactory precedent for Scots law.
(131) for the use of the term "constructive delivery" see
Lord Chelmsford at n.334. (1870) LR 4 HL 317.
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the bankers concerned as mortgagee and says:
"Now if anything could be sUDposed to be settled in
mercantile law, I aDnrehend it would be this, that
when goods are at sea the Darting with the bill of
lading ••.••• is parting with the ownershiD of the
(132)
goods".
He goes on to say, however, that when the bills we re returned
to the original mortgagor, he at once "pledged" two of them
to Meyerstein. Conclusions on the basis of this case would
clearly be frivolous.
Sewell v. Burdick, on the other hand, was a case in
which the issue of Dledge as against ownership was clearly
focussed by the word "Droperty" in the 1855 Bills of Lading
Act. The judges we re not, correctly perhaps, content merely
to construe the Dhrase "to whom the property shall pass" as
governing or qualifying the word indorsee; they regarded the
nhrase as definitive at least in one sense. The Lord
Chancellor gave the term "property" its non-legal sense:
the only property which passed was that which it was the
intention to transfer, which might or might not only be
(133) .
nossession. Both Lickbarrow and Bc'1.rberv. IvIeyerstein
were interDreted in their least favourable light as regards
the nossibility of Dledge. Desnite this, the Lord Chancellor
regarded ErIe C.J. in the latter case as supDorting the
nroposition that "the indorsement and delivery of the bill
ofl
(132)
(133)
at p.325. ibid.
(J_884)L.R. 10 A.C. at n.80.
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of lading by way of Dledge was equivalent, and not more than
equivalent, to a delivery by way of uledge of the goods
(134)
themselves".
ThBt is a very similar reasoning to that employed at
an earlier point in this discussion when it was nointed out
that the "pledgee" or holder in security of a bill would be
a favoured anomaly, whose rights of ownershin would logically
diminish when the powers of ownershin were exercised by a
taking of physical possession. As to the existence of
"special property" as a technicality of English law, the
Lord Chancellor's attitude is clear:
"The statute relates to a subject of general mercantile
law, in which not Englishmen only but foreigners also
may be, and often are, concerned •••.•• It seems to
me inconceivable that the construction of the words
"the nroperty in the goods" in such a statute can
have been intended to depend upon rulY such technical
distinction as that made in English law between legal
(135)
and equitable titles".
Lord Blackburn in Sewell accepts that the role of
intention is paramount and does, it is submitted, identify(136)
the rights of special property and possession. Brett
(137)
West India Dock Co. is, in effect,
L.J.
in Glyn v. East and
(138)
over-ruled./
(134) ibid at p.83.
(135) ibid at p.85.
(136) ibid at n.98.
(137) 6 Q.B.D. 480.
(138) ibid at p.l02.
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over-ruled. And Lord Bramwell aunoor-ts this judgment on the
ground that "the pronerty does not nass by the Lndor-semerrt ,
but by the contract in pursuance of which the indorsement is
made".
The decision in Sewell was apryroved in 3ristol and. (139)
West of England Bank v. rJIidlandRailway Co. although
Fry L.J. did expose the terminological barrier between Scots
and English law in the use of the wor-d nronerty:
"they were the pledgees of the bill of lading; they
(140)
had the pronerty in the goods".
This apparent contradiction in terms is only troublesome if
property used in an extra-legal sense is equated to ownershin
in the technical Scottish sense.
(141)
Sewell also found supnort in Brandt's case although
some of the reasoning of the Lord Chancellor was questioned;
at least some of the apparent implications of that reasoning
were. And in Official Assignee of Nadras v. Hercantile Bank(142)
of India the nrivileged nosition of bills of lading was" (143)
reaffirmed by the Privy Council. The attitude taken was
that "the principle that goods might be pledged by pledging
the documents of title had been fully established by the Act(143)
of 1844".
(139)
(140) ibid at p.662.
(141) suura cit.
(142) [1935] A.C.53
(143) ibid at 62.
(144) f.i922J2 Ch 211 at 216 c.f. Bell's Comms supra cit.
where the remedy of sale is stated to exist onlyon Sheriff's warrant.
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There are, of course,differences between the English
(144)
and Scots lawsof pledge. In re David Allester Ltd.,
Astbury J. stated that "as pledgee the bank had a right to
realise the goods in question from time to time". Assuming,
however, that there is a general identity of purpose in the
two systems, and an agreement of the general concents involved,
we must now turn to their narticular relevance to documents
offered in security under the commercial credit transaction.
It is as well once more to reiterate the framework in which
the security arises and to emphasise the points about it
which appear, at least at first Bight, to be specially
significant.
The security-holder is the bank with whom the eventual
purchaser of the goods has arranged the credit facilities -
in normal parlance the bank would be the pledgee and the
purchaser the pledgor. The contract between the parties is
contained in the letter of credit and there are normally
specific terms governing the nature of the bank's security
and the powers of the bank as security-holder. Among these
is commonly the right of sale. The bank is also indemnified
against liabilities incurred as security-holder.
Delivery of the subjects of the pledge is effected by
the seller of the subjects either directly or by means of an
intermediary bank. The eventual purchaser does not handle the
documents prior to the creation of the pledge; and the
security/
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normally (145)
security is/created by means of an irrevocable contract
so that once the credit is instructed the security is
inevitable provided the bank complies with its instructions.
the
The security is the basis of/whole credit transaction, and
while the bank does not profess to deal in the goods which it
accents as security, it does insist on the right to realise
them in the event of not receiving satisfaction of the advance
normally made by them. In many cases the purchaser can not
satisfy the repayment of the advance before the value of the
goods is realised by re-sale or by incorporation in saleable
products. For this reason, the realisation must be effected
(146)
without nrejudice to the bank's security and to this end
letters of trust and hypothecation are employed. Whether
these are in any real sense effective or necessary will form
the subject of a later discussion. Of vital importance in any
consideration of the theoretical problems is the admission
that the credit facility could not exist without an effective
security.
There is, of course, nothing to prevent the credit
instructions being given verbally. This is unusual and would
be manifestly unwise. One subsidiary benefit of this, however,
(147)
is that the intentions of the parties are clear. Moreover,
the/
(145) at least in the normal case.
(146) the economic background is explained at length in Davis
and Gutteridge and Magrah in their introductory chapters.
(147) on one view of the authorities above discussed this is
vital.
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the establishment of the credit is notified to the seller and
he can be in no doubt as to the role of the bank in the
transaction.
Within these general outlines there are many variations,
partly because the parties are free to dictate their own
terms and partly because business transactions and relationships
are seldom as simple as our basic model would suggest. Yet
another difficulty is in the form of the documents used. The
bills of lading may be indorsed in blank or in name of one or
other of the parties to the transaction. While blank
indorsement is the usual custom and has most frequently come
before the courts, it is in no way inevitable. In the
commercial credit transaction there can be no question of the
bill of lading being indorsed in the seller's name or in the
name of an agent appointed by him. This common device of
the c.i.f. contract would completely negate the whole purpose
of the credit facility. Apart from this, however, the bill
could be indorsed to the various holders of the documents
in order of their holding; it could also be indorsed in the
name of the eventual purchaser; but normally, as we have
said and as we have seen in the cases so far discussed, the
bill is indorsed in blank.
Gutteridge and Magrah consider the situation where the
(148)
bills are in favour of the eventual purchaser; in such
cases, they say, "the banker clearly has no enforceable nledge."
The term "enforceable" seems in this context merely to indicate
that!
(148) at p.139.
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that there is no right of sale. In Scots law a pledge is
only enforceable in this sense on a warrant by the Sheriff.
Nevertheless, where the bill is in the purchaser's name, the
bank would appear only to have the power to detain the goods,
a right mainly of nuisance value. The bank in this situation
could prevent its customer obtaining the release of the goods;
it could not in any real sense be said to have the requisite
control or possession essential for pledge. The intention of
the parties in this situation would partly be dependant on
the facts and partly on the construction to be put on the
specific indorsement of the bill of lading. In so far as the
latter is concerned there would seem to be nothing to contradict
the assumption of deposit only.
Other situations do not offer such clear solutions;
nor is it suggested that there is one solution of uniform
application. Scrutton L.J. in Rosenberg v. International
Banking Corporation casts doubt on the nature or source of
the pledge:
"v/hether you talk about it as an express pledge, or
whether, as Lord Oampbell does, you talk about it as
an implied pledge, in my view such a transaction gives
(149~
bank to secure the amount which they have advanced".(150)
Davis
an independent right, or right of property, to the
adopts the assumntion of implied pledge, the
implication existing "by the very fact of -paying against
documents" •
While/
(149) (1923) 14 Ll.LR 344 at 347.
(150) supra cit at p.188.
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While the pledge is often specified in the letter of
credit, it would seem an unjustifiable extension to talk of an
implied pledge unless the authority of the pledgor, in all
cases the eventual purchaser, can be supported by the
circumstances. The relevant circumstances which might convey
that authority of pledge has been given are the creation of
the credit facility in the first place and the notification
of the arrangements for presentation of the various documents
of the credit given to the seller of the goods. Although
there is no specific decision on the implication of pledge
arising from these circumstances, its existence is, it is
submitted, more than possible.
The bank obtains the documents of title in terms of its
undertaking to do so on satisfactory tender of the documents
in terms of the credit. There are thus two conditions
precedent to the bank's security: the instructions in the
credit and the satisfaction of its terms, the former given
by the purchaser and the latter provided by the seller or by
the seller by way of an intermediary. It is thought that it
is the former which is the causa causans of the security and
that there is an authority given to the seller to provide
the possessory rights essen~ial to the security of pledge. In
other words, the pledgor is the purchaser, the seller only
being his agent for the purnoses of providing the essential
real right in pursuance of their contract.
More difficult is the question "what is pledged?"
This/
- 55 -
This question was posed by Devlin J. in Chao and Others v.(151)
British Traders and Shippers Ltd., when discussing
possible prejudice to the right of the purchaser to reject
the goods as disconform to contract. His solution is that
the pledgor is dealing only with a conditional right in the(152)
goods. Atkin L.J. in Hardy and Co. v. Hillerns and Fowler
had put forward two possible views:
"One was that, notwithstanding that the documents had
been tendered, the property in the goods did not
pass until the goods had been examined or until an
opportunity for examination had been given. The other
was that it passed but only conditionally, at the time
when the documents were tendered, and that it could
be re-vested if the buyer properly rejected the
(153)
goods."
Devlin J.ts objections to the former were the lack of
authority and the complications which would follow. The
example chosen to illustrate the latter is unfortunate:
"If the property in the goods has not passed to him,
(153a)
how can the buyer pledge?"
But this is exactly what happens where the commercial credit
is used to finance the transaction. Prior to the creation of
the pledge there can by the very nature of things be no title
in the purchaser.
Devlin J. tsi
(151) [1954] 1 All E R 779.
(152) [1923J 2 KB 490.
(153) [1954] I All E R at p.795.
(153a) ibid at p.796.
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Devlin J.'s solution is as follows:
"I think the true view is that, when the documents
of title are given to the buyer, he obtains the
property in the goods, subject to the condition that
they re-vest if on examination he finds them not in
(154)
accordance with the contract".
In short, where the buyer pledges the goods or the documents..of title he creates in the pledgee !laspecial property in a
"conditional property".
(155)
As Davis correctly points out, however, the bank's
security, be it express or imnlied, is created when it pays
against tender of the documents. Moreover, it is created by
the hand of the seller with, presumably, full knowledge of the
security riehts of the bank. If the bank merely has possession,
as we have suggested above, the property or ownership does not
pass until the documents are passed to the eventual purchaser.
The bank is not the purchaser's agent for the purposes of
receiving delivery of the goods in terms of section 35 of the
(156)
Sale of Goods Act 189). It may be questioned, therefore,
whether Atkin L.J.'s first alternative should be rejected out
of hand. It would certainly fit with the facts of the letter
of credit situation. Any other would tend to make the credit
transaction an exceution and a theoretical anomaly.
The alternative which Devlin J. urefers (and there can
be no question of one view being right and one wrong in
absolute terms) would tend to support the theory that
ownership/
(154)
(155)
(156)
[1954) 1 All E It at 796Journal of Institute of Bankers
at p.18S. He also has the support of/(1954) Vol.75 p.1S3.
56 & 57 Vict c 71.
- 57 -
ownership passes at each stage of the credit transaction.
This would be a theoretical reconciliation at the price of
disregarding the intention of the parties. The only certainty
in the situation, one whf.ch would be agreed by nroponents of
actually derives from the seller, acting either as
principal or as the buyer's agent, if the seller by
both theories, is that the holding of the bank is not "an act
which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller" in
terms of s.35 of the 1893 Act.
The dictum of Devlin J. has been considered both by
Gutteridge and Magrah and Professor Bennett Niller in his
Casebook on Commercial Credits, although neither profess to
have settled the point. Gutteridge and I'lagrahcomment:
"Seeing that under an irrevocable credit, the nledge
so pledging could destroy the buyer's right to reject,
the who Le purpose of documentary credits would be
lost, at any rate so far as the buyer is concerned,
because he could rarely afford to dispense with his
(157)
right to reject".
They emphasise two points of particular interest:
the role of the seller and the viability of the credit system.
In support of their argument that the seller is either a
principal or the buyer's agent for the purposes of creating the
security, they cite Lord Wright in Ross T. Smyth and Co. Ltd.
(158)
v. T.D. Bailey Son and Co.
"The/
(157)
(158)
p.139 and 140.
[1940] 3 All E R at 68.
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"The whole system of commercial credits depends on the
seller's ability to give a charge on the goods and
the Dolicies of insurance".
This must be construed in the limited sense which we have
indicated above, that the seller provides the possession
necessary as the real right to complete the security contracted
for between the purchaser and the bank. It is agency in the
sense that the seller is directed how to make delivery by the
instrument of commerce and does not resolve the
nurchaser.
The practical point is correctly treated by Professor
Miller:
"The point made is cogent but its cogency is in
relation to the usefulness of the credit as an
pernlexities of the legal theory surrounding the(159)
credit II.
(160)
McCardie J. in Diamond Alkali Export Corporation v. Bourgeois I
reinforced this vhen he admitted that his decision might be
disturbing to business men but that he could not be dictated
to by views of convenience.
One of the few consolations in dealing with this topic
of law in which we have been unable to be dogmatic in our
conclusions is that the suggested approach avoids this
conflict of theory and practice.
(159) Casebook: n.103.
(160) [1921) 3 K.B. 443 at 455.
Chapter II.
THE REALISATION m' THE BANKER IS SECURITY
UNDER THE LETTER OF CREDIT
The banker's security under the letter of credit and the
realisation of that security have to a certain extent been
treated as separate topics by the academic writers who have
studied this field of law. Nor is this merely a concession by
them to chronological order. For English writers, the
realisation of the security involves the introduction of
further concepts, of further documents such as letters of
hypothecation, lien and trust. These are variously defined by
reference to English technical terms such as bailment, custody
and equitable charge. The uicture drawn in this way is, not
surprisingly, most unsatisfactory so far as Scots law is
concerned.
The approach of the present writer has accepted that the
realisation of the security must be examined separately and
in detail. It will be suggested, however, on the basis of
arguments to fOllow, that the security and the realisation
thereof are merely parts of a theoretical and logical whole
and that any concession to chronology is merely that, not an
admission of concepts and terms which are not accepted in
Scots law.
If the Scottish position is to be regarded as following
a/
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a logical unity, the English authorities offer a wide selection
of technical weapons to deal with the difficulty that is
encountered. This difficulty is felt to be inherent in the
fact that, commercially, realisation can only expediently be
accomnlished by allowing the customer to sell the goods for
the highest price obtainable on the open market. To do this,
the customer must clearly have the documents of title. And
it is at this point that the possible prejudice to the banker's
position arises and for this purpose that the document variously
known as the "letter of hypothecation", "letter of trust",
''letter of lien" or "trust receipt" has evolved.
Whether this difficulty is real or imagined is, of
course, crucial in any discussion of the suggested solution and
(1)
this will be the subject of later discussion. It may be that
the only conclusion possible is that not only the security of
the banker but his means of realising it exist in terms of the
letter of credit, and that further documents are superfluous.
The terms used must, however, be discussed in outline
at least, and there are available several helpful definitions.
It must be pointed out that letters of trust, lien and
hypothec are to some extent used interchangeably, by academics
and courts alike, and that rigid differentiation may lead to
(2)
artificial difficulties. "Hypothecation" is defined by
Gloag and Irvine as
"a real right in security, in favour of a creditor,
over/
(1) See p.25 hereof and following nages.
(2) For a discussion of this term and its particular "meaning"
for Scots law, T.E. Smith's: A Short Commentary on the Law
of Scotland at p.472 et seq.
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over subjects which are allowed to remain in the
(3)
-possession of the debtor".
When used in the special context of banking transactions, it
has been suggested that
the
"hy-pothecation may, so far as/goods are concerned,
be regarded as a conversion of the -possession of the
owner of goods into that of a bailee from the pledgee,
or as an equitable agreement by the owner to create a
(4)
pledge at a future date".
(5)
In contra-distinction to hypothec, a lien describes a
right of retention of the possession of subjects, a right which,
may be limited by reference to asingle contract or which may
(
apply within a course of dealing to a right to retain for a
balance outstanding. Lien, then, is based on possession,
hypothec being independent of and unrelated to possession.
Both of these concepts are recognised by Scots authorities in
particular fields; and it may well be that letters of
hypothecation and lien are appropriate shorthand descriptions
of mercantile devices. The letter of trust is, however,
defined exclusively by reference to its use:
"The object of the letter of trust is to enable the
banker as pledgee of the bill of lading to redeliver
it to the buyer without forfeiting his rights as
pledgee by parting with possession ...... The rights
enjoyed by a banker •••••• are clearly of an
equitable/
(3) p.406.
(4) G & M p.141.
(5) loosely used by Scrutton L.J. in Rosenberg (1923)14Le L R
344 at 347.
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(6)
equitable character".
"The relationship appears to be partly bailment, partly
(7)
agency, and -partly trust".
(8)
And for bailment, we must refer to English authority:
"the delivery of the possession of goods on a condition,
express or implied, that they shall be returned to the
bailor or dealt viith according to his directions as
soon as the purpose for which they were bailed is ended(9)
There are many common everyday transactions of bailmen~'-
"for mere custody, for loan, for hire, for -pledge, for(10)
carriage";
These few definitions illustrate the difficulties which
face a Scots lawyer in dealing with this field of law. It is
necessary to examine how the concepts have been applied before
their authority can be estimated.
Early judicial statements are of doubtful relevance in
view of their concern with particular English statutory
provisions. For example, in A}ers and Others v. The South
. (11-
Australian Banking Company, a Privy Council decision, the
respondents relied on an agreement for "preferential lien", an
artificial device supported by an Australian statute of 1855;
the/
(6)
(7)
(8)
G & M p.142-3.
Davis ]).190. ~enerally
See also Pollock and Wright: Possession p.163 and/Paton:
Bailment (1952).
(9)
(10)
(11)
Steven's Merc. Law 14th Ed. p.444.
Examples given in Anson's Law of Contractfl18th Ed. at p.lll
(1871) LR 3 P.C.548.
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the issues were s~ecial and the case is of interest only for
its illustration of the fact that special security devices may
be justified, and indeed supported by statute, in particular
economic situations. The following year, the case of
(12)
in re Slee e.p. North Western Bank was decided and the
court were faced with many of the terms which now call for
comment: hypothecation, equitable charge, pledge and reputed
ownership. A warehousekeeper had "nledged" certain goods with
the bank in terms of a "letter of hypothecation", no possession
(JK > thereof ~) warrants therefor being granted by the warehousekeeper,
although delivery of the latter was promised. The bank obtained
possession through an employee of the warehousekeeper only after
the latter had absconded and the question arose as to whether
or not they had acquired a good security title.
Sir James Bacon C.J. held that they had, differing only
from the judge at first instance as regards the nature of the
warehousekeeper's rights. Provided that the property was the
warehousekeeper's to deal with, the learned judge held that
(13)
the "hypothecation might operate as an equitable charge".
The nature of the bank's holding is not entirely clear. The
bank are spoken of as "true owners" and later:
"The mode in which the advance was made was in the
ordinary course of trade, the engagements entered into
by the bankrupt were complete, and the goods from that
time were charged with the loan of, and became the
property/
(12) (1872) LR 15 Eq.69. See also Regina V. Townshend (1884)
Cox CC 466 referring to this decision and using the term
"hypothecation note".
(13) ibid p.73.
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(14)
pronerty of, the bankers".
(15)
In Lutscher v. The Comntoir D' Escompte de Paris the
right of the security-holder was again discussed; the facts
can very shortly be given in the words of Cockburn C.J:
"there was a specific engagement between the plaintiff
and the consignor that the goods should be bought with
money advanced by the plaintiff and that the bill of
lading should be forwarded to the plaintiff as security
(16)
for his advance".
When bankruntcy supervened the court were asked to enforce the
agreement by obtaining the release of the goods to the plaintiffs
It was held that there was a clear equitable right in the
plaintiffs which would be protected by a court of equity
particularly where third party interests did not intervene.
Third party rights did call for protection, however, in
(17)
the later case of Joseph v. Lyons in 1884. Thi~ case
turned partly on the special position in English law of
"chattels after-acquired (i.e. after an agreement concerning
them had been made between mortgagor and mortgagee) to be sold
in the course of trade" and much of the legal debate concerns
differences between legal and equitable remedies. A jeweller
assigned stock to be acquired to the plaintiff with a proviso
for redemntion; in breach of this agreement, the stock was
thereafter pledged to the defendant. There was an attem~t to
argue/
(14) ibid
(15) (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 709.
(16) ibid at 712.
(17) (1884) LR 15 QB 280.
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argue that the jeweller was acting as a factor for the
mortgagee but Lindley L.J., supported by the court, said:
"how can a mortgagor of chattels to be sold in the (18)
course of a trade be the agent of the mortgagee?"
It is at this point that the English court drew the line,
rather later than a Scottish court would, between "only an(19)
interest and not the property in the goods" passing. The
Factors Acts were held not to apply on the grounds that the
jeweller was selling on his own account in order to repay his
debt; "the Factors Acts relate to one who sells for a principal!'
Similarly, of course, this argument can be put forward as
regards the position of the banker in a commercial credit
transaction; at what point does the banker become in any real
sense the princi~al? What if the goods are never in fact
delivered to him in terms of the documents of title?
Few of these authorities examine closely the nature of
the security documents with which they deal. Contrasting with
(20)
in re Slee e.p. North Western Bank are the discussions of
the concepts of "property" and "control" contained in the case
(21)
of re Hamilton, Young and Co. e.pe Carter. Letters of lien
were the instruments at issue and the practice regarding them
\22)
was described in detail by Vaughan Williams L.J. The letter
of lien narrated that goods were "held on account and under
lien" for the security-holder with an undertaking that indorsed
bills/
(18) ibid p.282.
(19) ibid p.284.
(20) (1872) LR 15 Eq.69.
(21) [1905J 2KB 772.
(22) ibid 784.
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bills of lading would be delivered to the security-holder on
shipment of the goods. Vaughan Williams L.J. distinguished
the management and control of the borrower from the sole right
of the bank who , until they received bills of lading, had only
a right in equity to restrain the borrower from doing anything
inconsistent with the security. In apparent contradiction to
this statement the court held that the letters of lien were
"documents used in the ordinary course of business as proof
of the possession or control of the goods". It is to be noted
that the possession referred to is closely identified with
control and the judgment of Vaughan Williams L.J. leaves little
doubt that in practice the "lien-holderfl did not have practical
control. The use of the word "lien" is also unfortunate in
that there is no suggestion of actual possession either of the
goods or bills of lading by the security-holder.
The limitations of the equitable charge or mortgage of
goods without possession thereof are illustrated in Ladenburg
(23)
and Co. v. Goodwin. Ferreira and Co. Ltd. where sellers of
goods attempted to give their bankers security rights over
goods sold to South American customers. Pickford J.'s decision,
which was not appealed, is attractive in its simplicity and
clarity, although the point at issue eventually turned yet
again on the construction of an English statute:
"In the circumstances of this case it :is difficult to
see how any valid charge or mortgage on the goods
could/
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could have been given to the plaintiffs, for there
was no interest in the goods remaining in the defendant
company •.•.Therefore the only thing remaining which
(25)
When this judgment was referred to in re David Allester, it
could be the subject of hypothecation was the nroceeds
(24)
of the goods".
was distinguished on the basis that "the bank had no pledge or
other right in the goods at all before the transaction in
question". And it is in the judgment of Astbury J, a judgment
dealing principally with technicalities of English statutes,
that we find one of the clearest expositions on the rights of
the bank, as security-holder, to realise its security:
"The pledge rights of the bank were complete on the
deposit of the bills of lading and other documents of
title. These letters of trust are mere records of trust
authorities given by the bank and accented by the
company stating the terms on which the pledgors were
authorised to realise the goods on the pled~.e' s behalf.
The bank's pledge and its rights as nledgee do not
arise under these documents at all, but under the
(26)
original pledge".
The justification for this is clearly business
convenience supported by such precedents as
North/
e.p.
(27)
Hubbard and
(24) ibid p.280.
(25) [1922] 2 Ch 211 at 218.
(26) ibid p.2l6.
(27) (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 690.
- 10 -
(28)
North Western Bank v. Poynter. As to the letters of trust
which had been drawn un to cover the realisation, they were
"mere records of authorities given to the pledgors to act as
(29)
trustee agents for sale on behalf of the bank".
Very similar authority, though couched in different terms,
is offered by the Privy Council decision in Official Assignee of
(30)
1-1adrasv. Mercantile Bank of India. The main question at
issue was that of the "pledge" of documents in security, the
topic which was dealt with in detail in the earlier discussion
on this point. After detailed examination of this, however, the
Privy Council, in the judgment delivered by Lord Wright, disposed
of the contention that the respondents had parted with their
pledge on these goods by giving back possession of the railway
receipts to the insolvents. It was held that this contention
was based on a misuse of the word "possession". "The respondents
did not part with the possession of the goods or the receipts
in the juridical sense of that word; they merely narted with
the custody, by entrusting the receipts to the insolvents as
their agents or mandatories for the special purpose of convenient
(31)
dealing with the goods". This, it was said, was in the
usual course of business. Obiter, in as much as the above
conclusions were sufficient to dispose of the appeal, the letter
of.hypothecation was defined in terms substantially the same as
those/
(28) supra cit.
(29) [1922] 2 Ch at 217
(30) 1].935J AC 53.
(31) ibid p.63-64.
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those of Astbury J. in David Allester's case. The Privy Council,
however, could not resist the further comment that the "letter
of hypothecation constitutes a good equitable charge".
"Equitable charge" or "equitable assignment" was the
(32)
subject of the earlier case of Palmer v. Carey, also a
decision of the Privy Council; in contrast to the attractively
simple explanations quoted above, this case highlights the
subtleties of the technical term "equitable charge" and its
relative unsuitability for adoption into Scots law. The
principle approved and discussed was laid down by Lord Truro in
. . (33)
Rodick v. Gandell ._ as follows:
"an agreement between a debtor and a creditor that the
debt owing shall be paid out of a specific fund coming
to the debtor, or an order given by a debtor to his
creditor upon a person owing money or holding funds
belonging to the giver of the order, directing such
person to pay such funds to the creditor, will create
a valid equitable charge upon such fund, in other words,
will operate as an equitable assignment of the debts or
fund to which the order refers".
The two elements necessary are the agreement and the fact that
an obligation has been imposed in favour of the creditor to pay
the debt out of the fund received from the sale of the goods.
It was on the latter that the case turned, and the words of the
Chief Justice, endorsed by the Privy Council, show the
importance/
(32) U926] AC 703.
(33) 1 D.M. and G. 763, 777 and 778.
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importance which is attached to the words of the agreement:
"The words of the agreement on which the appellant relies
are apt to express a contract by the bankrupt to apply
the money in the purchase of goods, to sell those goods,
and to nay the proceeds of the sale into the appellant's
bank account, but I can see nothing in them to indicate
that the intention was to assign any interest in goods
purchased by the bankrupt or to create either a charge
over or a trust of such goods in favour of the
appellant".
Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bank of America National Trust and
(5)
Savings Association came before the courts in 1937 and
provided a discussion of the position of the pledgor who is
given possession in order to effect a sale on behalf of the
pledgee. The bank had given banking accommodation to a company
Strauss and Co. Ltd. in exchange for the security of certain
bills of lading and invoices, the terms of the transaction being
set out in a letter of hypothecation and two agreements. The
bank surrendered the goods to Strauss and Co. to enable them to
sell the goods, this being a course of business which the two
parties had followed for a number of years. On this occasion,
however, Strauss and Co. pledged the documents with the defenda~
who were acting in completely good faith. In the action by the
plaintiffs for recovery of the documents, the decision turned on
an application of the Factors Acts and on the construction of
the terms "possession" and "ownership". At first instance,
Porter J./
(34) [1926] AC.707.
(35) [1937J 2 KE 631 and [19 381 2 KE 147.
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Porter J. held that the plaintiffs could not succeed as they
were owners of the goods and Strauss and Co. were their
mercantile agents for the purpose of sale: "Looking at their
mandate, namely, the trust receipts, I think they were employed
(36)
as agents"; the learned judge referred to such cases as
North Western Bank, in re David Allester and the Official
(37)
Assignee of IVJadras. On appeal the result was upheld, although
Sir Wilfrid Greene M.R. found it difficult to be as dogmatic as
Porter J. when talking about the respective ownership and
possessory rights of Strauss and Co. and the bank:
"It seems to me that, where the right of ownershin has
become divided among two or more persons in such a way
"that the acts which the section (s.2(1) Factors Act
save
1889) is contemplating could never be authorised/by both
or all of them, these persons together constitute the
(38)
owner" •
The situation in which a third party is asked to sell
should be identified with that where the merchant himself
re-takes .possession. The learned judge stated also his
alternative ratio as being that the bank were given, by virtue
of the contract, all the rights of ownership over the goods,
in which case Strauss and Co. were in possession with the
consent/
(36) g937] 2 KB at 639.
(37) [1938J 2 KB 147.
(38) ibid at 162. See also pp.163 and 164.
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(39)
consent of the owners.
It was contended in argument before the court that the
trust receint did not create an agency relationship but merely
released the general pronerty of Strauss and Co. from the bank's
pledge. This emphasis on the general property of the pledgor
was held to be misconceived in as much as Strauss and Co. were
only given re-possession in terms of and on the faith of the
(40)
trust receipt. Their capacity to sell was, it was suggested,
completely expressed as that of a "trust agent", and although
this would seem to contradict the learned judge's earlier
treatment of the ownership question, it is clear that the
trust agency was really no more than a mercantile agency in the
sense of the Factors Acts. Too much must not be read into the
continued use of the word "trust" in discussing the position
of the merchant, and it may be that it only confuses the
position.
The practical point that the result of the case might
discourage security-holders from releasing documents of title
to the original pledgors was nut into persnective by Lord
Justice r1acKinnon:
"The truth i8 that almost every aspect of commercial
dealing is not proof against the possible result of the
frauds, that a lawyer, thinking of the possibilities of
such things, might suppose to be so easy, but which in
business in fact occur so rarely •.•••• I have no doubt
that this very convenient business method will continue;
and can do so because the whole basis of business rests
upon/
(39) ibid p.164.
(40) ibid u.165.
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upon honesty and good faith, and it is very rarely
(41)
that dishonesty or bad faith undermines it".
(42)
Mercantile Bank of India v. Central Eank of India
concerned a similar mercantile practice, whereby railvmy
receipts were pledged as security for a loan with a bank. The
bank on this occasion nassed the receipts to their own
warehouse-keeper who in turn released them to the pledgors
for the specific purpose of uplifting the goods and storing
them in the bank's warehouse. The merchants fraudulently
pledged the documents with another bank with whom they had
been in the habit of dealing and the question arose as to the
right of the first bank in the goods. In distinction to
Lloyds Bank, the Privy Council held that the first bank had
dealt with "their own property" in the usual course of
business and that there were no grounds on which they could
be estopped from asserting their title. The very clear
principle on which the decision was based was that estoppel
or personal bar existed only where there was some related duty.
Of more interest to the present discussion, however, was the
strict construction applied to the passing of the receipts
from bank to warehouse-keeper to pledgor, and the clear
indication that the special provisions of the Factors Acts
will materially alter the respective positions of the parties.
The facts of this case were of course unusual and in most
instances there will be no doubt that the Acts apply. It has
been/
(41) 11-9381 2 KB at l6'6.
(42) ~938] AC 287.
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been clearly held, as we have seen, that a pledgor can for the
purpose of a pledgee realising his security be considered to
be a mercantile agent.
We have now examined most of the English authorities
which tend to throw some light on the theoretical relationship
between the pledgor and the security-holder wishing to realise
his security and certain conclusions can be drawn. There has
been no attempt to~haustively investigate the meaning of
the various technical terms used by the English courts. Some
of them have been defined in passing. But many of them are so
closely related to the individual facts of the case as to defy
accurate definition, and even such terms as "equitable charge"
and Uassignment", defined by Lord Truro above, have caused
difficulties in comnaratively recent cases, as, for example, in
(43)
in re Kent and Sussex Sawmills Ltd. where the registration
of a charge on the book debts of a company was at issue.(44) .
In re David Allester also illustrated the fact that technical
statutory requirements can place a strain on the definition of
terms which might otherwise be used quite loosely. And on
occasions the English courts have been unable to avoid confusing
the technical with the straight-forward e.g. in Official
Assignee of Madras. Although this has not led to
inconsistency of decision, it makes the rationalisation of the
various authorities extremely difficult and the over-riding
nrinciples/
(43) (1946] 2 All ER 638.
(44) supra cit.
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nrinciples rather obscure. It is also the writer's opinion
that the too-ready recourse to the technical term has concealed
the substantial similarity of the English and the Scots
anproaches. And this is the theme which it is now intended to
develop and justify at some length.
As we have seen, many of the technicalities introduced
into English law to deal with the realisation of the security
are superfluous. Others, such as lien and hypothecation, are
not strangers to Scots law though their application may be
somewhat restricted. Hypothecation is an exception to the
general rule that a security over moveables can only be
maintained by a security-holder so long as possession or control
is retained. It is generally true to say that only a security
perfected by the passing of possession or ownership will convey
the right to realise the security subjects if such becomes
necessary, but the lesser right of control, such as the control
of title-deeds or of documents falling short of documents of
title, may have a substantial nuisance value to the "security~
holder.
Hypothecation as a doctrine has always been strictly
construed by Scots law. Stair's justification of this is well-
known: so "that commerce may be the more sure, and everyone
(45)
may more easily know his condition with whom he contracts";
and, statutory exceptions such as floating charges and hire
purchase notwithstanding, this has remained the foundation of
the/
(45) Institutions I.14.
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the Scots law of securities. Hypothecs are of two types:
tacit, or legal, and conventional. !lAtacit hypothec is a
(46)
species of pledge," said Erskine, "constituted without
paction, in which the debtor retains the possession of the
subject impignorated". It must be noted in passing that
pledge is misused in this context in that the creation of
pledge, strictly speaking, is completely dependant on possession.
It is preferable to consider hypothecs as anomalies in modern
law justified by the special situations in which they operate.
There are three classes who are thought to merit this
(46a)
protection: law agents, landlords and superiors; and
there is a small group of maritime hypothecs protecting those
with rights against ships. Conventional hypothecs are
completely restricted to the maritime securities of bonds of(47)
bottomry and respondentia. And although the commercial
credit operates most frequently in a framework of bills of
lading and marine transport it is well-settled that no new
hypothecs can be created.
If, therefore, the term "letter of hypothecation" is to be
used to describe a document which is undoubtedly in common use
by banks in obtaining a realisation of their security, or in
providing the borrower with the means by which he can realise
"his" goods and repay the bank, it is only in the sense that
the "security-holder" sacrifices the possession normally
essential outwith the narrow ranges of hypothec. In
Official/
(46)
(46a)
(47)
Unfortunately only in one very special case!
See Gloag and Irvine p.406 et seq. and the Institutional
authorities there referred to.
3.1.34.
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Official Assignee of Hadras the Privy Council stated:
"the letter of hypothecation creates a good equitable(48)
charge" •
Against this we must weigh the statement of Gloag and Irvine
\that "the doctrine of equitable mortgage is unknown to the law(48a)
of Scotland" and the authorities cited by those learned
writers. Scots law insists on a comnleted transfer or assignation,
and the final test of a security, the bankruptcy of the borrower,
illustrates the need for some formal conveyance and intimation.
The contrasting approaches of Scots and English law are
illustrated in their treatment of the delivery of share
certificates and policies of assurance. In England if there is a
transfer of these documents accompanied by an intention that they(49)
should serve as security, there is created an equitable mortgage.
Scots law insists on a formal assignation.
(50)
In Robertson v. The British Linen Co., a company
limited by guarantee and empowered to create a guarantee fund was
apparently authorised (in terms of its memorandum and articles of
association) and did in fact attempt to pass letters of guarantee
from subscribers to the fund to the bank by way of security for an
advance; the question then arose on the voluntary liquidation of
the company as to whether or not the security was effective. Both
Hume and Bell were cited in the judgment of the Lord
(51)
Ordinary, Stormonth Darling, and apart from the
decision/
(48)
(48a.)
(49)
(50)
(51)
l1935) AC 53 at
supra cit at p.520.
See Soci6te Generale de Paris y. Walker(1885) 11 AC 20.
(1891) 18 R 229.
ibid at 1232.
- 20 -
decision on the powers of the company, it was held that the
nretended lien or hynothecation was ineffective. The comnany's
constitution could not validate a security which was bad at
common law. While the facts of the case were very special,
this was a clear indorsement of the general principles of Scots
Law that possession is an integral part of a nroper security
and that in the normal case delivery of documents can not be
(52)
treated as equivalent thereto. Christie v. Ruxton, already
discussed, was also referred to with approval.
We must now turn to the decision which, for Scots law,
should have answered many of the questions which long remained
unsolved.
In North Western Bank v. Poynter Son and Macdonald, a
case whose importance for Scots law has already been considered
in another context, the terms of the security agreement referred
(53)
to the nature of the security as nledge and continued:
"It is distinctly agreed that we are to have immediate
and absolute power of sale, and under that nower we
authorise and emnower you to enter into contracts for
the sale of the merchandise on our behalf in the
ordinary course of business, and we expressly direct
you to pay to us from time to time the proceeds of all
such sales immediately and specifically as received by
you to be applied toward payment of the said advance,
interest, commission, and all charges".
In the normal course of business the bills of lading
were thereafter re-delivered to the pledgor in terms of a
letter/
(52) (1862J 24 D 1182.
(53) ~895] AC at p.57.
- 21 -
letter which narrated:
"we transfer to you as trustees for us the bill of
lading •••••• and we further authorise and empower you
to enter into contracts for the sale of merchandise
(54)
on our behalf".
The interpretation of "trustees" selling for princinals
was supported by Counsel for the apuellants, the reasoning
going so far as to argue that trust money from the sale could
not be arrested to found jurisdiction. The case, as has been
pointed out, was professedly decided on Scots law. And the
House of Lords showed no disinclination to take the agreement
on its face value. It will be noted that the letter
accompanying the transference from bank to borrower of the bill
of lading was in very similar terms to those of the pledge
agreement itself. The letter was not a "letter of hypothecation'" ,
in a formal sense; it did not profess to be a security document
as such, although it was in similar terms to those do.cuments
which have been the subject of the English cases discussed.
As to the position in English law the Lord Chancellor felt no
doubt; it was only because the Court felt that Scots law had
to be applied that any question of difficulty arose. We have
already argued that the nature of the security should be
(55)accepted as being pledge, and, pace J.J. Gow, it is
submitted that it is only on this basis that the conclusions
of the learned judges have any meaning whatsoever. Lord
Chancellor Herschell pointed out that something more than
pledgej
(54) ibid p.58.
(55) p.274.
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nledge was given to the bank but this was only in the sense
that an additional power of sale was given; and the general
propositions are still valid! it is submitted, in the context{55a)
of "pure" nledge. Erskine's statement that "the creditor
who quits the possession of the subject loses the real right. (56)
he had" is distingu.ished as not covering the situation
where nossession is narted with only for a particular nurposeD
And since it is established that possession can be given to a
third party without prejudice to the security, and since sale
could be carried through similarly without prejudice, at least
in so far as a third party was employed, there can be little
doubt, it is respectfully agreed, that Erskine's limited
advice must be distinguished.
The view expressed in Bell's Commentaries, although in(56)
considerably more detail, likewise fell to be distinguished
by the learned Lord Chancellor. Voet's clear expression of
disapproval of the Roman theory by which the possession of the
pledge goods could be surrendered to the debtor on the basis
of a senarate contract is cited and endorsed in the following
terms:
"the doctrine delivered by Voet is sound, where the
possession is given up without necessity to the owner
(56~)
of the goods"
Thel
(55a)
(56)
(56a)
3.1.33.
l2-89i} AC at p , 69 et seq.
ibid p.70.
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The Lord Chancellor distinguished this authority on the
basis that the surrender in question was not only necessary
but in the ordinary course of the administration
of the security. In as much as sale is not within the normal
scope of the pledgee's powers, it might be argued that sale
would be treated as an exceptional case. Where, however, the
right of sale was expressly conveyed, it would be anomalous to
allow the pledgee unrestricted powers of management and yet
to prejudice his security when he took steps to realise his
security by virtue of specific terms designed to make the
secUrity commercially viable. It is not disputed that
surrender of possession involves the possibility of fraud:
the pledgor may sell or pledge in breach of the agreement.
But sale is not a special case. The risk is, of course, placed
in perspective by Lord Justice Mackinnon in Lloyds Bank,
(58)
and the contrary decision in Tad proceeded on the basis
of a different interpretation of the facts, namely that the
pledgor could not be said to make the sales on behalf of the
pledgee.
A few words must again be said here as to the framework
within which these theories will operate. The credit issued
necessarily involves the tender in security of the shipping
documents, and the pledge agreement must be made specifically
with the bank. The bills of lading may either be indorsed or
made out originally in the bank's favour, failing which the
bills/
(57) [193~ 2 KB at 166.
(58) Tad & Son v. Merchant Banking Co. (1883) 10 R 1009.
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bills may be indorsed in blank and transferred to the bank.
The third possibility, namely that the bills are in name of
the eventual purchaser or borrower, although extremely
unlikely to occur in nractice, does raise a different problem.
It is suggested that in this situation the bank is merely
receiving custody of the shipning documents in much the same
way as banks in nractice often hold the heritable titles of a
customer. There is no pledge since the element of possession
is absent: there is no physical nossession of the goods,
nor is there the means to control the goods. And if in this
situation the bank were to surrender the bills of lading for
purposes of realising their "securi ty~' it is thought that they
would lose whatever security their tenure gave them. On the
other hand, their "security" has a nuisance value in as much
as they can prevent their customer obtaining access to "his"
goods for the purpose of selling them. To release their hold
on the shipping documents the bank could quite competently
convert their holding into that of pledge simply by obtaining
their customers' indorsement in blank and thereafter the
documents could be returned to the customer, as in North
Western Bank, for re-sale. A similar device would be available
to the bank in the unlikely event of no express right of sale
being given; the bank would only release the documents on
their right of sale being made an express part of the security
agreement. What if this was not done? In that case the
bank's release of the pledge for the purpose of sale would
notl
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not be the release of control to an agent for the pur-Dose of
carrying out something in the bank's power. Quite simply,
the "agent" could not as an agent do something, namely sell
the subjects, which was not in the bank's Dowers. Authority
for this proposition is clearly expressed in the judgment of
(59)
Lord Chancellor Herschell in North Western Bank where he is
talking about Tad and Son v. r'lerchantBanking Corporation.
Davis suggests at page 190 that "the written
acceptance of r.the letter of trust' sJ terms by the customer
amounts to a trust receipt". With respect, it seems unlikely
that any acceptance is necessary except in so far as there
must clearly be a security agreement prior to the security
situation arising. Where a letter is issued by the bank in
terms closely related to the original pledge agreement, as in
North Western Bank, acceptance of terms is unnecessary.
Receipt of the documents with instructions to sell is
sufficient in itself. And Davis appears to accept this later
when he says:
"the letter of trust thus merely evidences the
reached
agreement/between the banker and his customer ......
[ who] does not become a trustee in the commonly
accented meaning of that term, as the banker does not
divest himself thereby of the property which he has
(60)
in the goods".
The/
(59) l}895] AC at 71.
(60) Davis supra cit p.190.
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The notion that the customer acts as the bank's
agent now calls for some examination. For the nurposes of
the Factors Acts a "mercantile agent" is defined as Ita
mercantile agent having in the customary course of his
business as such agent authority either to sell goods, or to
consign goods for the purpose of sale, or to buy goods, or(61)
to raise money on the security of goods". \'Iherethe
Dledgor obtains Dossession of the documents of title, he
does so as an agent whose business at least involves buying
and selling in commercial circles. Moreover, the security
device is by no means an unusual one; it is a normal method
of financing foreign business; and although the particular
transaction may be the first of its type in which the pledgor
has become involved, this is auparently irrelevant. There
is no requirement that the agent should be one selling in
his normal business capacity of mercantile agent. In
(62)
Lowther v. Harris, the judgment of Hr. Justice Wright
dealt with this point. An art dealer agreed to sell for a
customer certain furniture and a tapestry. He was an agent
for one nrincinal only. It was held by the learned judge
that this was irrelevant. Re emphasised that the duties of
the art dealer were extensive, covering the conclusion of a
bargain, the delivery of the goods, the collection of the
price and a subsequent accounting to the plaintiff. Earlier
authority was discussed, and although it may be that the
learned/
(61) sl(l) Factors Act 1889. (52 and 53 Vict. c.45)
(62) 8-927J IKB 393.
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learned judge's reasoning was not entirely consistent,
his conclusion has not been challenged. The duties of the
agent in this case were extremely similar to those of the
selling pledgor in the commercial credit transaction, and
the English authorities we have above'referred to in another
(63)
context seem to confirm that the application of the
Factors Acts is extremely broad.
It must be remembered that the agency of the pledgor
will in most cases be a specific term of the agreement and
even if it is not, it is submitted that the pledgor's dual
capacity is no more inconsistent than the relationships
between the various narties to the commercial credit
transaction being defined almost exclusively in terms of
,agency. It seems also to be clear that the agency eoncent
must be annlied to its logical conclusions, subject to the
inherent limitation that the agency is strictly ad hoc.
The bank's right of sale, being only in terms of the
security agreement, must be construed according to that
agreement. In North \vestern Bank the agreement stipulated:
"It is distinctly agreed that we are to have immediate
(64)
and absolute power of sale".
And Gutteridge and l"Iagrah's style states:
"we give you full discretionary power of sale over
the merchandise at such times, either before or after
arrival,/
(63) See e.g. Lloyds Bank [1937J 2 K.B. 631.
(64) (j895]AC at 57.
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arrival, as you may deem fit".
In England, the bank has a common law right of sale.
Lord Justice Scrutton in Rosenberg v. International Banking
Corporation said: "bankers' liens or bankers' nledges, effected
in such a way, give, according to the views of merchants, the
(68)
bankers a right of sale". There has been a certain
amount of judicial discussion as to how this power should be
(66)
exercised. In in re Richardson it was suggested that
reasonable notice should be given to a pledgor if no time
This wasfor sale had been specifically contracted for. (67)
endorsed a year later by Lord Justice Cotton in in re Morritt.
When the requirement for reasonable notice was considered
by Vaughan Williams L.J. its justification was quite clear:
"to give the mortgagor a reasonable opportunity to
(69)
redeem" •
While bankers and merchants in Scotland might also
feel, as Lord Justice Scrutton did, that there is an implied
right of sale, it is suggested that it is correct to say
that to be effective the right must be exnressly conferred
on the Scots pledgee. That being so, the question is one
of construinG the express right. It is suggested that the
term allowing the security-holder this further power would
fall/
(65) p.195. Appendix C.
(66) (1885) 30 Ch 396 at 403.
(67) (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 222 at 232.
(68) (1923) 14 Le LR 344 at 347.
(69) [1902] 1 Ch 579 at 590.
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fall to be construed contra proferentem, although this
canon of construction is a judicial device which has not
yet required to be considered by the Scottish courts in
this context. Its apnlication would, however, be tempered
in that it should properly only operate where there is some
ambiguity. Nothing could be clearer than the bank's
stipulation in North \vestern Bank that it should have
"immediate and absolute right of sale". The credit and the
security are so interwoven as to make this entirely justi~d;
and the commercial situation of the parties might well make
any requirement of notice inconvenient or, at the very least,
economically hazardous. In practice, of course, the bank
would exercise its nower with due regard to the interests of
the debtor and this duty is one which would, it is thought,(70)
be enforced by law. The resultant position, then, may
not be so very far removed from that of English law, but
it is well to remember that the underlying theories are by
no means uniform.
The content of this Paper has been devoted to the
rights of the banker as security-holder i.e. the issuer of the
credit. Other parties have, however, an interest in the
security subjects and whether or not their interests receive
similar nrotection has also been the subject of discussion.
Davis is quite clear that parties other than the issuing
(71)
banker "are not in such a favoured nosition" and
reference/
(70) Ferguson v. Grant (1856) 18 D 536.
(71) at '0.202.
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reference is made to the well-known judgment of Lord Justice
(72)
Cairns in Banner v. Johnstone:
"The order to send home the shipping documents and
the condition annexed to the promise to accept -
that the shipping documents shall be sent to them -
are for the protection of the bankers and not, as it
seems to me in any way for the protection of the(73)
persons who negotiate the bills of exchange".
This case concerns documents which are presented to the bank
and accepted in terms of the credit. At that point of time,
the presenter "no longer" has any security over the security
SUbjects. In the words of Lord Cairns again, "that cotton(73)
passes into the hands of the bankers themselves". ThiS,
however, is no more than an application of the general rule
which restricts security without possession, and Lord
Chancellor Hatherley correctly, it is respectfully suggested,
puts the position in perspective when he says:
"the result would be that in the case of everyone
letter of credit of this kind, the bankers giving it
would be held to constitute themselves trustees for
every bill-holder •••••• and they would be held
bound, as trustees for the various bill-holders, to
keep a separate account of the proceeds of the goods
(74)
consigned to them by way of security".
These/
(72) (1871) LR 5HL 157.
(73) supra cit at p.174.
(74) ibid p.168.
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These dicta are confirmed in later authorities and,
a fortiori, would be followed in Scots courts. They do not,
however (nor do they profess to) apply to the situation of
the third party or interim-holder of the security documents.
Chapter III.
THE BANKER'S LIEN==== = = --=--==
The concepts of lien, pledge and hypothec are of
central importance in the consideration of the special nature
and extent of the banker's security over moveables; that of
lien is of particular interest in as much as the law bas
conceded that the banker has special interests which should
be and require to be protected and has bestowed on him a
general lien with its own particular characteristics and(2a)
difficulties.
Lord McLaren in Robertson's Trustee v. The Royal Bank(1)
of Scotiand stated:
lilt1s a general principle in our law that every agent
bas a lien or right of retention against his principal
for the balance due to him, and this right of retention
is not confined to moneys collected, such as rents and
dividends, but may extend to securities, the precise
extent of the lien being determined by the nature or
character of the agency. The so-called banker lien is
an example of this rule of law".
Gloag and Irvine defined "retention" aa Itaright to reSist a
demand for payment or performance till some coUnter obligation
l2)
be paid or performed ", While the conjunction of these two
statements does shed some light on the nature of the banker's
lien, the definition is by no means complete. The characteristics
oft
(1) (1890)18 R 12 at 19.
(2) at p.303.
(2a) The concepts of "pledge" and "hypothec" received more
detailed discussion in the first two chapters.
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of lien are its emphasis on the possession of the security-
holder and the fact that the security arises by implication
from the relationship under which it is created.
Lien is prima facie a "nuisance" security; with one
exception of considerable importance which will be considered
later, it enforces performance or payment rather than itself
providing the means for the performance or payment. And in
this it is unique. The retention of title deeds by a bank
"in security" of an advance made in connection with heritage
<:3 )
is also often spoken of as a nuisance security. Lien,
however, gives a more effective security than this. In the
course of the business relationship the power of the lien
can induce the lender to provide accommodation, dictate the
terms on which he will lend and allow him effectively to
control the financial mobility of the borrower. It gives a
floating security - it comprises whatever is in fact held by
the lender, always provided that it is capable of being
subjected to a lien. Moreover, on the bankruptcy of the
borrower, the lender is given protection for his security
providing that posseSSion is retained throughout.
Lien has most frequently been defined by example only,
by an explanation of the circumstances in which it arises.
As in so many other legal definitions (so-called) the
definitive sentence merely serves to highlight the conflicts
of/
, (3) the nuisance element of which is in large measure
eliminated by section 45 of the Oonveyancing and Feudal
Reform (Scotland) Act 1970. (c.35)
----- ~ --- --~~------.--.---------"'
- 3 -
of writers of great authority. In contrast to Lord McLaren's
judgment cited above, Gloag and Irvine state:
"Originally, indeed, it would appear that the doctrine
of retention is a part of the law of Scotland, derived
from the civil law, while lien is an e~uitable right
(4)
introduced from the law of England".
The distinction which has been justified by Professor More
does seem artificial, if not untenable, and it is respectfully
submitted that it is now of historical significance only and
(5)
that for all practical purposes the terms are synonymous.
There is little doubt that, whatever its origin, retention is
by nature an "equitable" security, and it may well be that
lien and retention are merely derivatives of an original
remedy which both legal systems, Scots and English, acknowledged
as being commercially expedient. Within certain limitations,
English authorities on the subject have come to be accepted
in the Scottish courts and such academic writing as there is
clearly accepts the large area of identity. Within the
special scope of the banker's lien, however, there are
differences of importance: in origin, in scope and in
enforcement; these will require detailed consideration. In
this discussion the term "lien" will be used exclusively
although the authorities cited tend to use "lien" and "retention"
indiscriminately/
(4) at p.329.
(5) except of course where "retention" is being used in
a special sense e.g. in sale of goods.
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indiscriminately if not interchangeably; and English
authorities will be cited without apology unless some
speciality or distinction dictates otherwiseo
The two principal characteristics of lien, its emphasis
on possession and its reliance on an implied agreement, serve
to distinguish it from other security rights. Possession
distinguishes the lien from the ~ facie absolute property
which gave a security in such cases as Hamilton v. Western
(6)
~ and from hypothec which requires neither physical
control nor the means of obtaining that control. Lien allows
some of the flexibility of the hypothec while not involving
the uncertainty and commercial risks which are also inherent
in the latter concept. The fact that lien arises by
implication from certain circumstances distinguishes it from
pledge, although where the two concepts overlap there may be
an area of theoretical difficulty. In National Bank of(7)
Scotland vs Dickie's Trustee a stockbroker who held stock
in his own name for a client transferred it to a bank in
security of an advance for his client; the fact of agency
was disclosed to the bank. In his judgment, Lord Xyllachy
said:
"there can, I think, be no doubt that a pledge for a
particular debt excludes the general lien, where, as in
the present case, the bank had notice and knew that
the securities belonged to someone else than the pledger,
and/
(6)
(7)
(1856) 19 D 152.
(1895) 22 R 740. See also Lord Oampbell in Brandao (1846)
12 Cl. & Finn. at 805.
I.....__.__ ._J
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and .,kere being pledged by the latter for special
loans effected by him, as a stockbroker, for behoof,
(8)
if not on behalf of clients".
While lien is a security right conferred by law to protect
the creditor against the default of his debtor, not his
debtor's disclosed principal whose own debts have been
specifically secured, a fact which was recognised by Lord
(9)
McLaren in the same case, the areas covered by the concepts
of lien and pledge are generally distinct, the former properly
speaking being concerned only with negotiable securities. The
use of the word "lien" in this case may not be entirely
satisfactory in view of the fact that the security related to
stock; it is suggested with respect that the situation was
more closely related to the ~ facie absolute ownership ot
Hamilton y. Western Bank although, of course, on the facts,
the bank's rights clearly had to be limited by reference to
the bank's knowledge and the express agreement between banker
and customer. Distinguishing between pledge and lien, the
rule of law conveyed in the phrase "assignatus utitur iure
auctori8" limiting the right of the security holder, diminishes
thel
. (8) ibid at p.749.
(9) ibid at p.755; and confirmed in Farrar and Raoth v.
N.B. Banking 00. (1850) 12 D 1190.
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the responsibility on the bank so far as enquiry into the
origin of the security is concerned. The limitation which
applies equally is, however, the reference whioh the court
will make to any agreement, express or implied, which the
customer can prove in connection with the bank's possession.
Although the general ooncept of possession will not be
discussed in detail in this paper, there are speoial
difficulties in applying the ooncept within the scope of the
banker's lien whioh do require to be oonsidered. In general,
the oriterion of possession is limited by that of implied
agreement. The possession must be in consequence of that
It must notagreement and not in any way in conflict wi.th it.(10)
be the resu! t of ohanoe, error or fraud t or in(11)
a specific agreement excluding lien. There is no general
breaoh of
rule of law which falls to be applied. Each set of
circumstances requires to be oonsidered to see whether there
is the requisite oontrol and whether that control bas been
obtained in the furtherance of an implied agreement and in the
course of a banking relationship. In Pattens v. ROYal Bank of(12)
Scotland the ratio of the decision, as given by Lord(13)
Cuntnghame, was that the dividend was paid to the bank in
errorl
(10) See Fattens v. Royal Bank (1853) 15 D 617.
(11) Cases referred to infra at p.16
(12) (1853) 15 D 617; facts summarised by Gloag & Irvine at
p.343.
(13) ibid p.6l9.
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error and that accordingly the bank were in the same position
as unlawful intromitters or intromitters without a title. Not
only was the possession obtained in error, the very error
vitiated whatever title might have justified the lien.
The requisite control has been considered in several
English authorities which are at least illustrative of the
considerations which would apply in the Scottish courts. In
(14)
Giblin v. McMullen. a case concerning the standard of care
to be exercised in relation to goods lodged with a bank for
safekeeping. the box containing the securities being in the
bank strongroom, the key of the box being in the customer's
possession, there was clearly not the requisite possession
for lien even if the securities had been within the scope of(15)
the lien. In contrast, in United Service CompanY, certain
certificates were lodged for "safekeeping", the bank
undertaking to receive dividends for a small commission.
Although the case concerned the standard of care shown by the
(16)
bank, Sir V.M. James L.J. said:
"In this case, although it is true that the possession
of these particular documents was not essential to the
collection of the moneys which the bank were authorised
to collect, it appears to us that they came into their
custody in the ordinary course of their bUSiness as
bankers,/
(14)
(15)
. (16)
(1868) La 2 PC 317.
(1870) La 6 Ch App 212•
at p.2l7.
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bankers, that they were deposited with the bank by a
customer of the bank, and that such deposit was made
under such circumstances as would have entitled the
bank to a lien upon them for their general banking
account" •
With respect, it seemB as though the court in this instance
wrongly interpreted the application of the qualifying phrase
"in the ordinary course of their business as bankers". Banks
commonly undertake many tasks not in the ordinary course of
banking business, and while the receipt of a small commission
may have had a bearing on the standard of care to be shown,
it should not have affected the nature of the holding nor
have permitted the exercise of a lien. Nor was the decision
consistent with the earlier leading case of Brand~ v.(17)Barnett where the banker was employed to collect interest
on certain exchequer bills and it was held that there was no
lien over the bills for a general balance. In the course of
(18)
his judgment, Lord Campbell pointed out that the mere
fact of the bank handling the bills was not sufficient per se
for a lien to exist. There must also be some banking operation
involving them. It had been argued before the court that
"the nature of the general lien of the banker is not yet
accurately settled. It 1s not yet settled what is the lien
of a banker upon plate left with him by his customer for safe
custody,/
(17) (1846) 12 01 & Finn.787.
(18) ibid p.808.
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custody, or whether he has any?" The principle at least was
quite clearly laid down in Lord Campbell's judgment. (19)
In Robertson's Trustee v. Royal Bank of Scotland,
certain bonds were lodged with a bank by their customer in
accordance with a receipt stating that the bonds were held
"for safekeeping on your (the customer's) account and subject
to your order". In the course of his judgment, the learned
(20)
Lord President conceded that "the ~bject for which the
bonds were handed to the bank partly was to place them in
safer custody than he could himself command" and that "so
long as the customer's account remains in a wholesome
condition, I think the receipt very fairly expresses the
relation of the parties". With respect, it is suggested that
it would have been more satisfactory if the learned Lord
President had made it clear that if the original relationship
was that of banker and customer, the former acting as
safekeeper, then that could only thereafter have supported
a lien if there was some further specific arrangement to
that effect. On the facts of the case, the Lord President's
expressed view on this matter was not essential to the
decision, the various judgments being more concerned with
presumptions of intention and the onus of proof. It ie not,
however, acceptable to say that the relationship between
banker and customer materially alters whenever the customer's
acoount/
(19) (1890) 18 R 12.
(20) at p.l7.
- 10 -
account goes into overdraft(ll) unless there is agreement
(21)
to this effect. The exercise of the security right may
well in practice depend on the state of the account; the
right itself, and the nature of the holding on which it is
based, does not so vary.
There is no particular difficulty in distinguishing
possession from custody as far as banking is concerned; it
is quite clear that the requisite degree of control is not
conferred by phySical control per se. There must be the
right to control and the intention to use that right if the(22)
circumstances so require. Gloag and Irvine state that:
tithecivil possession which the indorsee of a bill of lading
obtains by the indorsement to him is not suffiCient, if he
has not obtained actual delivery of the cargo, to entitle him
to claim a preference over it, on the ground of retention, on
(23)the bankruptcy of the indorser". Wh:iileit is quite clearly
the case that there is no lien in these circumstances, it is
suggested that this is not as a result of the lack of the
required possession. The merits and de-merits of this point
of view have already been mentioned in connection with pledge
and it need only be repeated here that there is nothing
inherent in the civil possession which leads one to oonclude
that the requisite degree of control does not exist. The
simple/
(21) Borthwick v. Bremner (1833) llS 716 at 717.
(22) at p.341.
(23) See Bell's Oomm. ii 87; Kinloch v. Oraig 17891 RR 664.
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simple reason justifying Gloag and Irvine's conclusion is
that the possession of the banker only supports lien where
certain subjects are involved: bills of exchange, promissory
notes, warrants payable to bearer and other negotiable
securities. It is this special scope which serves to delimit
the banker's lien. There is no mystery in this classification;
nor, quite clearly, can it now be extended. It comprises
those subjects which the banker obtains in the course of its
employment as a monetary agent and which it is involved in
"using" on its clients behalf. Outwith this classification,
whatever security right the bank may have is not constituted
as a lien; it may just be the nuisance right of retention
(in the loose sense) of title deeds or it may be by virtue
of a specific transfer of ownership. In passing, it is
interesting to note that banks in Scotland are in the habit of
asking for the deposit of title deeds when also obtaining
a bond of cash credit in security of a loan and that this
deposit is in practice narrated in the bond as being "further
security". It is clear that this specific transfer does not
impart any special effectiveness to the nuisance security.
The distinction of ownership and possession is of
importance in examining the bank's rights over particular
bills of exchange presented by the customer. Generally
speaking, there are two purposes for which a bill may be
presented: the bank may be requested to discount or buy
thel
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the bill at a price which takes into account the risk element
and the normal business acknowledgement that money now is
more valuable than money in the future. In such cases the
bill ceases to be the customer's property. Ownership of the
bill and its proceeds pass to the bank and it can either pay
the customer in cash, credit the customer's account or on the
client's instructions apply the price in reduction of any
outstanding overdraft. In any event, the bill is not held
for the client and the.concept of lien is simply not relevant.
The bank may, however, obtain a bill from its customer
in order to present it for collection on the customer's behalf
(24)
and so obtain payment. In these circumstances the
property remains in the client, only possession passing to
the bank. The distinction between this and the transfer above
described is discussed at some length in Wallace and McNeil's
(25)
Banking Law and an example of the difference which may(26)
result in practice is given by Gloag and Irvine. It is to
be noted that the presumption operated by the courts is in
favour of discounting where the customer has indorsed the bill.
This presumption can be displaced by evidence of book entries
made by the banker at the time of the bill passing showing the
contrary/
(24) See the ChequESAct 1957 8:2 where the situation is
acknowledged.
(25) 8th Ed. p.42 et seq.
(26) p.373 et seq.
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contrary or in fact by any other evidence tending to show
that the bank is only holding the bill for the purposes of
collection on the client's behalf. In Glen v. National Bank
(27)
of Scotland, a firm lodged with its bank a promissory
note which had been granted in its favour as an accommodation
bill by a third party. Around the same time the bank arranged
advances in favour of the firm but did not discount the
accommodation bill. The circumstances of the lodging of the
bill and the existence of an agreement concerning the lodging
were disputed between the acceptor of the bill and the bank,
the former arguing that the bill was lodged for discounting,
the latter that it was intended in security of their advances.
The case was distin~shed from the special circumstances of
(28)
Borthwick v. Bremner and Lord Justice Clerk Hope emphasised
that the transaction was in all respects in the ordinary course
of banking business and that the action of the bank in
discounting other bills in other circumstances corroborated
the bank's averments. The onus of proving speoial agreement
is with the customer and in this instanoe it had not been
discharged. The onus is not, however, always on the customer
~28)
as was shown in Borthwick v. Bremner, where the Lord
Ordinary (upheld on appeal) allowed a proof before answer on
allegations that a bill originally presented to the bank for
discounting had specifically been made the subject of lien by
arrangement between customer and banker. The general rule
wast
(27) (1849) 12 D 353.
(28) (1833) lIS 716.
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was stated thus:
"When a bill is transmitted to a banker for discount,
he is not entitled to retain it in security of any
prior claim. He must either comply with the request to
discount it, or return it. But if the party in a bill
presents it to a bank for discount, while the bank
declines to discount it, it may be retained, with
consent of the holder (presenter), as a security for
(29)
prior advances".
And as the bank was unable to prove such agreement, there was
no security right over the bill. The various other
authorities on this particular topic illustrate the general
rules and presumptions and must be interpreted as showing that
the court's concern is always with the agreement, express or
<:30)
to be implied, between banker and customer. The most
recent judicial comment having a bearing on this topic is
contained in Lord Justice Buckley's judgment in Halesowen v,
(:31)
Westminster Bank Ltd. where Lord Justice Buckley
underlined that banking operations concerning bills and
cheques may well affect the existence of lien and the nature
of the bank's rights.
In the main, the elements of the decision as to whether
or not the bank has the required possession to found lien are
not special to the banking relationship. Examination of the
notion/
(29) ibid p.?l?
(30) See Matheson v. Anderson (1822) IS 486; Haig v. Buchanan
(1823) 2S 412.
(:31) o.9?OJ 3 All E R at 487.
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notion of presumed intention, fundamental to the right of
lien, does, however, disclose particular difficulties. One(32)
of the earliest authorities, Anderson v. Laurie and Co.,
clearly drew the distinction between "general rights of
retention" and "liens or limited rights of retentiontt• The
former rights exist where "in certain trades and employments,
a usage has received effect to retain goods for a general
balance, though deposited at first for a special purpose".
This usage bas been justified by reference to an implied
agreement assumed where in certain circumstances security goods
come into the hands of the security holder. There is a
presumption that the intention of the parties was to confer
security rights. Whether this presumption is realistic in
practice is now no longer of more than academic interest,
having been established beyond question in several early
authorities.
In Robertson's Trustee, the facts of which have already
been narrated, the Lord Ordinary thought that the terms of the
receipt created a presumption as to the nature of the bank's
holding which required to be revoked if lien were to operate.
Lord President Inglis, on appeal, varied the Lord Ordinary's
(33)
judgment on this matter. The original presumption was of
possession sufficient for lien and it was that presumption
which/
(32) (1853) 15 D 404.
(33) (1890) 18 R 12 at 17.
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which the terms of the receipt might or might not vary. In
the circumstances the lodging of the bonds coincided with
(34)considered crucial both by the Lord President and Lord Adam.
the granting of overdrafts to the customer and this was
The written receipt's terms would only have been given effect
to if they could have been said to constitute an express
agreement varying the normal rule, or if the writing had
disclosed to the bank facts which clearly made an implied
(35)
agreement untenable. In Farrar and Rooth v. North British
(36)
Banking Co. a blank bill was sent to a bank by a broker
accompanied by a letter in the following terms: "The
enclosed has been sent me from Huddersfield to send to Glasgow
for discount, and if you can do it for me on moderate terms,
it will oblige". As the fact of agency was disclosed to the
bank there could be no lien in respect of the agent's own
(37)
debts, and, as Lord Cuninghame pointed out, since the
arrangement was specifically for discount, there could not be
a lien in respect of the principal's debts. Similar authority
(38)is given in National Bank of Scotland v. Dickie's Tr.
where pledge of stock by an agent for specific accommodation
clearly/
(34) ibid at 18.
(35) Dunlop's Trs. v. Olydesdale Bank (1893) 20 R (HL) 59.
(36) (1850) 12 D 1190. at 1191.
(37) ibid at p.1l93.
(38) (1895)22R 740.
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clearly excluded the lien.
The implication is only operative where the security
is created in the "ordinary course of bankir business". It
(39
is thought that it is this qualification that limits the
scope of the lien to cover bills of exchange, promissory
notes and other negotiable instruments. In Robertson's Trustee,
the Lord President said that the precise extent of the lien
was determined by the nature or character of the agency.
Share certificates and title deeds are of course handled by
banks in the course of their business. The distinction,
however, is that they are not held for the purposes of banking
but only by virtue of particular agreements either of
security or for safekeeping. Exactly the same limitation
applies to the debts secured: these do not include charges
(40)
for acting as safekeepers or agents not in a banking
capacity. The question might well arise in the future as to
the bank's rights over bills where they are originally
presented in the normal course for collection but where the
customer thereafter countermands his instructions and asks
either for the return of the bills or for their discounting.
It is conceived that in these circumstances the bank would
require to comply with these new instructions varying the
.1implied agreement". The bank would, however, be entitled
on receipt of the instructions to consider whether at that
moment/
(39) already discussed at p.7.
(40) Bell: Oomm i1 115.
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moment it was in a position to exercise its lien and if so
to retain in terms of the implied agreement. Any other
solution would permit evasion by the customer of the
consequences of the lien. It is submitted that authority for
this view can be obtained from Paul and Thain v. Royal Bank
(41)
of Scotland and Ireland v. North of Scotland Banking
(42)
Companx. In the former case the bank claimed to have
"good reason to doubt the sufficiency" of their customer and
(43)
to be entitled to exercise their right of lien. Lord Ormidale
approves Professor Bell's statement that:
"One who is due money presently payable cannot defend
himself against the demand by setting off money due to
him six months after, or the payment of which depends(44)
upon a condition".
The corollary to this is that present debts outstanding
will entitle the bank to use its security rights without the
customer having any unilateral right to vary the agreement.
In Ireland Va North of Scotland Banking ComPanY, where there
was no sequestration (and a trust deed for creditors was
said to be "no concern of the bank") Lord President Inglis
(45)
said:
"There/
(4l) (1869) 1M 361; aleo Ferrier v. British Linen Co. there
cited.
(42) (1880) BR 215.
(43) supra cit at p.364.
(44) Comm. ii 122 (cited by Lord Ormidale at p.128)
(45) (1880) BR 215 at 217.
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"There is nothing more plain than this, that while a
customer has funds in a bank his right to draw on his
account is absolute, unless the bank has a right of
retention over the money, or some other equally good
answer" •
As has already been pointed out, lien is by nature a
nuisance security, a fact which is inherent in the alternative
term more commonly used by Institutional writers and judges
century
of the 19th/- retention. In distinction from the English
position, there is no special right conferred on bankers to
realise the security subjects. This was made clear by Lord(46)
McLaren in Robertson's Trustee v. Royal Bank of Scotland.(47)
and by Professor Bell in his Commentaries. The property
,
in the bills remains with the customer. The consequence. of(48) ,
this is well illustrated by Gloag and Irvine.
The bank does, however, continue to have a responsibility
to honour the instructions of his customer so long as the
security is not prejudiced. And as bills for collection are
subject to lien, in the normal course of events the banker
will obtain cash for the bills and so in effect realise their
security. This exception is only by virtue of the special
agreement in terms of which the bills passed into the bank's
hands. And it operates in this way only because the banker
has a right to set-off sums of money owed to the customer
against/
(46) (1890)18 R 12.
(47) Comm. 11 23.
(48) at p.374.
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against sums of money payable by him. It is this most
important right which we now must consider.
It is stated by Gloag and Irvine, and normally
accepted without comment that "the subjects which a banker
may retain under his lien are bills of exchange, promissory
notes, bonds or share warrants payable to bearer and other
(49)negotiable securities". Often spoken of under the
heading of "lien", however, is the banker's right to set off
account against a debita credit balance on his customer's
(50)
balance on another account.(51)
describe this right as a right to readjust the form of
Gloag and Irvine prefer to
the account and assume that the duplicity or multiplicity of
accounts is merely a formal separation of funds for convenience
which is only binding on the bank where there is a special
I
contract to that effect. Support for this interpretation is
given by the fact that on the bankruptcy of the bank, the
(52)
customer has a similar right to demand a combined accounting.
In so far as the "lien" of the bank allows it to reduce or
eradicate the debt, the adjusting of accounts is exceptional.
In general, a lien only gives a potential security, not the
means/
(49) p.372.
(50) See Comments of Roski1l J. in Ha1esowen [1970] 1 All ER
at pp.38 &: 46.
(51) p.38l.
(52) Bailey v. Finch (1871) LR 7 QB 34.
- 21 -
means of realising that security. The set-off of accounts
by the bank does, as we shall see, share with lien the
emphasis on presumed intention, and the right of set-off
is affected by the nature of the banking relationship.
Several recent authorities have accepted without comment the
use of the word "lien" in describing the rights of the bank:
in this area.
(53)
Bank Ltd. did, however, consider the question to be worthy
The Court of Appeal in Halesowen v. Westminster
of some discussion. Lord Denning M.R. preferred to speak
Winn L.J. envisaged a
(55)combination bringing about a set-off.
simply of the "right to combine accounts" or "'to set-off'
(54)one account against the other".
It was left,
however, to Buckley L.J. to rationalise the nature of the(56)
bank's right:
"The money or credit which the bank obtained as the
result of clearing the cheque became the property of
the bank, not the property of the plaintiffs. No man
can have a lien on his own property, and consequently
no lien can have arisen affecting that money or that
credit. The amount of the credit of the plaintiffs on
the No. 2 account was, of course, increased, but this
credit represented indebtedness by the bank to the
plaintiffs as its customer 0 ..... "
Properly,/
(53) [1970J 3 All E R 473.
(54) ibid at p.477.
(55) ibid at p.480.
(56) ibid at p.487. ..' .
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Properly, he said, the situation in which there are a number
of accounts is not one of set-off, nor of lien but simply of
accounting i.e. ascertaining a balance of mutual dealings.
Accepting that the distinction is well-taken and theoretically
well-founded, it is suggested that the nature of the right
is well-understood and the term lien will be used and quoted
(56a)
without further apology. One is tempted to suggest, however,
that if Lord Buckley's rationalisation is accepted much of
the justification for the majority decision in Halesowen is
open to question. The facts of this case may be summarised
as follows: the plaintiffs had what was described by the
bank's manager as a "dormant overdraft" which kept getting
larger and larger. After pressure from the bank, the
plaintiffs opened a No. 2 Account in April 1968 which was to
be used as a trading account, which was to be kept in credit
and separate from the original (now No.1) Account which was
to remain frozen "in the absence of materially changed
Circumstances". On 20th May, 1968 the plaintiffs called a
meeting for 12th June to consider a resolution to wind up.
Although notice of this meeting came to the bank it took no
action other than deciding to "keep a close watch" on the
account. On the morning of 12th June 1968 a cheque for
£8611.5.10 in favour of the plaintiffs was lodged for the
credit of the NO.2 Account; on the afternoon of that same
day the plaintiffs went into voluntary liquidation. The
cheque/
(56a) It must be admitted that this statement was first made
before the House of Lords judgment (see infra) was
available and perhaps this apology now requires to be
underlined!
- 23 -
cheque was subsequently credited to the No. 2 Account and(57)
cleared, leaving a balance to credit of £8,634. The
Bank only then advised the liquidator that it proposed to
set-off this credit against the overdraft of £11,879 and
prove for the balance. The Liquidator challenged this
purported right of set-off and accordingly brought this action.(58)
The judgment of Roskill J. at first instance reviewed
carefully the issues involved and many of the earlier
authorities. Before considering the decision in detail, it
might perhaps be appropriate to define, so far as possible,
the characteristics of the bank's right of set-off as
accepted prior to Haleaowen: the right of set-off is confined
to'circumstances in which both accounts are opened by the
bank for the customer in the same capacity. An executry
account, for instance, could not be combined with the executor's
(59)
private account. And where the terms of the two Accounts
make it quite clear that the duplicity is not merely for
personal convenience, but for purposes of proper accounting
for the customer's various responsibilities, then again the
(60)
two can not be combined by the bank. One way of looking
, . at this facit of the rule is that it is simply an application
of the general rule that the banker'S lien will be excluded
by/
(57) there were other smaller transactions which need not
here concern us.
(58) [1970] 1 All E R 33.
(59) Bailey v. Finch (1871) LR 7 Q.B.34 particularly at 41.
(60) e p Kingston (1871)LR 6 Ch 632.
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by specific agreement or clear implication of contrary
intention. The onus of proving such agreement is the
customer's, and the bank'e duty of inquiry into the
customer's reasons for opening the accounts is not as onerous
(61)
as in other spheres. Assuming that there is a right to combine
in a given set of circumstances, it was very early decided
(62)
in the case of Garnett v. McKewan that the right could be
exercised at any point in time without prior notification to
the customer. It was held that it is the customer's
responsibility to know the state of each account and the state
of the balance of them and if he draws a cheque when the
combined effect is that he is overdrawn, without the prior
agreement o~ the bank, then he must not expect the cheque
to be met. The converse is equally true: the bank is not
entitled to exercise its right of lien unless the general
balance on all the customer's accounts is adverse to the
customer, subject, o~ course, to any special arrangement
(63)to the contrary.
The relatiQnship between the various accounts opened
by the one customer has long given rise to difficulty. And
it seems clear that this is not solely because the facts of
each case require to be considered carefully to see what
arrangement was in fact made between banker and customer. The
reasons/
(6l) See cases referred to in Gloag and Irvine p.3S3.
(62) (1872) LR 8 Ex 10.
(63) re European Bank (Agra Bank Claim) (1872) LR 8 Ch.App.41.
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reasons for opening No. 2 Accounts (and sometimes a customer
may have several accounts all numbered separately) vary
considerably: it may be a question of convenience, to allow
the customer to budget for certain recurring expenses,
household or otherwise; it may be that the customer finds it
convenient to have accounts in various branches of the bank
(in which case the accounts will not be numbered); it may be
that the accounts are opened by the one person acting in
different capacities; and it may be that the customer is USing
one as a current account for day-to-day operation by cheque
in the normal way and the other as a loan account in which
(64)
the balance will not vary to the same extent. The
request for the separation of the accounts may come from the
customer or from the bank, and the effect of the numbering
will vary accordingly in many cases.
(65)
In Bradford Old Bank Ltd. v. Sutcliffe, the facts
clearl~ showed that one account was opened specifically to
record a loan which was itself secured by a deposit of
debentures and two personal guarantees. In these circumstances,
Pickford L.J. aaid:
"The facta clearly show that the accounts were to be
(65a)kept distinct ~ arrangement between the plaintiffs and
the company. If it were otherwise the company would
bel
(64) aa in Bradford Old Bank Ltd. v. Sutcliffe [1918] 2 KB 833.
(65) supra cit.
(65a) "my emphasis"
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be extremely hampered in their business for they
could never safely draw on the current account so long
as the credit balance did not exceed the amount due
(66)
on the loan account tI •
Because of the arrangement, stated Scrutton L.J. "the sums
paid into the current account are appropriated by the customer
to tbat account and cannot be used by the bank in discharge of(67)
the loan account without the consent of the customer".
Six years later Swift J. tried a case which is summarised(68)
in the headnote as follows:
"A banker who has agreed with a customer to open two
accounts in his name, and who holds bills which the
specificallycustomer bas/appropriated to one account, is not
entitled, without the customer's consent, to transfer,
the proceeds of such bills to the other account".
Thus far, the ratio is quite acceptable and consistent with
Bradford Old Bank. Swift J., however, in answer to Defendant's
Counsel's argument that the banker was entitled to deal with
both accounts as being one whole and entirely under his
(69)
control, stated:
"If a banker agrees with his customer to open two or
more accounts he has not in my opinion without the
assent of the customer any right to move either assets
orl
(66) ibid p.839.
(67) ibid p.847.
(68) [1924] 2 KB 153 - Greenhalgh (wp) and Sons v. Union
Bank of Manchester Ltd.
(69) ibid at p.164.
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or liabilities from the one account to the other; the
very basis of his agreement with his customer is that
the two accounts shall be kept separate".
With respect, it is suggested that this generalisation is too
wide unless it is qualified effectively by the use of the
word "agreement" and Mr. Justice Swift's emphasis later in his
judgment on the "agreement between the banker and customer".
Swift J. would appear to have held that the very opening of
two accounts creates a presumption of an agreement to separate
operation and therefore exclusion of lien; in such an event
the burden of proof would lie not with the customer but with(70)
the bank.
The varying consequences of the numbering of accounts
(71)was illustrated in the case of in re E.J. Morel (1934) Ltd.
where the one overdraft account of the company was frozen
when a further two accounts, one a normal trading current
account and the other a wages account, were opened. It was
conceded in argument that although the No.2 and NO.3 Accounts
were nominally separate, they were truly interdependent and
operated together. The judgment of Buckley J. was principally
concerned with the position of the No. 1 Account, and the
argument of learned Counsel for the LiqUidator was cited
(72)approvingly as follows:
tlit/
(70) this dictum of Swift J. was disapproved by Lord Denning
MR in Haleeowen - (1970J 3 All ER 478.
(71) [1962] 1 Oh 21.
(72) ibid p.29.
.1
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"it would be contrary to common sense and to business
practice to treat what is paid into current account
from time to time as capable of being a-ppropriated,
by the bank at any moment to discharge the loan account
or the frozen account, because it is of' the' essence
of the arrangement, they say, that the customer should
know that he is able to deal with the credit balance
on his current account,and to draw cheques against it
for the purpose of his current needs".
This reasoning does not, however, apply where the
question at issue is the relative positions of banker and
customer when the latter is bankrupt or in liquidation; nor
where for some other reason the banking relationship is at
an end. Moreover, it is submitted that frozen and loan
accounts are subject to different considerations. In practice,
their origins are to be distinguished. An overdraft on current
account can, and often does accumulate without specific
authority or at least only with authority for each cheque as
it is drawn or presented. The bank may well have no intention
of granting loan facilities other than very temporary
accommodation. Thereafter if the customer is not in a position
to clear off the overdraft almost immediately, or if the
customer is observed to be in difficulties, the bank may
consider it preferable to regularise the position by stopping
operations on the overdraft account and allowing the customer
tol
- 29 -
to open another account, place funds to its credit, and then
to operate it under close supervision. The bank should not
thereby be taken to be sacrificing its right of lien or
compensating the accounts for ever; it is at most merely
suspending its rights. In practice, the freezing of an account
in this way is often the bank's last attempt to give its
customer a chance to continue business operations and perhaps
to operate profitably, without venturing further overdraft
facilities.
The loan account, on the other hand, is created in
furtherance of a specific agreement to provide overdraft
facilities. The bank's choice of position is taken prior to
the creation of the loan, not after it. In this case, the
independence of the two accounts is necessary for its operation
as a loan and there may be more in the argument for the
complete separation of the accounts even in liquidation or
bankruptcy.
In his judgment in re E.J. Morel, Mr. Justice Buckley
would confine the ratio of Garnett v. McKewan to the position(73)
where there are two or more current accounts. He(74)
justified the separate treatment of accounts by the
liquidator by their separate operation in the course of the
banking relationship. It is suggested that evidence of this
sortl
(73) at p.30.
(74) at p.".
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sort should not have a conclusive bearing on the rights of
the bank on the termination of its relationship with the
customer. The most important criterion is surely: what was
the agreement at the time the "loan" relationship was set
up? Did the bank merely agree not to exercise its right of
lien for a period of time to be determined by reference to the
duration of the banking relationship or some arbitrary period?
Or did the bank ~ initio agree that the loan account was to
be distinct and that no other funds held by1t were to afford
any seourity for the loan?
The earlier authority of in re European Bank (Agra
(75)
Bank Claim) had illustrated that the naming of the accounts
is not to be oonsidered oonclusive. In this case there were
three aocounts, "loan", "discount" and "general". The
customer was another bank. On the voluntary liquidation ofthe
both banks, there arose/question of Agra and Masterman's Bank's
lien over three bills lodged as security for aocommodation. Sir
W.M. James L.J. considered not only a letter whioh accompanied
(76)
the lodging of the bills but also the bank books:
"But when we look at the books, it is clear that there
was no particular reason for treating these three
accounts as distinct matters. It was only for
oonvenience that the loan account was kept separately ••• I
In!
(75) (1872)8 Ch J. pp 41.
(76) ibid at p.44.
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In truth as between banker and customer, whatever
number of accounts are kept in the books the whole is
really but one account and it is not open to the
customer, in the absence of some special contract, to
say that the securities which he deposits are only
applicable to one account".
It might be thought that where the customer was a bank there
might be some special reason for amalgamating the accounts,
for treating both parties as principals, but in the
circumstances of this case the true relationship was that of
banker and customer and the latter was just as dependant on
the bank's extending whatever credit bad been arranged. Here,
however, the loan account was in no sense frozen and it is
significant that the question fell to be resolved when the
parties were in voluntary liquidation. The case involves an
application of the same principles as those of Garnett v.
McKewan, a case which was decided contemporaneously therewith,
although in another court.
Even allowing for extremity of generalisation, for
instance Swift J. in Greenhalgh's case and Sir W.M. James L.J.
in the Agra Bank Claim, there were clearly unresolved points
(77)
of difficulty prior to Halesowen; nor did re K~r e.p. The
(78)
Trustee v. Midland Bank Ltd. afford any clear assistance
other than a professed application of the prinCiple of the
Agra/
(77) See Paget 7th Ed. p.125 et seq.
(78) (1966]3 All E R 631.
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Agra Bank Claim. Counsel for the defendant bank in this case
did, however, state that on a bankruptcy or liquidation there
must be a combination of accounts notwithstanding arrangements
to the contrary during the currency of the banking
(79)
relationship. And it was upon this argument that Mr.
Justice Roskill based his decision in Halesowen.
The facts of Halesowen have already been recounted.
Two arguments were put forward by Counsel for the plaintiffs
to justify the continued separation of the two accounts:
firstly, that there had been an "express oral agreement" that
IIthe bank would "in no circumstances seek to set-off any
balance on that No. 2 Account against the frozen overdrafts
on the No. 1 Account. The onus of proving such an agreement
clearly lay on the plaintiffs and on the evidence before the
(BO)
court it was not discharged. The facts of the case showed
that the customer's financial standing prior to the arrangement,
while not unusually precarious in that its assets were
considerable, was giving cause for concern. The possibility
of liquidation was sufficiently feared to be in the mind of
the customer's financial adviser before the arrangement was
entered. One would imagine that it would require the
clearest of evidence in these circumstances before the bank
could be held to have sacrificed its right of lien irrevocably.
Thel
(79) reported ing.967]Ch at p.lB8.
(80) this finding in fact was of course binding on the
Court of Appeal.
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The principal question for decision was whether or not
there was some rule of law which prevented the bank setting
off the two accounts in the event of liquidation in view of
the bank's undertaking that the first account should remain
frozen with no sums being debited or credited to it, no steps
being taken by the bank to recover the balance outstanding
and the interest payable being debited to the second account.
The learned judge at first instance reviewed the relevant
authorities fully, most of which could be reconciled on their
facts although the judgments contrasted in emphasis. The
particular point which fell to be decided was, however, only
squarely faced in the case of in re Keever, and there only by
the defendant's counsel who stated:
"the bank has never suggested it was entitled to
combine a loan account with a current account whenever
it liked: such a course has to be with the customer's
consent otherwise the purpose of making a loan would
be avoided; but on a bankruptcy or liquidation there
(81)
must be combination".
Mr. Justice Roskill read the judgment of Ungoed - Thomas J.
(82)
in Keever as impliedly accepting that submission, and there
seems no doubt that the learned judge in Halesowen was
Similarly impressed.
Plaintiff's counsel had emphasised in argument that the
accounts/
(81) [1967] Ch at p.188.
(82) at p.51. ([1970) 1 All E R)
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accounts were not physically combined after liquidation.
With respect, it is submitted that Roskill J. took the
correct line when he advised that the mechanics by which the
bank sought to exercise its lien were irrelevant so long as
the claim was properly stated to the liquidator.
The ratio of the decision at first instance is contained
in a correction of Swift J.'s generalisation which has already
(83)been cited; says Roskill J:
tiThetrue view, as I think, is that if a banker
agrees with his customer to open two or more accounts,
the banker has, by virtue of his lien, the right to
move either assets or liabilities from one account
to the other without the customer's consent, unless
the banker has expressly or impliedly agreed with
his customer that he will not do so; such agreement
may be for a limited period or it may be indefinite
in the duration, or it may be only for such period
as the banker/customer relationship subsists"; and(83)
later:
"the critical question must always be, 'what was the
contract?' and not whether a particular account or
accounts bear one title rather than another".
It is possible for the bank to exclude its lien
completely on this reasoning although it is submitted that
the/
(83) at p.49.
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the rule of construction to be applied should be strongly
against this interpretation of any agreement which would
bear to extend into the situation where the customer was
bankrupt or in liquidation. In that event the protection
of the customer in using his banking facilities is no longer
in issue. Indeed, it is difficult to see why any agreement,
not completely specific, should affect the right of lien
on bankruptcy or liquidation and it would be arguable that
the implication is always in favour of this limitation on
any exclusion of the bank's lien. It is submitted that
the courts should look more favourably on a suspension of
a bank's right under its lien than on a complete exclusion
thereof. Support for this is to be found in the judgment of
Roskill J. when considering the arguments of plaintiff's
counsel at p.50; and later when justifying his decision in
logic he says:
"I can see no logic in the view that a restriction
on the exercise of a banker's right of lien which
arises by virtue of the terms of the contract made
between the banker and the customer when the
banker/customer relationship exists must continue
to bind the banker once that relationship has been
determined by death, insanity, liquidation or
(84)
bankruptcy, or for any other reason".
And while the decision can rest on a narrower ratio and
this/
(84) ibid at p.52.
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this statement of principle may not have been entirely
accepted by the House of Lords it has a certain logical
attraction; and it seems to me that the Court of Appeal, in
reversing the decision of Roskill J. did largely accept the
ratio. In any event the basis of the Court of Appeal's decision
was, it is respectfully suggested,not altogether clear and the
issues were hardly clarified by the somewhat strikingly
contrasting opinions of the Court.
It is clear that the decision was reversed not on a
different interpretation of the principles of law involved
but on a different interpretation of the agreement reached
between bank and customer and recorded in letters of 17th
and 22nd April 1968, which narrated, in part:
" •••••• in theabsence of materially changed
circumstances in the meantime we for our part will
adhere to the present scheme of arrangements for
this period of tine"
i.e. four months.
in the Court of Appeal (8S)
On appeaVthe three learned judges all envisaged
the necessity of the bank giving notice ot its intention to
take advantage of any such changed circumstances. There
was no stated consensus as to what notice would be required;
(8Sa)
probably notice would be effective immediately on receipt
thereof./
(85) [1970] 3 All E R. Lord Denning M.R. at 476; Winn L.J. at
481; and Buckley L.J. at 488.
(85a) also the opinion given in the House of Lords (see infra)
.. ..J
- 37 -
thereof. It must be noted, however, that the agreement
does not itself stipulate that there should be notice. And
it can not be assumed that the bank would at any time feel
itself restricted by a requirement to give notice especially
in the highly uncertain financial situation of the company
and the continuing risk it (the bank) was taking. Rather
it might well have had just this situation of insolvency in
mind when it would wish to take immediate advantage of
"changed circumstances". The agreement was partly to the
advantage of the bank in that it at least secured the interest
on the overdraft but it was principally to the benefit of the
company which was being permitted to remain in business.
One finds it difficult to see the bank agreeing,
expressly or impliedly, to the result suggested by the
Court of Appeal. If the combination of accounts is merely
an accounting, albeit one which normally allows a preference,
it is difficult to see why the court should tend towards
excluding the normal rule in the absence of the clearest
intention to that effect.
(86)
Lord Denning interpreted the agreement as follows:
"The agreement was, I think, an agreement which
continued over the liquidation of the plaintiffs, so
as to prevent the bank from combining the accounts
or setting off one against the other - to the
prejudice/
(86) C1970] 3 All E R at 479.
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prejudice of the general body of creditors".
It is submitted that it is not helpful to think of the
agreement in terms of whether or not it was prejudicial to
the creditors. The bank's preferential right to combine
accounts is in the normal case no less prejudicial. The
agreement restricting the right of combination was for the
company's benefit not in any way for the protection of its
creditors. The transfer of the banking account was a
perfectly natural request made by the bank in return for its
continued tolerance of the unsatisfactory state of the
overdraft account. Moreover, Lord Denning's emphasis on
the bank's continued separate operation of the accounts
and its failure to give notice of intention to terminate
the agreement at an earlier stage seemsto disregard what
most banks would probably regard as normal practice. The
effectiveness of lien (if such the right be called) is in
this one category of cases most striking at the stage of
insolvency and the bank might consider it should be forgiven
for not preCipitating the liquidation by revoking the
agreement and presumably thereafter seeking to recover the
balance owed. There can be no doubt that there was a change
in circumstances - this was accepted by each of the judges
of appeal and, of course, by Roskill J. at first instance.
Apparently the only justification for disregarding this
change/
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(87)
change (which was concurred in by Buckley L.J.) was the
absence of the notice.
Lord Justice Winn did not, however, accept this(88)
view as to the length of operation of the agreement:
"However, I agree that the agreement was, as counsel
for the bank contended in the course of his main
submission, one which would endure and the effect
of which would operate only so long as the
relationship of banker and customer obtained between
the bank and the plaintiffs; it was an agreement
regulating and restricting the conduct of the bank
qua banker".
The learned judge took the view that this did not mean that
the agreement did not govern the bank's dealings with the
cheque:
" •••••• an agent who has in his hand cash belonging
to his principal and is owed a debt by that principal
is not entitled to pay himself out of that cash
without authority, express or implied, from his
(89)principal".
But this is exactly the significance of the bank's lien
which would have existed in this case without any question
at/
(87) ibid at 488.
(88) ibid at p.48l.
(89) ibid at p.481. See Lord Cross's comment on this
judgment - [1972]1 All E R 654.
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at all if there had been no agreement. The learned judge
(90)
took the view that the first account having been converted
into a debt or loan account and the second account having
been subject to the agreement for separate operation there
was no time in the course of the banking relationship when
the two accounts could be combined. This seems to presuppose
the termination of the banking relationship on liquidation,
surely not a tenable proposition so far as the effectiveness
of lien is concerned.
Leave having been granted to appeal to the House
(91)
of Lords an appeal was proceeded with and Roskill J.'s
judgment at first instance and the dissenting judgement of
Buckley L.J. in the Court of Appeal found final approval.
Although much of his judgment revolved round the interpretation
(92)
of Section 31 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914 as applied by
(93)
Section 317 of the Companies Act 1948, Viscount Dilhorne
agreed with Roskill J. that the agreement between banker and
So far as the
(94)
use of the term "lien" was concerned the learned judge agreed
customer ended with the winding up resolution.
with Buckley L.J. 's comment that:
liThemoney or credit which the bank obtained as a
result of clearing the cheque became the property of
the bank not the property of the (company). No man
canl
(90) ibid at p.485.
(91) [1972J 1 All E R 641.
(92) which does not apply in Scotland.
(93) ibid at 651.
(94) ibid p.646.
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can have a lien on his own property, and consequently
no lien can have arisen affecting that money or that
(95)
creditit.
It seems to have been agreed by the judges that the term
"lien" is inappropriate to describe the banker's right to
(96)
combine accounts; and although notice requires to be given
by the bank that it is exercising the right of combination,
(97)
Lord Kilbrandon approved Buckley L.J.'s opinion that it
takes effect immediately.
In passing, it is pleasing to note that Lord Kilbrandon
troubled to point out that the absence of an equivalent to
Section 31 in Scots law does leave a difference between,the way
in which the set-off is effected, albeit of minor practical
(98)
importance. And perhaps his suggestion for a re-statement
of the law of bankruptcy for both England and Scotland is the
only conclusion in the case to which absolutely no exception
may be taken. So far as Halesowen is concerned the decision
finally reached by the House of Lords conforms to what would
in most cases be the normal commercial understanding of the
parties involved and to that extent is liable to meet with
long-term approval.
(95) 1970 3 All E R at 477.
(96) See Lord Cross reported at p.563.
(97) ibid at 662.
(98) ibid p.664.
Chapter IV.
DIFFICULTIES CREATED BY "FALSE" DOCUMENTS
The term "false" is used in an attempt to delineate
the scope of this discussion; it is not used as a term of
art. Only incidentally will its meaning concern us; its
importance is in covering a miscellany of situations in
which for some reason the documents do not correctly
represent the goods, or in which they may be described as
misleading, either on their face or in substance; also
discussed is the position of false bills of exchange
tendered in the credit transaction. While clearly the system
of commercial credits is designed to operate on the transfer
of documents not goods, and therefore prima facie such
discrepancies between the two should be disregarded, such
(1)
cases as Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder .Banking Corporation
have at least highlighted difficulties which the British
courts may have to face.
One of the underlying themes which it is hoped to
bring out more fully in this context is the dichotomy
between the general and the particular. To explain:
the law of forged documents in the field of commercial
cre~its depends both on the general principles and theories
underlying the system and on particular considerations
arising because forgery and dishonesty are involved, and
because the nature of forgery is such that it may be
difficult/
(1) (1941) 31 NY Supp (2d) 631.
i
j
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difficult to detect. In reverse, too, the judicial authorities
on forged documents have been instructive both in the
(2)
general background and theory of the subject and in giving
solutions to many particular problems. There remains
inevitably a large area of the law ripe for speculation and
hypothesis, an area which may never be completely clarified
as a result, quite simply, of the infrequency of judicial
decisions. This treatment of this particular topic has
both in mind, the general and the particular.
The obvious difficulty is one of sources and authority.
The general principles of the system all too often permit
varying interpretations when particular difficulties are to
be faced. Nor should judicial dicta intended only to apply
in the circumstances under review be extended in solution
of difficulties not then envisaged. Care must be taken in
adopting the principles of closely related subjects such as
agency or c.i.f. contracts - the issues involved are seldom
strictly the same. One of the more recent authorities
underlining the independence of the credit transaction: from
(3)
the sale contract is Malas v. British Imex Industries Ltd.
where the bank's obligation was stated to be "irrespective
of any dispute there may be between the parties [buyer and
, (4)
seller] as to whether the gopds are up to contract or not".
Forgery, too, introduces notions of morality, justice and
public policy which may, on occasion, dissuade courts from
rigid/
(2) e.g. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay~918] 1 XB 43,
2 KB 623; the American decision based on the same facts
is reported at 210 Fed Rep 810.
[1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep 549; [1958] 2QB 127.
ibid at p.129. ,(i
..:J
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rigid adherence to principle. This is at least one reason
why the United States authorities on the subject must be
treated with great care. In other ways also the trends in
the United States, for instance, regarding the banker's
responsibilities, are by no means necessarily to be reflected
(5)
in the British courts. Even the English authorities can
at times be questioned not so much on the grounds of differing
trends, but more on the basis of varying theoretical
(6)
justifications.
All this merely by way o~ introduction - the subject
to be discussed clearly emphasises the problems caused by
forged documents. It will be convenient to treat of these
first (and so far as possible, separately) both because of the
particular difficulties involved and because the propositions
there decided upon can be considered and tested in relation
to other circumstances involving falsity in some wider sense.
(7)
As suggested elsewhere, the various documents fall to be
treated separately depending on whether they are cheques or
drafts, documents of title, or letters of credit themselves.
The position of the cheque or draft is unique in two
respects: the general principles of a well-defined department
of the law, i.e. negotiable instruments, are applicable, and
the position has been made reasonably clear by Scots decisions.
The relevant statutory provisions are contained in sections
24 and 64/
(5) Scrutton L.J. in Greenwood v. Martins Bank Ltd.
(1932] 1 KB at 384.
(6) e.g. Guaranty Trust Co. supra cit.
(7) e.g. J.B. Miller: Casebook p.86. 87.
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(8)
24 and 64 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882 and the law
may,with one or two exceptions, be taken as well-settled.
The guiding principle on which most questions in(9)
this area are based is to be found in Orr v. Union Bank.
where the Lord Chancellor was reported as stating:
"It is the law both of England and Scotland that
payment on a forged cheque or order is not of
itself any payment at all as between the party
paying and the party whose name is forged. although
cases may exist where such payment may be made
valid by collateral matters".
While the first part of this statement must be regarded almost
as trite law, there are several comments to be made. Clearly
the "collateral matters" referred to are either those leading
to an inference of personal bar or estoppel or facts revealing
that the party whose name is forged has received a benefit
as a result of the payment. The latter unusual set of
circumstances is mentioned later. Although the former
inference is a question which will be considered more fully
under the heading of forged letters of credit, it may be
remarked at this point that estoppel in general depends on
the existence of a duty, and the circumstances in which this
duty may be inferred may well differ where the letter of
credit forms one link of the relationship between banker
and customer. In other words although the basic rule is
unchanged,/
(8)
(9)
45 & 46 Vict c6l.
Orr and Barber v. Union Bank of Scotland (1852) 14 D 395;
(1854) 17 D (HL) 24 at 26.
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unchanged, the prospects of proving personal bar are increased.
Orr v. Union Bank also indicates that there is nothing
inherently impossible or unacceptable in ascribing to the
banker responsibilities against the breach of which he ean
take few effective precautions. It is to be noted that the
letter of credit involved in this ease was by no means
(10)
typical, a consideration which may well be relevant in
deciding where liability lies. Its nature, however, was
clearly stated:
"a letter of credit is not a negotiable instrument.
It merely gives authority to the bank to honour the
cheque of Orr and Barber. The bank ought to have
made inquiry as to who were the drawers of the cheque,
and satisfied themselves as to the genuineness of the
signature. The fact that it was presented by a
person who held and gave up the letter of credit
only raised a presumption that it bad been drawn by
ifthe proper party; and~he bank chose to act on such
(lOa)
a presumption, they must abide by the consequences".
Thus mere possession of the letter of credit by the presenter
of the cheque will not justify the bank in accepting a forged
cheque, although it may be that the person instructing by
letter of credit has a duty to take care in the way in which
it/
(10) It was addressed to the bank in Liverpool and ran
"Please to honour the drafts of Messrs. Orr and Barber
to the extent of £460.9/- which charge the bank
signed J. Watson, Cashier".
(lOa) supra cito at PQ26.
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it is drawn or communicated to the bank. This will be
discussed later. In Orr's case, the issuing bank, the
defenders, had recompensed the bank to whom the letter of
credit was addressed and which had made payment to the
person presenting the letter of credit with the forged cheque.
The court clearly indicated that the issuing bank could
recover in turn from the other bank but held that as between
the party requesting the credit and the bank, the latter had
no right to recovery. The proceedings originally arose
because ~ and Barber, the beneficiaries of the credit,
could not get their cheque honoured, and joined with the
drawer of the letter in suing the issuing bank with whom the(II)
drawer at least had some contractual relationship.
Again in the slightly later case of Caledonian
(12 )
Insurance Co. v. British Linen Co. the letter of credit
involved was by no means the conventional modern document.
It was issued in satisfaction of a loan application the
papers for which were forged along with the indorsement of
the proper payee (King, by name). The actual terms of the
letter of credit are not detailed in the report. The
decision is generally (and justifiably) regarded as supporting
O~r and the Pursuers' arguments (which were successful) were
put on that basis; but it is of most interest because of an
obiter dicta of Lord Benholme:
"Had/
(11) The form in which the action was brought was extremely
unusual and caused many of the conflicts contained in
the Court of Session judgments.
(12) (1859) 21 D 1197; (1861) 23 D (HL) 3.
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"Had the genuine signature of King been adhibi ted
to the letter (of credit) the Pursuers would have
been entitled to recover the amount from King. For
by adhibiting his own signature to a letter of credit
in his own favour •••••• King would have become
(13)
accountable tf •
This is surely one of the clearest applications of the doctrine
of personal bar, and it does indicate that a Scottish court
might be persuaded to take a verycritical view of a party
who did not take reasonable care in his dealings with the
letter of credit.
The question as to whether a banker who pays a person
presenting a draft bearing a forged signature can recover from
(14)that payee on discovery of the forgery has not yet been settled.
Although related to the general law of bills of exchange and
not particularly to letters of credit, this matter is of
great practical importance and is one of those points at which
Scottish theory may lead to an answer at variance with that
given by the English authorities. A few comments may therefore
be appropriate.
Although the question has been considered ~ longum
inl
(13) (1859) 21 D at p.1203 and 4.
(14) See generally, Paget - Law of Banking (8th Ed) at
3'79 et seq.
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in England, there does remain considerable doubt except in
the clear case where the presenter is responsible for the
forgery, either directly or indirectly, and must therefore
remain liable to re-payany sums paid as a result thereof.
Paget's criticisms of the rule laid down in Imperial Bank of
(15)
Canada v. Bank of Hamilton may, it is suggested, not be
well-founded. The case itself has never been over-ruled.
(16)
Paget points out that the right to give notice of dishonour
can not be lost in the way in which the Privy Council inferred
in Imperial Bank. He concludes that the bank's right of
recovery would therefore be unlimited in time, and suggests
that it would not therefore be prejudiced. This is not,
however, the necessary conclusion and the ratio of Imperial
Bank seems only to mitigate what the Privy Council regarded (17)
as the severity of the rule laid down in Cocks v. Masterman
i.e. recovery will be allowed where notice of mistake is
given in a reasonable time and where no prejudice has been
incurred. The mere fact that the right to give notice of
dishonour is not lost does not mean that the party's position
has not been prejudiced and it is this prejudice over which
the Privy Council was concerned.
The situation is further complicated for Scots law
by the possible differences occasioned by the operation of
thel
(15) [1903J AC49.
(16) cit supra at p.3ma.
(17) (1829) 9 B & C 902.
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the condictio indebiti. This doctrine has been judicially
recognised as an equitable one and "it will not be granted
by the court unless it clearly appears that it would be
inequitable for the party to whom a payment has been made
(18)to retain the sums alleged to have been paid under error".
Where "equity" is to be substituted for a supposedly fixed
rule of law, we may be justified in ignoring those English
decisions which preach inflexibility. On the other band
(19)London and River Plate Bank v. Bank of Liverpool, one
of these decisions, was clearly influenced by its own different
interpretations of equity. But at least the question must
(20)be regarded as open for the Scottish courts. Gloag cites
Imperial Bank as an example of the application of the condictio
indebiti and while it is difficult to know how far the
doctrine may be carried, the decision of the Privy Council
(21)has received some support in Jones v. Waring and Gillow Ltd.,
where Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said:
"In the language, for instance, of Lord Lindley in
Imperial Bank of Hamilton: 'As regards negligence in
paying the cheque: It cannot be denied that when the
Bank of Hamilton paid the cheque on January 27 it had
means of ascertaining from its own books that the
cheque bad been altered. But means of knowledge and
(22)
actual knowledge are not the same: and it was long
ago/
(18) 1909 SC 510 at 521 - Lord Ardwall in Henderson & Co. v.
Turnbull 4: Co.
(19) [1896] 1 Q:B 7.
(20) Contract (2nd Edition) p.61 et seq.
(21) [1926] AC 670, at 6890
(22) Contrast the reasoning in Clydesdale Bank v. Royal Bank
cited ln~ra.
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ago decided in Kelly v. Solari that money honestly
paid by a mistake in fact could be recovered back,
although the person paying it did not avail himself
of means of knowledge which he nossessed. This
decision has always been acted on since'''.
It was on the principle of this case i.e. Kelly v. Sol~,
that Jones v. Waring and Gillow Ltd. was decided. Lord
Sumner indicated that from his interpretation of the facts
he did not think that there was a duty owed as between the
two parties involved and that in the absence of such duty
Jones was entitled to recover the money paid under mistake
(24)
of fact. Even if this qualification of the rule by the
introduction of notions of duty does apply, it is submitted
that there is no duty incumbent on the bank vte-a-vf.s the
presenter of a draft to take more than normal precautions
(25)
against forgery. It is difficult to see how the equity
lies in favour of the presenter instead of the bank. The
presenter, has after all, been closer in time at least
to the source of the forgery and may therefore have more
opportunity to suspect its existence or recover from the
perpetrator. Any notion of the bank having a duty to
nrotect the presenter is artificial. The bank's duty extends
in this situation primarily to its customer.
Before/
(23) (1841) 9 M & VI 54.
(24) supra cit at p.691.
(25) What are "normal" precautions is of course another
question and involves an examination of the
circumstances in which the bank might be assumed to have
been "put on enquiry".
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Before leaving this matter, however, some mention
should be made of the rather contradictory authority of
(26)Olydesdale Bank v. Royal Bank in which a stockbroker's clerk
incurred obligations on the Exchange for which his principal
was responsible; in an attempt to meet these obligations the
clerk presented to his principal's bank a cheque on which the
drawer's and indorser's signatures were forged. The cheque
was credited to the principal's account and the principal's
bank then recovered the sum from the payee's bank, the
pursuers in this case. Only thereafter was the forgery
discovered and proceedings raised against the principal's
bank. The court took the view that the principal's bank was
acting as the principal's agent only and that as between two
innocent parties, the respective banks, the payee's bank
would require to bear the loss:
"The Olydesdale Bank, when they paid money on a
draft of their own customer, were bound to satisfy
themselves that the signature was genuine. The Royal
Bank, which presented the cheque, had not necessarily
any knowledge of the Signature, but the Olydesdale
Bank must have known the signa.ture of their own
customer. They were in the everyday habit of cashing
his cheques. It seems to me that in a question between
(27)the two banks the Clydesdale is liable".
With/
(26) (1876) 3 R 586.
(27) ibid p.590, per Lord President.
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With respect, it does seem that the arguments of Dean(28)
Ames attacking this statement of the ratio are well-founded
and that while the alternative ratio suggested by the learned
author is not particularly appropriate in Scots law, it is
suggested that the case can be justified on a much narrower
ground than that emphasised by the court, namely the role of
the bank as agent for the alleged payee. This point was
(29)
mentioned by the Lord President and is sufficient, it is
submitted, for the disposal of the case. Nor does it
conflict, as the alternative ratio appears to, with the
ratio under+y-1ng Orr and Barber and the Caledonian Insurance'
<:~O)
Company. The defenders were merely recovering payment
for their principal and any payment by them was merely in
anticipation of their principal being placed in funds in
early course and in recognition of their faith in his credit-
worthiness. The sequel of the case, a successful action by
<:~l)the Clydesdale Bank against the principal, the Stockbroker,
supports this view. Although the court decided the matter
on general principles of agency law and the benefit obtained
by the stockbroker it is clear that the action could also
have been argued successfully on the lines suggested by ~
and Barber.
In conclusion it must again be noted that we have
been!
(28) cited infra footnote· 43.
(29) supra cit. at (27)
(30) supra cit. It is with respect, suggested that Lord Mure
was not correct in stating at page 588 that the latter
of these cases ruled the decision in Clydesdale Bank.
(31) (1877) 4 R 626.
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been dealing with part of the law of bills of exchange. Only
where notions of duty intrude will the relationship occasioned
by the letter of credit be of importance and it is in this
connection that we shall be looking further at the applications
of personal bar.
Most questions of difficulty in letter of credit
transactions arise in relation to the documents to be
presented with the cheque in terms of the letter. Forgery is
no exception. As a result, there are more authorities, though
they do have to cover a wider area. And it is here that the
general principles and practice of the system are at their
most helpful.
Guaranty Trust Oompany of New York v, Hannay has in
many ways been one of the most productive cases on commercial
credits, mainly because it both explains the practical
background and examines the legal principles involved. The
decision itself is beyond question. It does, however, provoke
discussion both of hypothetical situations and an examination
of the reconciliation of the decision with principles of
Scots law.
The judgment of Bailhache J. in the Kings Bench,
although subsequently overturned on its interpretation of
U.S. law, is significant for the manner in which it faces
each possible theoretical argument for the defendants as they
attempted to attach to the presenter of documents successive
liabilities. It was argued that there was a warranty by the
party/
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party presenting the shipping documents that they were(32)
genuine. He replied:
"The answer seems to me to depend upon what was
the object and effect of Knight, Yancey and Co.
handing the bill of lading to the plaintiffs and of
their handing it in turn to the Bank of Liverpool ••••••
If the true transaction was that by the indorsement
and delivery of the bill of lading to the plaintiffs
the property in the goods passed to them and was by
them transferred to the defendants, there would, I
think, be a warranty of genuineness by the plaintiffs.
Now a transfer of a bill of lading has such efficacy
as is necessary for the carrying out of the
transaction •••••• It mayor may not pass the property
in the good s"•
And in this case, it did not, said Mr. Justice Bailhache.
While this argument based on "special property" may be
satisfactory for purposes of English law, I would question
(34)
its relevance for Scots law. Indeed neither the admission
as to warranty where the property does pass nor the invoking
of the "special property" concept seem to be necessary. Clearly
there can be no question of an express warranty - it could
only be implied - and that implication can only arise out of
the situation between the parties concerned. The party
who accepts the documents and complains on discovering
them/
(32) L1918J 1 !CB 43 at 51.
(33) ibid at p.52.
(34) This question is to be examined fully elsewhere.
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them to be forged has not relied on a representation or
warranty as to genuineness. He bas relied on the security
of the credit system. This seems to be the gist of(35)
Scrutton L.J.ts judgment in the Court of Appeal, and of
Bailhache J.ts answer to the suggestion that there was a
(36)
representation as to genuinenes8.
It was also argued before Bailhache J. that there
was a -mutual mistake of fact-. He replied:
-Assuming the doctrine of mutual mistake of tact to
apply, I ask myself what possible reason can there
be for shifting the lOBS from the shoulders of the
innocent party on whom it has fallen onto shoulders
of an equally innocent party who has escaped the lOBS.
I can find none •••••• as I have already pointed out,
the duty of ascertaining the genuineness of the bill
(37)
of lading was primarily that of the defendants".
While it is difficult to know to what extent the
Scots courts would hold themselves to be restrained by Scots
principles and to what extent they would rely on -new·
principles formulated for the system on the basis of English
law, it is again clear that the Scottish position may not be
completely identified with the English one. Prima facie in
the circumstances above described by Bailhache J. there
wOuld/
(:~5) [1918] 2 KBat 662.
(36) [1918] 1 KBat 53.
('7) ibid at p.54.
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would seem to be what Scots law would term an error common
to both parties, and justifying reduction. Apart from
difficulties of restitutio in integrum in such complicated
situations, however, it is submitted that this is one clear
example where the courts would or should hold that there bad
(38)
been a common acceptance of a risk. This would certainly
accord with the commercial realities. Nor is it enough to
say that there can be no possible reason for shifting the loss(39)
from the shoulders of one innocent party to those of another.
In fact, the party who may be called upon to accept the
documents eventually, i.e. the buyer, has undertaken in terms
of his letter of credit to repay on the strength of the
documents. It is his contractual risk that the documents may
be forged. And it is his responsibility not to satisfy
himself as to their genuineness, but rather to ensure that
for his own sake the situation does not arise where forged
'documents can be tendered. Clearly as between the fraudulent
party and the issuing bank, the fraud may be pleaded in defence
(40)
of the latter's entitlement to refuse. Apart from thiS,
however, the loss does not merely fallon the party holding
the documents when they are discovered to be forged. Prima
facie the only duty on intermediary parties is to ensure
before acceptance that the documents are valid on their face.
It/
(38) See Pender-Small v. Kinloch's Trustees 1917 SC 307, at 315.
(39) as Bailhache J. puts in in Guaranty Trust Co.
(40) Gutteridge & Magrah at p.112.
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If there were to be a duty to detect forgery, and if mere
detection thereof were to give some remedy, the purchasers
would be entitled to refuse to accept from the issuing bank
documents which had been proven forgeries. No case has
gone as far as this.
The facts of Guaranty Trust Co. are not typical:
"the Bank of Liverpool sent their usual communication
to the defendants requesting them to call and inspect
the documents at once so that the draft, if in order,
might be accepted without delay. The defendants called,
inspected the documents, found them to be apparently in
(41)
order, and instructed the Bank to accept the draft".
The problem of the case arose when suspicions as to the
genuineness of the bill of lading arose subsequent to
acceptance but prior to payment. The accepting bank felt
that it was bound by its acceptance and recovered from the
defendants in the action. The plaintiffs argued that the
defendants were not bound to pay the accepting bank and that
any payment so made was gratuitous. The action was raised in
the form of a declaratory action. The arrangement for the
buyer to inspect the documents before acceptance was a
specific term of the contract between the bank and its
customer. But in most cases of course it is irrelevant to
ask whether or not the customer is satisfied with the documents.
The operation of the credit would be prejudiced by any
requirement/
(41) (1918] 1 KBat p.47.
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requirement of consultation between banker and customer
before acceptance. In the normal case the banker would not
even be entitled to seek his customer's approval. The
banker is under a contractual obligation to the presenter of
the documents to meet the draft if no objections are clear
from the appearance of the documents; his obligation is not
solely, or even primarily in this instance, to his customer,
and he may not allow the latter's discretion to be substituted
for his own responsibility.
On the facts of Guaranty Trust Company, the purchasers
would seem contractually to be entitled so to dictate the
acceptance or non-acceptance of the bank. The bank in these
circumstances could not be held liable on a bill which it had
not accepted, nor could it be forced to accept a bill presented
not for its inspection but for the purchaser's. Clearly the
purchaser in this case had not been content to rely on the
bank's discretion and had specifically safeguarded itself.
This, however, could not be the normal mode of operation of
the letter of credit. It would result in prejudice both to
the intermediary bank and to the honest purchaser, to the
former because of the uncertainty of relying on the individual
purchaser, and the latter because consultation takes time.
Lord Justice Scrutton clearly saw that any
representation as to the genuineness of the documents presented
(42)would have to be implied from the actings of the parties,
and it seems that the implication of the actings was best
expressed,/
(42) [19l8J 2 KB 623 at 663.
(43)
expressed, although in another context, by Dean Ames, (44)
cited in Guaranty Trust Co. by Lord Justice Pickford:
"The holder ~f a bill of exchange] is not a bargainer.
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By presentment for payment he does not assert,expressly
or by implication, that the bill is his, or that it is
genuine. He in effect says: Here is a bill which has
come to me, calling by its tenor for payment by you. I
accordingly present it to you for payment, that I may(45)
get the money or protest it for non-payment". The
learned/
(43) Harvard Law Review IV p.297 at 302.
(44) [ 1918J 2 KB at 631 and 632.
(45) It should be pointed out that this quotation is taken
from an article discussing the "Doctrine of Price v.
Neal" (3 Burr 1354; 1 W Bl 390 S.C.) a case in which a
drawee paid to an indorsee on a bill of exchange the
amount of the bill and thereafter discovering the drawer's
signature to be false (a fact not known to the indorsee)
sought to recover from the indorsee. The court held
that no recovery was possible and the quotation cited
was Dean Ames' suggested explanation for the rule,
which seems also to apply in Scotland by virtue of the
decision in Clydesdale Bank v. Royal Bank
[ (1876) ·3R 586J although the justification for the
rule is differently stated in the judgments of the
Court of Session and, as has been suggested, may still
be open to question.
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learned judge thought this applied equally to the holder
and presenter of a bill of lading.
Perhaps one of the most difficult problems in evaluating
judicial decisions in this field is to keep clearly in focus
the issues which have been decided and those which have not.
Guaranty Trust Oompany held that presentation of documents
did not ipso facto involve a warranty as to genuineness and
that payment made on the strength of them could not thereafter
be recovered. It did not decide whether or not payment could
be refused where forgery was discovered after acceptance of
the draft but prior to the date for payment although the bank
in Guaranty Trust declined so to refuse payment, apparently
on the basis that it could not go back on an acceptance
given and received in good faith. One imagines that the
bank would not have followed this course as against the
forger had he been the presenter and had no indorsee relied
on that acceptance.
In the earlier case of Woods v. Thied'l'B!
(46)
a
purchaser of wheat wrote to the bank in the following terms:
"We shall feel obliged by your requesting the Union
Bank of London to accept the drafts of Mr. Otto F.
Homeyer of Wolgast, for 2400 1 against a properly
indorsed bill of lading of 8320 scheffels of wheat,
(47)per Anna, F. Kell master, on our account".
Thel
(46) (1862)1 H & 0 478 or 130 ~.6l1.
(47) ibid quoted at p.621.
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The court held that the words of this letter did not import
that the bill must be "genuine". In reaching this decision
the learned judges leant heavily on the practicability of the
situation. At page 620, Pollock C.B. said:
"the transaction is simply this - the defendant
having entered into a commercial speculation and
wishing to accommodate the person with whom he was
dealing, and for whose honesty he ought to be
responsible, requests the plaintiffs to procure
their London agents to accept drafts against a
properly indorsed bill of lading. It seems contrary
to all usage to assume the plaintiffs undertook to
be responsible if it should turn out that the bill of
lading was not Signed by the Captain, or no goods were
(48)
on board".
This statement is of the very greatest significance in a
wider context as it aptly describes the relative positions
of the parties.
The American courts in Brown v, Rosenstein
(49)
also
accepted that the buyer must be assumed to have accepted
responsibility for the acts of his seller having selected
him in the first place.
(50)
Bramwell B. apportioned the responsibilities in
similar fashion:
"thel
(48) ibid p.620.
(49) (1923) 120 Misc N7 787 at 797.
(50) supra cit. at p.623~
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"the banker has not the slightest opportunity of
ascertaining whether the bill of lading is genuine,
whereas the customer may always make himself safe,
for he need never given an order to pay the bill
till he's satisfied himself that the goods have
~s
been shipped and a genuine bill of lading/issued".
This, on the other hand, should not be too widely construed
for once again the facts reveal that the situation was not
one in which a letter of credit was issued in the normal
way. The purchaser can always get someone at the place of
despatch of the goods to ensure that the genuine goods are in
fact sent. Normally this will be done by requesting(51)
presentation of a certificate of quality. But Bramwell B.
does not say that there is a right of cancellation after
the documents have left the seller's hands. Again in this
case, as in Guaranty Trust Co., the bank was only brought
in after the goods bad been despatched. Although in these
circumstances the purchaser retained some control, the
normal procedure is for the instructions in the letter of
credit to precede the despatch of the goods. This is the
idea behind the credit and there can be no residual right
in the purchaser to defeat the object of the credit.
Woods v. Thiedemann emphasised more than did Guaranty
Trust Co. the importance to be given to the duties of the
banker involved in the credit transaction. This emphasis
was/
(51) which does not eliminate all risk - see infra.
(52)
was continued in Basse and Selve v. The Bank of Australasia,
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a case involving fraud rather than forgery, and in which the
decision turned on the duties incumbent on the banker.
(53)
Bigham J.'s judgment is most instructive:
(54)
"their duties did not begin until O. brought the
documents to them. What these duties then were is
in my opinion quite plain. The defendants were in
the first instance to see that they dealt with the
right man; this they had to do at their own peril.
If they had parted with the money to someone who
was not in fact the man indicated in the mandate,
they could not I think have required the plaintiffs
to repay the amount; and it would not have mattered
how careful they might have been in making their
inquiries. But once they were in touch with the right
man the defendants' only remaining duty was to see
that the documents which he brought purported on
their face to be the documents described in the
mandate. It was no part of their duty to verify the
genuineness of the documents".
While this general submission seems clearly to be
correct it is difficult to see whether identity could ever
become material unless it was expressly stipulated in the
mandate. And even if it is expressly stipulated, it seems
somewhat/
(52) [1904] 20 TLR431.
(53) ibid p.433.
(54) i.e. the bank's duties of care.
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somewhat doubtful that an apparently higher standard should
be applied where the bank is deceived by a person
misrepresenting his identity than that where the genuineness
of the documents is at issue. In normal circumstances,
however, such questions do not arise.
Thus far the issues are relatively clear. Certain
situations have arisen and have been decided. Only the
judgments themselves must be treated critically lest they
be extended beyond their authors' original intentions. The
true ground for debate relates to the "entitlement" or the
"obligation" of the bank to reject in certain cases. The
materiality of the alterations or forgery must also be
considered. The problem of "obligation" and "entitlement"
however, is absolutely fundamental and its resolution has
V important consequences in many aspects of the law of
commercial letters of credit.
Unfortunately, though inevitably, the issues are
largely hypothetical and undecided - "unfortunately", because
the system has few outside sources on which to rely; and
"inevitably" because the courts are very much a last resort
in commercial matters. General guidance is, however, given
by such well-known statements as "a bank is not bound or
indeed entitled to honour drafts ••• unless those drafts with
the,accomp~ing documents are in strict accord with the credit
, (55)
8S opened". Moreover, the documents "have to be taken
up/
(55) English, Scottish and Australian Bank v. Bank of South
Africa (1922) 13 L1 L Rep 21, at 24.
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andup or rejected promptl~without any opportunity for
prolonged enquiry," they have to be such as can be re-
tendered to sub-purchasers and it is essential that they
should so conform to the accustomed shipping documents as
(56)to be reasonably and readily fit to pass current in commerce".
(57)
Davis would seem to state the rule more narrowly:
it is the duty of the banker"to exercise care in the
examination of the documents, and if on such examination he
is satisfied as to their genuineness, he may pay the draft
and debit the buyer with the amount of it". If this view
implies some special duty as to investigating the genuineness
of doouments other than to ensure that there are no
indications of falsity on their face,/(;;~ wisdom must be
~/
doubted. Prima facie it would appear that the bank should
refuse payment where the documents show signs of having been
altered, or where, for instance, the forgery 1s so crude as
to be perfectly obvious on cursory examination. But should
every alteration and erasure lead to such far-reaohing
consequences?
It is suggested that to answer this question in the
affirmative would be to place an unwarrantably onerous duty
of oare on all parties dealing with the doouments whioh are,
it must be remembered, designed for use in mercantile matters
in which formality is not as a practioal matter to be over-
stressed.1
(56) Hansson v. Hamel & Horley [1922] 2 AC 36, at 46.
(57) at p.146.
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stressed. It may be that obvious alteration or erasure puts
a bank on enquiry but it is thought that in following
through that enquiry the bank can not be held responsible
if it reasonably takes the view that the alterations or
erasure were not the product of fraud or evidence of falsity.
(58)
Some guidance is given by re Salomon and Naudzus an
authority on sales contracts in which divergent opinions
were given by Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice Philimore
the former prevailing when the latter opinion was withdrawn.
. (59)
Mr. Justice Darling stated
"They were perfectly put on enquiry when the three
documents which were to be tendered to them by the
contract were tendered, and it was their duty
thereupon to inquire, at all events to this extent,
to look at the other document and see whether they
could come to the conclusion that it was an honest
transaction".
The learned judge refused to allow the party receiving
the documents to abdicate this position of responsibility. He
pointed out that the dispute would in fact never have arisen had
not the market price altered dramatically and although this is not
sufficient reason for reaching the decision (many cases have been
decided in just such a situation with one party being found
entitled to the benefit of what would
normally/
(58) (1899) 81 LT 325; also discussed infra at p.48.
(59) at p.328.
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normally be ignored as a technicality) it is sufficient
reason for the court to postulate a rule which is
reasonable in the circumstances; no qualification of the
requirement of "clean" or "unusual" documents is, of
course, intended.
Where the genuineness of the documents is placed in
doubt, however, as opposed merely to there being alterations
therein, the courses open to the bank are as fallows:
firstly, to hold themselves bound to accept documents
clean on their face without further investigation, secondly,
to hold themselves entitled to refuse (implying also an
entitlement to accept) documents until further investigation
has proved whether they are genuine or not; thirdly, to hold
themselves bound to refuse tender of the documents until
their genuineness is proved; and finally to insist on an
indemnity. The first involves no extension of the bank's
duty; the third involves a considerable extension, in that
any investigation short of court proceedings would require
to be conducted by the bank itself. In no circumstances
(60)
involving a "normal" letter of credit could the decision
be left to the whim of the purchaser. The middle course
would involve the use of discretion by the bank and in this
as well there is an implied extension of the bank's
responsibility. Again, clearly the standard of satisfaction
to'prevail would be the bank's. If it were reasonably
satisfied,/
(60) i.e. not 8S in Guaranty Trust where the instructions
were specific.
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satisfied, it is difficult to see how it could then be
denied recompense from the purchaser. The analogy of
ambiguous instructions in the letter of credit at once (61)
suggests itself in sup~ort of this standard of reasonableness.
(62)
Davis suggests that when the banker "knows" of
the falsity of the documents accompanying the seller's
drafts he would appear to be not only entitled but also
bound to refuse tender of the documents. This seems to
(63)
introduce yet another concept, that of "knowledge". It
is difficult, however, to see what criterion is to be adopted
(7 if it is not "reasonable grounds to believe". Shientag J. in
the American case of Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking
(64) (65)
Corporation seems to have this criterion in mind when he says:
"The Chartered Bank, which stands in no better position
than Transea, should not be heard to complain because
Schroder is not forced to pay the draft accompanied by
documents covering a transaction which
itl
(61) See Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Partners
Ltd. (1926) 25 Ll L Rep 90.
(62) at p.150.
(63) There are some interesting and stimulating comments in
Professor Ellinger's recently published book,
Documentary Letters of Credit (1970) particularly at
page 183 et seq. This book ie of epecial interest in
that it sets out to give a comparative study of the
solutions reached in respect to commercial credit
problems and is the first work to be constructed round
the U.C.P.
(64) (1941) 31 NY Supp (2d) 631 - hereinafter referred to as
Sztejn's case.
(65) at p.634.
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it has reason to believe is fraudulent".
And if "reason to believe" is to mean no more than
"suspicion" an American court has already indicated its
(66)
disapproval of this criterion. The bank moreover,
is obviously in a difficult position in regard to any
investigation. It is not generally in a position to know
what has been shipped, nor to investigate the circumstances
surrounding shipment. From the nature of things, the goods
will usually be in transit when questions as to the validity
of the documents arise. Short of a conviction for fraud
based on the facts in issue it will be difficult for the
bank to make any sort of rational judgment as to validity.
Moreover, the party most likely to inform it of the forgery
is the purchaser, whose motivations must be suspect.
Assuming, however, that it could be conclusively
proved that the documents were false or forged it is not
clear on what basis the bank should be held bound to reject
the documents. It may be that public policy is the sole
basis for the bank's obligation to reject and if this were
so each case would require to be decided on its facts. On
the other band, it may be argued that the obligation is
inferred from the bank's duty to its customer as purchaser.
Or it may be that the bank is justified in rejecting since
the documents are the basis of its own security until it
hasl
(66) Dulien Steel Products v. Bankers Trust 00. 298 F (2d)
836 (1962).
- 30 -
has been recompensed by the purchaser. This last reason
c·'·does not, however, justify an obligation on the bank to
,
reject - at most it might perhaps justify an entitlement to
reject.
It is to be noted that the bank in accepting or
rejecting documents in terms of a letter of credit must(67)
exercise an independent role - independent, at least, in
the sense that duties are owed both to the purchaser, namely
to accept only in terms of the letter of credit, and to the
seller, that is, to accept when the documents are in Qrder.
Bchientas J. in .ll,;ztejn's case adds very little when he
(68)
says:
"In such a situation, where the seller's fraud has
been called to the bank's attention before the draft
and documents have been presented for payment, the
principle of the inde~endence of the bank's obligation
under the letter of credit should not be extended to
protect the unscrupulous seller".
One wonders whether the notion of extension of duty is not
superfluous; and one should not necessarily accept the
assumptions implicit in the judgment, namely that the law
as it stands (or did before~a~tejn) did not protect, at least
indirectly, the unscrupulous seller. Prima facie there is no
extension of the bank's duty if it merely examines the
documentsl
(67) See e.g. Urquhart Lindsay v, Eastern Bank Ltd. [1922]
1 KB 318.
(68) (1941) 31 NY supp (2d) 631 at 634. This case is
discussed infra at p.50 et seq.
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documents on face values only. The extension is only where
~/the bank is required to go further. "S£tejn's case seems
rather to have been decided on publio policy considerations
as related to the particular facts of the case. Where public
policy is concerned the facts must be of prime importance -
general conclusions are almost impossible. It may well have
been that in .Sztejn's case to alloy the bank to accept
vould have been to put a premium on fraudo But in another
(69)
case, Pearce L.J. said:
~Trust is the foundation of trade; and bills of lading
are important documents. If purchasers and banks felt
that they could no longer trust bills of lading, the
disadvantage to the commercial community yould far
outweigh any conveniences provided by the giv~ of
(:TO}
clean bills of lading against indemnities".
He saw any qualification of the practice of "clean" bills
being acceptable as in some degree prejudicial to the credit
system. The system is built upon trust. Moreover, at least
one element in public policy is surely the safeguarding of
the expediency of a sound commercial device only occasionally
necessarilyaffected by dishonesty. Nor is any condonation of frau~
direct in that it is not always the wrongdoer who is demanding
sat~sfaction. If it were, the fraud would be a olear defence
to any action for enforcement always assuming that traud
could be proved, a very large assumption in most legal systems.
Msmy/
(69) Brown, Jenkinson & 00. v. Percy Dalton (London) Ltd.
(1957] 2 QB621.
(70) ibid at 639.
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Many different situations may arise: it may be,for instance,
that the shipowner has interfered with the goods, or, the
seller may well have presented the documents to an intermediary(71)
bank who is in turn relying on the security of the goods
only until presenting the documents in its turn to the issuing
bank.
The issue of public policy is not really one in which
the guidance of the American courts can be anything more than
an illustration of one possible approach. Again, the variety
of ways in which the credit may be operated is hardly conducive
to generalisations on public policy. At most it is an
overriding doctrine whioh would probably be applied where
there was any question of injuring innocent parties at the
expense of fraudulent ones. If the fraud or forgery has been
committed and all that remains is the natural progression of
the documents to the purchaser, public policy is not helpful.
It must be doubted whether there is a duty as such on
the bank owed to the purchaser to refuse documents where
they are known to be forged - i.e. a duty apart from
considerations of public policy. Given a prima facie
independence, it is diffioult to see where forgery justifies
(72)
special treatment. Woods v. Thiedemann settled the point
that the bank was not responsible for the seller's honesty,
and it has been specifically denied that the instructions in
a letter of credit can be interpreted as requiring
genuine/
(71) represented by the documents.
(72) 130 R R 611.
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(73)
genUine documents. If the bank is not responsible
for the seller's honesty, neither should it be responsible
for ensuring honesty in the particular case before it carries
out its primary duties; and it should also be noted at this
stage that the concept of "knowledge" of fraud itself
involves many difficulties on which there is very little
judicial guidance: what standard is to apply, is an
honestly held belief sufficient, what is to be the effect
of reasonable grounds for suspicion, who is to judge when
knowledge is to be attributed to a bank, what regard is a
bank to pay to a customer's allegations of fraud or falsity?
The duty, it is to be remembered, is imposed ss a result of
the system, not by virtue of any speciality in the banker-
customer relationship.
In most cases in which documents are presented tor
the bank's acceptance the documents have two functions:
they are to be presented to the purchaser for acceptance
in normal course, and they are to serve as security for the
bank should the customer for some reason fail to so accept.
In two ways the bank will be prejudiced by having to accept
forged documents. The purchaser, the bank's customer, will
not/
(73) ibid at p.620,623. Continental National Bank 69F (2d)
312 at 317 underlines and perhaps extends the
implications of this view. See diSCUSSion infra p.58.
._J
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not in all probability have the goods he was relying on to
resell in order to repay the bank; and in lieu of this right
of repayment, the bank will not have the goods to fall back
on. The question then becomes; has the bank a duty to itself
or, putting it another way, can the bank consider the risks
it assumes in accepting documents suggested by one source or
another to be false or forged, and will this entitle it to
reject documents reasonably believed to be false. This of
course relates only to entitlement, not obligation" in terms
of the contract with the customer. If, as I have suggested,
there is no obligation to refuse, the bank accepting the
documents will retain its rights of recovery against the
purchaser, whatever these may be worth. Where the goods
themselves are valueless, the value of them might clearly
depend on the financial standing of the purchaser, though
just as clearly the bank's entitlement can not be related
simply to this factor. The presenter, on the other hand,
may well only have the security of possibly valueless goods
in addition to a possible action for fraud against the
seller, again not likely to be of great value. Moreover,
the presenter has acted in reliance on the terms of the
letter of credit which vis-a-vis the banker does not require
valid documents. It therefore becomes difficult to see why,
even admitting that it must naturally be concerned to minimise
its/
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its own risks arising out of the transaction, the bank should
have any special entitlement over and above its normal duties.
Assuming that the cour1awill not permit a party to take
advantage of his own fraud should it be proved in court,
the most difficult questions arise between equally innocent
parties, one of whom, the presenter, has relied on the
representation of the other, the ba~ in the letter of credit.
Is not the latter's risk something which should be reflected
in the commission fixed between bank and customer? The
courts have emphasised the fact that the bank relies on
(74)
the security ot the goods. But no case has been decided
on that fact alone.
Two further points cause concern: should the bank's
reasonable beliefs as to the documents' falSity not be upheld
on investigation, the delay may cause great prejudice to the
presenter. Who would be responsible for this loss? Surely
not the presenter. But if the bank is entitled to stop to
investigate it would not be responsible for the loss. Moreover,
the general rule is that the bank is nor_lly expected to(75)
take up or reject the documents promptly. Any enquiry
into genuineness would clearly take some time and contradict
this.
(76)
It is thought that the analogy suggested by Davis
is/
(74) See for instance ,'Sztejn's case supra cit at p.635, and
Oardo~o J.'s dissent in O'Meara (1925) 239 NY 386 at 401.
(75) Hansson v. Hamel and Horley Ltd. [1922] 2 AO 36 at 46.
(76) at p.150.
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is of very limited help. In the case relied on, Karberg v.
(77)
Blythe, Green et Co. , the buyer under a c.i.f'.contract
vas held entitled to reject documents which, although as
specif'ied by the contract, had ceased to be enforceable by
the buyer under the rule of public policy refusing validity
to contracts entered into with enemy aliens. This set of'
facts is analogous to that of a "known" forgery in that the
fact of unenforceability was readily ascertainable. But as,
has been pOinted out, "knowledge" in this sense can only very
rarely be ascribed to the bank; normally, only a reasonable
\j suspicion can exist. If'actual knowledge was required it is
difficult to see any circumstance other than criminal
conviction whioh would satisfy the requirement of "knowledge".
In Xarf~fif' such public policy decisions as Esposito v.
Bowden were applied and it would seem that the court did
no more than apply a well-decided rule. Towards the end of'his
judgment, however, Scrutton L.J. said:
"I do not suppose Hamilton J. in Biddell v. E. Clemens
Horst et Co. had this point in mind when he used the
phrase 'an insurance •••••0 which will be available
f'orthe benefit of the buyer,' but I cannot believe
that contracts which are illegal and void can.be
regarded as good tenders and available for the benefit
(79)
of the buyer".
Scrutton L.J./
(77) (1915] 2 KB 379.
(78) (1&57) 7 B & B 763.
(79) ':fr:.~§-~.
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Scrutton L.J. clearly suggests the analogy on which Davis
seeks to rely; but he just as clearly points out its
limitations. First of all, the question of a contract
with an alien enemy is one of the best examples of the
application of public policy, and secondly, Hamilton J.'s
remarks were directed only to the one particular situation.
We are in our case dealing with a three-cornered transaction
where there is no question of illegality as such between the
parties, nor any pressing consideration of public policy.
The question of the materiality of the forgery or
falsity scarcely arisee. If the falsity is clear on the
face of the documente the general rule as to the bank's duty
(80)
" would clearly preclude their acceptance. Where the
falSity is not clear from examination of the documents the
materiality would merely be one element in deciding the
(81)
application or not of the doctrine of public policy. In
(82)
Kwei Tek Ohao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd., Devlin J.
said:
"If someone forges the signature to a document, that
document is wholly fictitious from beginning to end,
and it is, of course, null and void aa soon as forgery
is proved, but I do not think that that is any
authority for the view that any material alteration
to a document destroys it and renders it null and void.
Deciding!
(80) they would not be "clean".
(81) See Salomon and Naudzus supra cit.
(82) [1954] 1 All B R 779.
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Deciding the matter in the absence of authority and
on principle, I think the true view is that one
must examine the nature of the alteration, and see
whether it goes to the whole or to the essence of the
instrument, or not. If it does •••••• then the
instrument is destroyed, but if it corrupts merely
a 11mb, then the instrument remains alive, though,
(83)
no doubt, defective".
This is no doubt the case where the contract is c.i.f. and
wheJBthe issue is between damages or reduction of the whole
contract. As regards the letter of credit situation where
a bank bas the instructions of a letter of credit to follow,
all that is necessary to justify rejection is a defective
deed, one that it cannot insist on the purchaser acoepting.(84)
Devlin J. also approved the dicta in Clough v.
(85)
London and North Western Railway Co. to the effect that
where fraud or forgery is involved, the party who is to
accept the documents may take longer in deciding whether or
not he is going to accept them. This, however, was only
intended to apply where the question is whether or not to
affirm a oontract. The bank is in no position to affirm.
It is only an intermediary, though with its own interests
to protect. The expediency of the system and the judgment of
LordI
r
(83) at 787.
(84) at 786.
(85) (1871)La 7 Exoh.35.
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(86)
Lord Sumner in Hansson v. Hamel and Horley are clearly
against any extension of the bank's discretion.
Regarding the letter of credit itself, there are
no specific authorities; those suggested by previous writers
have been based on analogies with the law of negotiable
(87)instruments. Although the letter of credit is not of
course a negotiable instrument, the guidance afforded by
this section of the law is not to be underestimated. Its
limitations are, however, obvious. The element of
negotiability may be a very vital one, and the frameworks
in whioh the two instruments operate can not be identified
(88)
with each other. Gutteridge and Magrah suggest that where
the letter of credit is fraudulently altered, the position
is as in the law of bills of exchange. It is submitted that
the problems raised can not so simply be resolved. The bank
has in most instances an active role to play in the issuing
of a letter of credit. It is thought that where the letter
of credit has been forged there can be no doubt that the
bank is entitled to reject any tender of documents; acceptance
by the bank could only be on its own account, not on the
basis of an expectancy of recovery from the purchaser. This
applies where the letter of credit is a nullity·, where the
instrument's/
(86) supra cit.
(87) See G & M p.I08, and Davis p.146.
(88) at p.108.
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instrument's signature has been forged or its terms materially(89)
altered. If the bank's attention is drawn to the
possibility of forgery, it must investigate or take the risk
of failing to recover from the purchaser. On the other
hand, the purchaser could not be allowed merely by pleading
forgery to escape liability; and the existence of forgery
may not be easily proved. There seems to be no alternative
to giving the responsibility of investigation to the bank.
The situation is a special one: the bank's duties only arise
on the basis of the letter of credit. Until it can be sure
that there is a mandate it should not act. Against this,
it must be admitted that the person tendering the documents
is normally entitled to an immediate decision as to their
acceptance. If the bank has reasonable grounds to suspect
the genuineness of the letter, it must surely be given a
reasonable opportunity to investigate. The principal
responsibilities in this situation are undoubtedly the
bank's. It should not be thought that this is alien to the
bank's position within the field of commercial credits - in
(90)
Equitable Trust Company of New York v. Dawson Partners, the
bank had to pay for the consequences of an error in
communication.
The position as regards the recovery of payments made
on the strength of a forged bill of exchange has already been
examined. It is thought that the considerations discussed
apply equally where the letter of credit bas been forged.
Thel
(89) c.f. Lord Devlin supra cit.
(90) supra cit.
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The element of negotiability is not a vital one in this
connection since one of the documents presented will
normally be a bill of exchange and since the doctrine in
question is in both cases that of payment under mistake of
facts.
The major difficulties are in the duties of the
purchaser or customer towards the bank named in the letter
of credit firstly in signing and presenting the letter and
secondly when he knows of the forgery although not himself
directly responsible for it. While the duties incumbent
on the drawer of a cheque do give some guidance, it is
thought that the particular situations in whioh the letter
of credit operates are signifioant. The system is intended
for the benefit of both purchaser and seller, with maximum
security to both - it is a more complicated concept than the
bill of exchange where the bank's responsibilities as regards
forgeries are very onerous indeed. In credit transactions,
the bank's involvement is by way of individual instruction
and until its mandate reaches it, it has theoretically no(91)
control over the letter whatsoever. The customer or
purchaser has.
(92)
Arthur, when talking of duty of care in drawing cheques,
In London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan and
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline said:
"it appears to me that a crucial consideration in
a case such as the present is this, namely, what
is the point of time at which these respective
obligationsl
(91) in practice, of course, the modern bank is intimately
involved in the preparation of the letter.
2 1918 AC 777.
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dbligations meet. The paint of time is the
presentation of the cheque. Not until that
moment is the banker confronted with any(93)
mandate or order"
He goes on to stress that negligence is the crucial ratio in
(93)
such cases. A fortiori where the buyer approaches the
bank for use of credit facilities, it is reasonable that he
should take care both in signing and presenting the letter
, of credit to the bank. And it may well be that his
responsibility goes further than this. Thus if the purchaser
were to send to the seller a letter of credit to be presented
to a certain bank by ,the seller, (not, of course, the normal
situation now, although it was frequently the case with the
(94)
earlier forms of travellers' credits ) it is thought that
providing the signature was genuine and no forgery or falsity
obvious on its face, the buyer would be responsible for
alterations fraudulently made by the sellers. In the more
usual case, however, where the letter of credit is given
directly by the buyer to the bank in the sense that he signs
a document prepared by the bank the circumstances in which
forgery could intervene are somewhat difficult to envisage.
If the signature is not genuine or some other matter in the
letter forged and the purchaser presents the document to the
bank, it would seemclear that the purchaser is personally
barred as against the bank from disowning the letter or
subsequently founding on the forgery. In the normal case,
the/
(93) at po824.
(94) Davis p2 et seq.
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the major banks have stereotyped forms for letters of
credit which are completed and signed according to the
customer's special requirements. In this situation it does
not seem unreasonable to place the bank in a position of
responsibility as to the genuineness of the documents.
It may well be that the bank would not be entitled in such
a case to delay payment on presentation of documents in
order to verify the letter's genuineness. Normal principles
of personal bar would apply. The duties and responsibilities
of the bank before the credit machinery is set in motion
have no logical connection with the duties involved
thereafter.
The most delicate questions are those of alterations
in the letter of credit where there is a genuine signature.
For example, the instruction to accept the draft only on
presentation of three bills of lading may be altered to allow
acceptance on the presentation of two. It seems that any
alteration must prima facie be regarded as material where
the bank or banks involved must, from force of circumstance,
operate without close acquaintance with the trade background.
The above example would be a clear example of a fundamental
alteration with the same result as that of the addition of a
(95)
nought to the figure in a cheque. And despite Devlin J.'s
observations on the effect of alterations in dates in c.i.f.
(96)contracts, it would seem that such alteration would also
justify/
(95) Chao supra cit. at p.787.
(96) ibid.
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justify the rejection of the document as a complete nullity.
The importance of exact conformity with stipulated dates
(97)
has already been stressed in several cases. More
generally, the rejection of the de minimis principle contained(98)
in the case of Moralice (London) Ltd. v. E. D & F Mann Ltd.
~ should be extended to such alterations in the letter of credit.
The buyer or customer's general duties as to letters
of credit known by him to be forged or in some respect false
must also be considered. The duty to inform the bank of
such falsity could arise conceivably by reason of a general
course of dealing in commercial credits, by reason of trade
u~age, or simply as a result of the banker/customer
relationship. Generally there is no duty to correct another's
misapprehension and no responsibility can be inferred from(99) . (100)
mere silence. In Polack v. Everett, however,
Blackburn J. said: "if a man stands by and allows another
the
to act without objecting when, from/usage of trade or
otherwise, there is a duty to speak, his silence would
preclude him as much as if he proposed the act himself".
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Parke B. in Freeman v,(101) (102)
Cooke and by Bramwell J. in Russell v. Thornton. In
Scotland,/
(97)
(98)
(99)
(100)
(101)
(102)
e.g. Midland Bank v. Seymour (1955] 2 LL 1 Rep 147.
(1954)2 L1 Rep 526.
Jones v. Waring & G1llow Ltd. [1926] AC 670.
(1876)1 QBD 669 at 673.
(1848)2 Exch 654 at 663.
(1859) 4 H & N 788 at 798.
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Scotland, Mackenzie v. British Linen Co. may be regarded
as authoritative support for these decisions.
While all aspects of the relationship between purchaser
and issuing banker have not been judicially examined as yet,
it is submitted that some guidance may be given by the judgments(104)
in Greenwood v. Martins Bank Limited, particularly that(104a)
of Scrutton L.J. Lord Justice Scrutton examined the two(101)
grounds of liability put forward in Freeman v. Cooke:
statement by conduct and conduct by omission where there was a
duty to disclose the truth. These must be carefully
distinguished and while the facts of an individual case might
highlight the first, the second will more often arise merely
by reason of the juxtaposition of the parties. The court in
Greenwood's case relied on the continuing nature of the
relationship of banker and customer in the operation of a
current account to formulate a duty on the one to inform the
other of forgeries detected by them or brought to their notice.
(105)
The duty was conceived by Scrutton L.J. to be mutual.
Now clearly the operation of the letter of credit does
not dictate a continuing relationship in the sense that a
,current account does. There will, of course, usually be
Buch a relationship in the background. It is not on this,
however, that reliance should be placed. As Lord Justice
TOmlin/
(103) (1881) 8 R (HL) 8.
(104) [1932] 1 KB 371; on appeal [1933] AC 51
(104a) at p.379 et seq.
(105) ibid at p.381.
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(106)
Tomlin pointed out, the duty depends solely on the
circumstances; and, leaving aside for the present any
question of usage of trade, it takes little imagination to
formulate a duty arising from the circumstances of the
credit's establishment. If the individual purchaser and
the bank had negotiated a credit, some element of which
thereafter came to the attention of the purchaser as being
forged or false, there would be a duty arising out of the
agency relationship. And where there had been prior dealings
in commercial credits or even in other banking facilities
rendering the bank likely or open to deception by third
parties, there would seem good grounds on the ratio of
Greenwood for holding the customer under an obligation arising
from the banker/customer relationship. Where there had been
no prior communications between purchaser and banker, there would
be no such duty - in these circumstances, however, no bank
would be justified in proceeding without satisfying
itself that the mandate was good. Two other judicial
observations on this field are also helpful. In Union
(107) (108)Credit Bank v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, Bigham J.
(109)referred to the case of Swan v. North British Australian Co.,
the headnote of which would suggest that the doctrine of
estoppel/
(106) Greenwood supra cit. at 59.
(107) [1899] 2 QB 205.
(108) ibid at 210.
(109) (1863) 2 H & C 175.
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estoppel by executing instruments in blank is confined to
negotiable instruments:
"if this semble means that the doctrine of estoppel
does not extend to cases of other documents even
where authority has been given to fill up the
blank, I say there is nothing in the judgments to
justify the semble; nor indeed do I think there is
anything to justi'fyit as it stands".(110)
And in Greenwood, Scrutton L.J. commented on a passage
in Paget "to the effect that neither estoppel nor adoption can
be relied on if the banker's negligence has in part contributed(111)
to the loss". He pointed out that this was not supported
by English authorities and that the U.S. law had gone further
than English law in developing the mutual duties of banker and
customer. Rather they have developed in a different way,
perhaps one which is correctly less one-sided.
One further point which arose from the case of Brown,
(112)
Jenkinson and Co. v. Percy Dalton (London) Ltd. was the
suitability of the indemnity device in circumstances suggesting
forgery or falsity. Although the court in this case was
commendably clear in its condemnation of this middle course,
apparently so commercially popular, it is inevitable that in
many caBes the indemnity device will be utilised and that
accordingly many disputed or doubtful cases will not come before
the courts. Two conclusions are clearly stated/
(110) supra cit. at p.384.
(Ill) 4th Ed. PS 330 & 345.
(112) [1957J 2 QB621.
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stated in the judgments: firstly that clean bills of lading
do not require to be supported by indemnities; and secondly,
that an indemnity should not be used to cover up for false
documents, or documents which throw doubt on the existence
of the goods. Business pressures do not, however, generally
admit of such niceties.
The major topics relating to forged documents in the
field of commercial credits have now been considered and we
may turn to the subsidiary questions of alterations in
documents and of documents false in a sense other than forged.
Both general principles and particular situations are involved.
The position as regards alterations, already touched
upon, can generally be settled by application of principle.
If the alterations are obvious, the bank's duty is clearly
to refuse the documents as not being clean. It would be a
question of circumstances, which so far as not arisen, as to
whether or not such altered documents might, though not "clean",(113)
qualify as "usual". The only guidance is that offered(114)
by the judgments in re Salomon and Co. and Naudzus, where
the special responsibilities created by the credit system
seem at first sight to be better catered for in the judgmenttl15)
of Phillimore J. The facts of the case are interesting.
An/
(113) See National Bank of Egypt v. Hannewig's Bank (1919)
1 Lll L Rep 69.
(1899) 81 LT 325.
329/at 330. The judgment conflicted with that of Darling J.
and was withdrawn, the latter judgment being given
as that of the court.
(114)
(115)
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An invoice correct and unaltered on its face was presented
together with a bill of lading and a certificate of insurance
both bearing a date which though the same as the invoice's
had clearly been altered. The documents were refused as
being unclean.
(116)
stated that the party who was to accept the documents had
Darling J., whose judgment prevailed,
been put on his enquiry so as to investigate whether or not
there had been some falsity but that there was no entitlement
to reject out of hand. He emphasised that the goods had
fallen in value and that this was undoubtedly the true
(117)
reason for the rejection. He concluded in favour of the
old dictum "that the law is best applied when it is subservient
to the honesty of the case". This, of course, merely provokes
the retort that "hard cases make bad law". Phillimore J.
answered the suggestion of the duty of enquiry as follows:
"In this class of cases a man specially requires a
good marketable title. He is probably dealing largely
on borrowed money, and he is possibly buying to sell
again. In either case he requires not only
documents that would satisfy him, but documents which
(118)
he can compel others to take as being satisfactory".
This reasoning may be more appropriate to the circumstances
likely to arise with a letter of credit transaction. Where
the alterations were not clear from reasonable inspection of
the/
(116)
(117)
(118)
at 328.
at 329.
ibid
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the documents, the courts would require to apply the
general rule as to the banker's duty as expressed by
Gutteridge and Magrah at page 68 and explained by Lord Sumner
(119J
in Hansson v. Hamel and Horley Ltd.
The problems posed by documents otherwise false are
focussed by a series of American authorities which, though
subject to consideration of factors not necessarily similarly
viewed in British courts, have formed the basis of suggestions
made by earlier writers as to the position which the British
(120)
courts would adopt. It may well be that this ready
acceptance is not beyond criticism.
(121)In Sztejn, the seller fraudulently shipped
"worthless rubbish" and presented his draft together with
shipping documents to the intermediary bank in order that
the latter might present them for collection to the defendant
bank. The seller who had by this time learned of the fraud
was granted an injunction to prevent the payment of the draft.
The terms of the letter of credit were Significant, providing:
"drafts by Transea for a specified portion of the
purchase price of the bristles would be paid by
Schroder upon shipment of the described merchandise
and presentation of an invoice and a bill of lading
covering/
(119) supra cit.
(120) See G. & M. p.lll and Davis p.150.
(121) supra cit.
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covering the shipment, made out to the order of(122)
Schroder" •
The terms were not for "shipment •••••• as evidenced by "••••••
However, there is no indication in the reported judgment
that any great significance was attached to the wording of
the letter.
The case has attracted sufficient discussion to
justify a very close scrutiny of Mr. Justice Shientag's
judgment. After holding that fraud had been proved he went
(123)
on to say:
"It would be a most unfortunate interference with
business transactions if a bank before honoring
drafts drawn upon it was obliged or even allowed to
go behind the documents at the request of the buyer
and enter into controversies between the buyer and
seller regarding the quality of the merchandise
shipped. If the buyer and seller intended the bank
to do this they could have so provided in the letter
of credit itself and in the absence of such a
provision the court will not demand or even permit
the bank to delay paying drafts which are proper in
form •••••• of course the application of this doctrine
presupposes/
(122) as quoted in Shientag J.'s judgment at p.633.
(123) 'ibid p.633/4.
j
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presupposes that the documents accompanying the
draft are genuine and conform in terms to the
requirements of the letter of credit".
It might be suggested that this case was exactly one
where the letter did provide the solution requiring as it
did "shipment" and "'Presentation". But no mention was
made of this. And while the general statement of principle
is clearly well-founded one must, with respect, question
the presupposition of genuineness emphasised in the last
sentence. It seems to conflict with such authorities as
Woods v. Thiedemann.
The basis of Shientag J.'s decision was that "where
the seller's fraud has been called to the bank's attention
before the drafts and documents have been presented for
payment the principle of the independence of the bank's
obligation under the letter of credit should not be extended
(124)
to protect the unscrupulous seller". He also pointed
out that the bank was relying on the security of the goods
represented by the documents, goods which were apparently
"cowhair, other worthless material and rubbish". Aa has
already been indicated, the element of public policy seems
to have been very much to the fore in thia deCiSion, and
while this may be justified via-e.-vis the "unscrupulous
seller" it is doubtful whether the case's ratio can bear a
widerl
(124) ibid supra cit. p.634.
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(125)
wider application. Professor Ellinger mentions that
-some London bankers think the rule should •••••• be limited
to cases of forged documents" on the basis apparently that
they are concerned with documents not goods. While this
view has some attraction it would be extremely ironic if it
were to be given effect to, Sztejn's case being one
concerning documents which were false rather than forged.
(126)
Professor Bennett Miller argues that the American
decision "appears to accord well with the general theory
and purpose underlying bankers' commercial credits" and
Davis uses it to support his reasoning regarding forged
documents. The latter's treatment has already been discussed.
It also seems that Professor Miller's generalisation may be
questioned. He supports ,Sztejn on the grounds of the
bank's mandate despite the fact that it has already been
decided that the mandate does not infer "genuine documents(127)only" • The question of the buyer's authority ie
irrelevant/
(125) cited supra(p. 28} at p. 194
(126) Casebook p. 94
(127) Woods v. Thiedemann supra cit.
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irrelevant except in so far as it is contained in the letter
of credit, and the possible prejudice of the bank's security
over the goods is not per se sufficient to justify refusal.
Judicial support for. Sztejn is scarce. The learned judge
recognised that he was not bound by previous authority. In
(128)
Old Colony Trust v. Lawyers Title and Trust Co. there
was an obiter dicta in the following terms:
"Obviously, when the issuer of a letter of credit
knows that a document, although correct in form, is,
in point of fact, false or illegal, he cannot be
called upon to recognise such a document as complying
(129)
with the terms of a letter of credit". Not only
was this statement obiter. In Continental National Bank et al
(130)
v. National City Bank of New York it was pointed out that
the judgment appeared to lay down as a general principle that
a requirement for documents inferred that the documents should
be "truthful tt and that the bank could refuse payment if the
goods did not in fact comply with the documents. Clearly, as
a matter of settled law, this is not the case, and it would
be unwise to rely on a decision which was expressed in such
ambiguous terms. In looking for support for .Sztejn,
reference may also be made to an obiter dicta of Tindal C.J.
inl
(128) 2 Cir 297F 152.
(129) ibid at p.153.
(130) 69F (2d) 312.
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(131)in the authoritative case of Robinson v. Reynolds:
"nor would the want of consideration between the
drawer and acceptors [ render the acceptance on the
bill of exchange not binding J unless they took the
bill with notice of the want of consideration".
"Want of consideration" is, however, an entirely different
thing where the goods are supposed not to be truly represented
by the documents. One immediately faces problema with
degrees of non-conformity. comforting (132)
certainty in the generalisation of Gutteridge and Magrah:
There is a
"It is submitted that in the United Kingdom the
banker would be bound to pay whatever his knowledge
of the shipment".
Where the tenderer of the documents was himself the
fraudulent seller, a refusal could, however, be safely given
since the fraud would be an adequate defence to any legal
I action to enforce acceptance. This refusal could not however
be enforced by the purchaser unless the fraud could be
conclusively proved. And in this case the ground could only
be that of public policy, the independence of the credit
precluding the ground of breach of contract.
,Sztejn is obviously a very clear example of fraud
and thus perhaps a very clear example of where public policy
should operate. On the other hand, American examples of
publicI
(1'1) (1841) 2 QB 196 or 57 R.R.649 at 656.
(132) at p.112.
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public policy are not generally acceptable for English
courts. And while the clarity of the situation in Sztejn
lent itself to a policy decision, it does not justify fixed
rules of law readily extended to the more two-sided
situations that may well arise. This was recognised in
America by Greenbaum J. in the case of Frey v. Sherburne and
(133)
National City Bank:
"It would be a calamity to the business world ••••••
if for every breach of contract between buyer and
seller a party may come into a court of equity and
enjoin payment of drafts drawn upon a letter of
credit issued by a bank".
One can readily envisage a situation where a fraudulent
seller ships goods which although not intrinsically valueless
are ~ither valueless to the purchaser either because of his
'-t.
requirements or because of the market in the purchaser's
country. The fraud is no less grave than in Sztejn's case,
nor the loss any the less. But is the bank to be forced to
arbitrate in such disputes? In Frey's case and in Benecke(134) ..
v. Haebler the courts certainly took the view, consistent
with general principles, that the bank were not concerned
with quality disputes, no matter how well documented were
. (135)
the complaints. It has been suggested that the rule in
Sztejn's/
(133)
(134)
(135)
193 App Div 849 (1920)
38 App Div 344; App'd 166 NY 631 (1899)
E.P. Ellinger: Documentary Letters of Credit 1st Ed. 1970
at p.190.
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Sztejn's case derives some support from English cases.
(136)
The authorities cited are not, however, at all persuasive
other than in acknowledging that a party may not rely in
court on his own fraudulent conduct to gain an advantage.
(137)
And a subsequent American case in which the plaintiffs
sought to rely on the ufraud principleu of '~tejn's case
indicated the court's unwillingness to apply the principle
in any but the clearest instance of knowledge of fraud. The
line of authority based on O'Meara's case was preferred and
on appeal it was stated:
"But here Bankers never had notice of the type of
fraud .B:&t.jnseems to require. Dulien's [i.e. the
purchaser and Plaintiff] own behavior was indicative
more of one merely suspicious of than one certain of(138) .
fraud" •
There were further indications that any application of the
principle in 'Sztejn's case would only be appropriate in an
action raised by the purchaser against the bank by way of
injunction prior to payment of the draft. In other words an
extension of the bank's obligations does not appear to be
(139)
envisaged, and Professor Ellinger may well be correct in
suggesting/
(136) Societe Metal1urgique etc (1922) 11 L1 LR 168 at 170;
Malas etc. v. British I !mex Industries [1958] 2 QB
127 at 130.
(137) Dulien Steel Products v. Bankers Trust Co.189 F Supp 922
(1960) affirmed 298 F 2d 836 (1962)
(138) ibid p.841.
(139) supra cit at p.196.
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suggesting that in any case where a seller's fraud or forgery
is suspected ~~_the buyer the bank should disregard the
allegation unless and until a court action is brought by the
\_buyer, albeit with the bank's encouragement. This is
especially so in English & Scottish courts where the
authority of Sztejn's case is debatable. Interim interdict,
at least, has the advantage of speed. It would be interesting
to see what standard of proof would be required by a Scottish
court before granting an interim order.
More subtle problems than that of ,-Sztejnhave been
(l40)Continental National Bank v. National City Bank of New York.
suggested by the earlier American decisions in O'Meara and
In the former case, the Bank refused to pay on the strength
of documents ~resented to them because they had no proof
that the goods in fact conformed to the description in the
documents as to their tensile strength. This is a situation
in which the purchaser would have been well-advised to have
sti~u1ated for a certificate of quality which would have been
attested by an independent qualified party, and been an
added safeguard against fraud or non-conformity. Even this,
however, could not eliminate the inherent risk of all such
(14la) (14l)
transactions. It is submitted that Davis goes too far
when he suggests that the stipulation of such a certificate
radically/
(140)
(141)
(1934) 69 F (2d) 312.
at p.155.
(141a) eogo Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney Ltd. Vo Jalsard
Pty. Ltd. [197Z) 3 WLR 566 where it was pointed out that
'certificate of inspection' was itself ambiguous, in this
case it gave no effective protection.
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radically alters the position. Provided the certificate
was acceptable on its face the bank would have no obligation
or right to delve further into its genuineness, short of the
overriding safeguard that fraud could be pleaded in defence
against the action of a dishonest party. There is, however,
no special rule where a certificate of quality is to be
presented. As was pointed out by Mr. Justice McLaughlin in(142)
O'Meara:
.tAprovision, giving [the bank the right to see that
the description of the merchandise contained in the
documents presented is correct] , or imposing such
obligation, might, of course, be provided for in the
letter of credit".
The learned judge goes on to question how exhaustive the
bank's tests would require to be in that situation. Would
sample testing be adequate?
In O'Meara where there was no question of such a
certificate nor of a special provision in the letter of credit
it was correctly held that the bank were neither entitled to
have the goods tested nor to inspect them. Although this
decision differs at least in degree, and probably in the
absence of dishonesty, from .'Sztejn, its importance in
limiting the ratio of sztejn should not be underestimated.
The dissent of Mr. Justice Cardozo is illuminating in
the different emphasis which is placed on the elements of
decision-making:/
(142) supra cit at p.397.
_.M
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decision-making:
"I assume that no duty is owing from the bank to its
depositor which requires it to investigate the
quality of the merchandise. I dissent from the
view that if it chooses to investigate and
discovers thereby that the merchandise tendered
is not in truth the merchandise which the documents
describe, it may be forced to make pa~ent of the
(143)
,price irrespective of its knowledge".
The non-existence of a duty was settled for the American
(144)
courts in Laudisi v. American Exchange National Bank and
for English law in Urquhart Lindsay and Co. Ltd. v. Eastern
(145)
~. With respect, it is in assuming that the bank
has the freedom to choose to investigate that the learned
judge is incorrect. Nor is the distinction drawn between
disputes with holders in good faith and for value and disputes
with the parties alleged to have misrepresented the goods
helpful in this context. Where the prevailing opinions in
O'Meara's case emphasised the bank's independence from the
sales contract, the dissent was based almost entirely on the
falsity of the documents and if it has a relevance to modern
law at all the dissent is important for underlining how many
situations/
(143)
(144)
(145)
239 NY at 401.
239 NY 234 see especially Hiscock C.J. at 243.
[1922J 1 KB 318 Compare the dictum last referred to
in Rowlatt J.'s judgment at p.322/3.
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situations can be looked at in entirely different lights.
For instance, Mr. Justice Cardozo complains that if the
bank was only concerned with documents then "the bales
tendered might have been rags instead of paper" - exactly
the predicament which came to court in ..Sztejn's case. In
Justicefact if Mr./Shientag is to obtain any inspiration from
previous judicial opinion it can only be from this dissent
and it is respectfully suggested that the reasons given in
(146)
criticism of the dissent apply equally to ,~tejn. Only
on the basis of public policy can .Szte'jnbe distinguished,
and it is illogical and unsatisfactory to try to formulate
different rules other than in this one very exceptional case.
(147)
The ratio of O'Meara was applied and perhaps extended
in Continental National Bank. In this case the court refused
to look behind the documents of title despite a contention
that the goods did not in fact conform to the standards laid
down by the letter of credit. Although it is true that, as
(148)
Professor Miller states, this decision might put the
bank in the position of having to accept false documents, it
must be pointed out that "knowledge" is relative, and that
there is no reason for supposing that the bank should not
v/ assume some risk within the operation of the credit facility.
The bank has both an intermediary and an independent role to
play/
-----------------------------------------------------------------
(146) See 1925 34 YLJ 775 at 777.
(147) See Miller: Casebook p.39.
(148) ibid.
- 62 -
play - the latter may lead to assumption of risk as much
as the former leads to duties. Should this risk assumption
weigh heavily with the bank (an unlikely prospect) the
solution 1s to raise its fee for acting in the credit
transaction. It is too easy to say that risk placed on the
bank prejudices the expediency of the credit, and the courts
have not indicated that they are prepared to accept such an
excuse. It is interesting to note that in Continental
National Bank among the documents stipulated for was a
certificate of quality. Both Laudisi and O'Meara were
considered by the court which pointed out that in any situation
like this where there was inevitably a question that one or
other of the parties had been dishonest there was no reason
(149)
to favour the buyer:
"To hold that the issuing bank may refuse to honor (sic)
because of the quality of the goods would throw the
risk of the buyer's bad faith upon the party who
would normally be less able to calculate it. Thus
the conclusion that the bank of issue may not refuse
to honor drafts because of the failure of the goods
to comply with the documents is consistent both with
the legal theory and commercial use of letters of
credit".
The court also emphasised that merely to describe the
goods as complying with a certain standard in the letter of
credit did not create a condition that the bank could or
(150)should ensure that the goods in fact conformed. It is
suggested/
(149) 69F (2d) 312 at 316.
(150) ibid at p.317.
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suggested that a British court would follow this statement
of principle, one of very considerable practical importance,
which is in line with the authority of Woods v. Thiedemann.
Further support for the principle is obtained from
the decision in Bank of Taiwan v. Union National Bank of(151
Philadelphia where the court refused to go behind the
bill of lading despite a bank's averments that the date of
shipment was false and held that as "the relations between
the parties to this litigation grew out of the letter of
(152)credit •••••• they should be confined to it".
In conclusion, there are two general comments
occasioned by this treatment of false documents apart from
the particular principles discussed above. I have tried to
maintain what I feel is so important in the treatment of a
subject such as commercial credits, that is, a central theme
and attachment to principle. In other more settled and
tested areas of commercial law there may be room for diversion
of decision with every changing circumstance - this is not so
with commercial credits. On the other hand, this uniformity
is not to be forced and it is appreciated that the varying
situations which can occur within the system do admit of
varying conclusions.
Supporting this uniformity, certain generalisations
are instantly attractive and generally helpful in anticipating
thel
(151) IF (2d) 65.
(152) ibid p.66.
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the possible attitude of the courts in future decisions.
Lord Justice Pearce, for example, said:
"Trust is the foundation of trade; and bills of lading
are important documents. If purchasers and banks felt
that they could no longer trust bills of lading,
the disadvantage to the commercial community would
far outweigh any inconveniences provided by the giving
(153)
, of clean bills of lading against indemnities".
(154)
And Scrutton L.J. in Guaranty Trust Co. approved Bowen
L.J.ts dictum that "the practice of merchants is not based on the
(155)
supposition of possible frauds".
The courts have not, however, been blind to the
(156)
dangers of fraud where they could be eliminated by one party.
Other generalisations are often only of significance
by reason of the qualifications and restrictions surrounding
them. Perhaps the most famous of these is Ashhurst J.ts
dictum that "whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person(157)
to occasion the loss must sustain it". And if these
were/
(153) supra cit.
(154) supra cit at p.660. Also Continental National Bank 69F
(2d) 312 at 316.
(155) Sanders v. Maclean [188~ 11 QB 327 at 343.
(156) Lord Finlay in London J. &: Stock Bank - [19l~ AC 777 at
789.
(157) Lickbarrow v. Mason 1787 2 T.R. 63 at 70.
- 65 -
were adopted literally the unenviable purchaser might find
himself in a very perilous position; it is not thought,
however, that the courts will in future determinations be
willing this easily to allow the bank to abdicate its
position of responsibility.
Chapter V.
THE DISCRETIONARY ROLE OF THE BANK IN
THE CREDIT SYSTEM.
The inter-relation of the bank's rights, obligations
and privileges under the letter of credit, the extent to which
a bank is entitled to look to its own interests which may
perhaps be in conflict with the interests of those parties
with whom it has contractual relationships, be they buyers,
sellers or intermediaries, and the whole question of how much
discretion can and should be given to the bank within the
credit system- these are all matters which are of central
importance to any discussion based on the letter of credit.
The system, of course, is based on the bank's
substituting its own financial reputation and strength for
those of its customer. It would be strange indeed if the
bank were to hazard its name and reputation without taking
extensive precautions to reserve to itself rights, privileges
and discretions designed to protect it from the inflexibility
of fixed rules of law and to safeguard it from too close an
identification with the perils of its customer's undertakings.
From the very nature of the system the bank occupies in part
an intermediary role standing between buyer and seller and
having obligations to both, and in part a pOSition of
independence in which the bank has to protect its own financial
interests/
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interests by relying on documents tendered under the credit
for what may be described as the period of risk and where
therefore it should be concerned to ensure that these documents
give as complete a security as possible.
The position of the bank varies of course according
to whether it is the bank "issuing" the credit,an intermediary
acting on the instructions of another bank or merely an
advising bank. The issuing bank is master of its own destiny.
In the normal case it prepares its own mandate, an excellent
example of the standard contract in operation, and is therefore
in a position to limit its area of responsibility and of risk.
On the other hand in questions of dispute between banker and
customer, as principal and agent, it is clear that the
mandate should be construed contra proferentem and should
(la)
therefore be as precise as possible. In the style letter(1)
appended to Gutteridge and Magrah, for instance, the
customers
"agree to hold you (the issuing bank) and your
correspondents harmless in respect of any loss or
damage that may ariee in consequence of error or
delay in transmission of your or your correspondents'
message, or misinterpretation thereof, or from any
cause beyond your or their control".
This clause covers or is intended to cover the situation
which/
------------------------------------------------------------------(1)
(la)
\.
at p.196.
In the recent case of Commercial Banking Company of Sydney
Ltd. v , Jalsard Pty. Ltd. [1972] 3 WLR 566 it was argued
that because of this relationship the bank had a
responsibility in drafting the letter to advise the client
on its terms; the issue is still open but the dangers for
the bank are clear.
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which arose in Equitable Trust Company of New York v. Dawson
(2)
Partners, where a mistake was made in the cable
transmission of the terms of the credit as a result of which
the customer refused to reimburse the bank; and while its
effectiveness for this particular purpose can hardly be
questioned there could clearly be difficulties in interpreting
such words as Itcontrol". It might also be suggested that
the phrase "or from any cause beyond your or their control"
governs the earlier contingencies although one's impression
is that the disjunctive "or" would prevent this construction.
It is within the bank's power to go much further in excluding(3)
its responsibilities e.g. in the style provided by Davis
the bank is not to be held responsib~ "for any error, fault
or mistake in the description, quality, quantity or delivery
of any goods" and their right to repayment is not to be
affected by "any such error fault or mistake or by any
invalidity or irregularity or misdescription of or in any
draft or document".
(4)
In British Imex Industries v. Midland Bank, Salmon J.
commented:
"According to their (the defendants) case, it was their
duty for a remuneration of £18 to read through the
multifarious clauses in minute print on the back of
these bills of lading, and 00 •••• to consider their
legal/
(2) (1926)25 Ll L Rep. 90;(1927)2711L Rep. 49.
(3) at p.209.
(4) [1958]1 QB 542 at 552.
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legal effect and then to call for an acknowledgement
that there had been compliance".
In other words either the duty is unreasonably onerous or
the rate for the job too low. This receives some support
in the judgment of Scrutton L.J. in National Bank of Egypt v.
(5) (6)
Hannwig's Bank; and in Midland Bank v. Seymour, Mr. Justice
Devlin said tlitis not for the bank to ask itself what legal
value such a description might have". But is investigation
so abhorrent in a mercantile contract of credit? In National
(7)
Bank of South Africa v. Banca Italians di Sconto, for
instance, Lord Atkin said that the document tendered must be
such as is an effective business substitute for what is
specified (in this case a delivery order). The determination
of an "effective business substitute" or any notion of "usual"
documents clearly involves investigation or at least some
intimate knowledge of the trade in question. Salmon J. was
obviously impressed by the ratio of the bank's remuneration
to the value of the credit; but this is merely what the bank
has asked for in opening the credit. It is not a criterion
of the bank's liability so much as an indication of what they
thought the service was worth. No more could they abdicate
their position of responsibility by modifying the payment to
£1. It is for the bank to fix the rate for the service. If
thel
(5) (1919) 1 LI L Rep.69.
(6) [1955]2Lloyd's Rep. 147 at 151.
(7) (1922) 10 LI. L Rep.53l.
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the liability is disproportionate, the remedy is simple -
to raise the ¢hange. That is not to say, however, that the
courts should completely disregard the practicality of the
credit system by seeking to impose duties which would
prejudice what is a mercantile device largely unspoiled by
legal sophistications.
The intermediary bank has, in contrast, a mandate over
which it does not have exclusive control. It acts on the
basis of an agreement with another bank and its relationship
with that bank depends solely on that agreement. This was
(8)
emphasised in Bank Melli Iran v. Barclaxs Bank by Mr. Justice
McNair. The decision itself is, however, open to question.
The two points at issue were as follows: the disconformity
of documents tendered under the letter of credit and the
entitlement of the principal to rely thereon. The ratio of
the latter appears to be that the principal ratified the
acts of its agent. It is suggested that the alternative ratio
which should have prevailed, albeit with the same result, was
that the principal bank was personally barred from repudiating
the intermediary's acts and that the intermediary was entitled
to know within a reasonable time whether the documents were
to be rejected. This ratio would prevail whether or not the
relationship was one of agency.
The role of the intermediary bank varies: it can be
asked merely to advise the beneficiary of the availability
and/
----------------------------------------------------------
(8) [1951J 2 Lloyd's Rep. 367.
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and terms of the credit without itself undertaking any
responsibility to the seller of the goods. In addition the
intermediary may be given an undertaking that the bank will
honour drafts provided they are tendered in compliance with
the terms of the credit; and it is quite clear in Scots law
that such an undertaking is enforceable by the intermediary
« 9)bank. In its capacity as adviser of the credit, the(10)
intermediary is acting as the issuing bank's agent and is
therefore bound by the terms of its mandate; and in negotiating
the drafts under the credit the intermediary relies on the
undertaking in its letter of instruction.
The intermediary may be required to go further, to
confirm the availability of the credit and provide its own
backing to the letter of credit. In many cases the seller will
indicate which bank is to act as correspondent and as in this
situation the seller is relying on the correspondent's
undertaking, some authorities have suggested that the (11)
intermediary is rather more than an agent. Gow states
"the correspondent being in terms of the contract
(i.e. between buyer and seller) of sale the originating
banker, because whatever undertaking he may get from
the buyer's bank, it is his letter of credit which
will issue to the buyer or other payee".
ForI
(9) as a promise in re mercatoria.
(10) Cape Asbestos Co. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank [1921 ]W N 274.
(11) at p.470, footnote 94.
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For "buyer" in the last paraphrase of this statement must
/ be substituted "seller". But the questions raised by Gow
are much more fundamental. The authorities referred to in
support of the proposition appear to have little direct
relevance. It is suggested with respect that it is distortion
to think of the correspondent as the originator of the credit.
The letter itself is drafted by the buyer's bank and its terms
are communicated by that bank to the correspondent who is to
tender accordingly. The confirming intermediary is also
bound by these terms. While the correspondent is undoubtedly
in these circumstances more than an agent in as much as the
seller relies on its undertaking not on the issuing bank's,
it is the undertaking and not the letter of credit which is
correctly described as "the correspondent's". In the technical
legal sense at least the issuing bank remains the originating
bank no matter whether the credit be confirmed or not. The
two authorities referred to merely support the proposition
that it is the intermediary's undertaking upon which the
seller relies; and in Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong and
(12)
Shanghai Banking Corporation it was stated that "where a
bank buys a draft relating to a letter of credit, it does not
act as agent of the drawee. The transaction is at its own
risk. It owes no duty to the drawee" (i.e. the issuing bank).
A fortiori where the credit is confirmed - it is only where
thel
(12) (1927) 245 NY 377.
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the intermediary pays under the credit that it acts as a
principal, and where it is bound to look not only at the
supposed mandate but also to consider its own security. In
article 5 of the Uniform Customs and Practice the position is
accurately stated:
"When the issuing bank instructs another bank to
confirm its irrevocable credit and when the latter
does so, the confirmation implies a definite
undertaking of the confirming bank as from the date
on which it gives confirmation".
As the bank's responsibilities vary according to its
role, so too does the form of the credit have important
consequences. It is not intended here to embark on a
detailed discussion of all the forms which may be used. The
variety is infinite. What is significant for present purposes
is the effect which the form of the letter has on the bank's
liabilities. There is a danger in the field of commercial
credits of ascribing legal significance to terms which merely
express common practical forms and devices; and this is a
danger of which not only the academic need beware. The
courts have shown an increasing tendency to develop the
legal sophistication of the credit device. Compare, for (13)
instance, the comment of the Lord Chancellor (Lord Halsbury)
that a
"business sense must be given to business documents"
(14)
and that of Hill J:
"ifI
(13) Glyn v. Margetson [1893J AO at 359.
(14) Myers v. SarI (1860) 3 E & E 306~ at 318.
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"if a contract be made with reference to a subject
matter as to which particular words and expressions
have by usage acquired a peculiar meaning ••••••• the
parties to such a contract •••••• must be taken to
have used them in their restricted and peculiar
signification".
The bank providing a credit for use in a particular
trade and referring to its particular terms must therefore
accept the risk of being bound by terms which it does not
and can not be expected to fully understand. In Diamond(15)
Alkali, NcCardie J. pointed out that the courts could
not be ruled by considerations of commercial expediency:
"It may well be that this decision is disturbing to
business men. It ie my duty, however, to state my
view of the law without regard to mere questions of
convenience".
(16 )
And in Mann. Taylor and Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada
the court was asked to accept a special and restricted
meaning for the term "documentary credit", namely that it
was always issued to facilitate the sale of goods. In this
particular instance, whE{rejID advance had' been given on the
security of documents of title, the court held that the term
must be interpreted according to the local banking usage
spoken to by the bank's witnesses and that the bank had
conformed thereto. It is to be noted that the court found
inl
(15) [1921J 3 KB 443 at 457.
(16) (1935) 40 C.C. 267.
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in favour of a local usage and not one, it is s~
would necessarily be upheld by an English or Scdttish court.
This case merely hints at the difficulties with which banks
may be confronted when the courts come to "define" such terms
as "revolving",lItransmissible" and"divisible" all of which are
used internationally by reason of the very purpose of the
(17)
v/ letter of credit. Until the courts do define these
terms, the banks must assume this additional burden in
interpreting their instructions, although one must with
respect concur with Bailhache J.'s view expressed in Nordskog
that strict interpretation is to be avoided if at all(18)
possible. And provided banks are aware of the possibility
of confusion there would seem to be little need to incorporate
them as terms of art in letters of credit; the difficulty
is more likely to arise as between buyer and seller where
the means of payment might well be referred to loosely and
so create problems in enforcement of the contract. ThiS,
however, is a problem of private international law with
which we are not here concerned.
In contrast to terms which have to date principally
been of importance in describing variations in the practical
application of the letter of credit, the terms "revocable"
and "irrevocable" have already been judicially discussed and
analysed/
(17) see the case of Nordskog v. National Bank (1922) 10 11 LR
652 where two conflicting definitions of the "revolving"
credit were referred to.
(18) for a discussion of the term "documentary" see Davis
p.26 et seq.
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analysed at length by academic writers. Styles of both types(19)
of credit are appended to both Gutteridge and Magrah and
(20)
Davis; those in the former are taken for present purposes
as convenient examples.
In the Uniform Customs and Practice, article 3 states:
"all credits, unless clearly stipulated as irrevocable,
are considered revocable even though an expiry date
is specified"
and article 4 states:
"revocable credits are not legally binding undertakings
between Banks and beneficiaries. Such credits may be
modified or cancelled at any moment without notice to
the beneficiary. When a credit of this nature has
been transmitted to a branch or to another Dank its
modification or cancellation can take effect only
upon receipt of notice thereof by such branch or other
Bank, prior to payment or negotiation, or the
acceptance of drawings thereunder by such branch or
other Bank".
These provisions are of course no more than an attempt to
standardise banking practice in relation to commercial credits
(21)
and they are in no way legally binding statements of law;
and/
(19) at p.200 et seq.
(20) at p.2ll et seq.
(21) although they may be of some assistance in ascertaining
banking practice and custom which the courts have shown
themselves willing to consider.
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and they have not been accepted as authoritative.
The example of a revocable credit given by Gutteridge
and Magrah includes in its narrative the term "revocable" and
expressly states that it "may be cancelled or modified at
. (22)
any time without notice". Davis considers such a credit
as "merely an advice ••• that he (the beneficiary) is
authorised to draw on the banker issuing it, but it contains
no undertaking on the part of the banker that bills drawn
in conformity with the credit will be met".
With respect, in Scots law at least, it is incorrect
to suggest that the revocable credit has no contractual
significance so far as the bank is concerned. It certainly
indicates a channel by means of which the beneficiary may
seek payment. But more than this, it is a contractual
undertaking enforceable by the beneficiary albeit an
undertaking which the bank is entitled to revoke at any time
and, in Gutteridge and Magrah's example at least, without
(23)
notice. It is unhelpful, moreover, to confuse notions of
(24)
"revocability" with whether or not a credit is confirmed.
(25)
In Cape Asbestos Co. Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank. the credit was
advised/
(22) at p.33.
(23) See T.B. Smith's Short Commentary and the authorities
there referred to on the ttunilateral promise" - p.742
et seq. This undertaking is of course in re mercatoria.
(24) as in Davis' example p.33.
(25) ~92lJWN 274.
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advised to the ~laintiffs by the defendants with the
statement "this is merely an advice of the o~ening of the
above-mentioned credit, and is not a confirmation of the
same". The defendants were notified at a later date of the
cancellation of the credit but neglected to give notice to
the ~laintiffs (it was accepted that the bank should
reasonably have and would have in the normal case).
Bailhache J. held that there was no legal obligation to
advise the cancellation of the credit, originally revocable
in form. The decision is completely correct on the very
simple ratio that the bank specifically restricted its role
to that of adviser. The bank did not itself issue the
credit, and, in passing, it is noted that the issuing bank
did give notice of the cancellation of the credit, although
the point did not arise as to whether it considered itself
under an obligation to give such notice.
Where, however, there is no statement that the credit
is revocable without notice, difficult questions may arise
(26)
particularly in Scots law. Gutteridge and Magrah state
that "it is doubtful whether or not such a credit can be
revokedll, but do not elaborate on this other than to say that
in any event revocation can only be effective after reasonable
notice. It is suggested that it is at this ~oint that Scots
law is forced to consider analytically the relationship
between the issuing banker and the seller. While it is true,
as/
(26) at p.36.
_J
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(27)
as Gow states, that consideration is irrelevant to
enforceability, the promise being enforceable as a writ in
re mercatoria, the right to revoke does depend on what view
is taken of the relationship between banker and seller. It
has been assumed by such learned writers as Gutteridge and
Magrah that the only theory which is satisfactory in
explaining this relationship is one which applies equally to
revocable and irrevocable credits. On this basis the so-called
"offer and acceptance" theory is dismissed. But where, as in
(28)
Scots law, there is no problem of "creating" a consideration,
this theory has much to commend it. It is suggested that
the revocable letter of credit is more-than an expression of
intent which would not create an obligation. It is, at least
so far as the example given in Gutteridge and Magrah is
(29)
concerned, an undertaking - expressed in the words "hereby
open 0 ••••• in your favour It - upon which the beneficiary is
invited to act, and the beneficiary is told how he may use
the facility - "by draft on us at sight". It is suggested
that the offer is in the communication of the terms of the
credit, and the acceptance is the act of tendering the
documents specified therein. Use of the word "revocable"
clearly expresses the right to revoke; but even if the nature
off
(27) at p.47l.
(28) a problem one is happy to leave to English lawyers.
(29) for this particular argument it must be supposed that
there is no last paragraph specifically excluding the
need for notice.
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of the credit is unstated, the credit is revocable on the
basis that an offer may be withdrawn at any time before
acceptance by the tender of documents. The authority of
Cape Asbestos may be distinguished as applying only to the
advising of a credit.
If this interpretation is accepted, there is no
difficulty in accepting Gutteridge and Magrah's suggestion
(30)
that the credit can only be revoked after reasonable notice.
It is suggested, however, that to be tlreasonable~'notice need
only be communicated to the benefioiary prior to the tendering
of the documents. The doctrine of enforceable unilateral
undertaking only applies to a credit whioh is irrevocable.(31)
Demogue's critioism that Gutteridge has created "a
third type of credit which can be revoked after notifioation
to the beneficiary" is met, therefore, by the answer that
Gutteridge's third type is in fact the standard revocable
oredit and the right to revoke without notice must be
specifically reserved in the communication of the credit.
In any event, it is unrealistio to seek artifioially
to restrict the types of credit. Each credit is liable to
be interpreted in its own circumstances. For instance,
Atkin L.J. is reported in the decision in International
. (32)
Banking Corporation v. Barclaya Bank as holding that, on
the eVidence, a credit was irrevocable unless it appeared on
its/
(30) at p.36.
(31) Le credit documentaire en droit anglais (1934) at 62.
(32) Legal Decisions affecting Bankers Vol.5 p.l.
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(33)
its face to be revocable.
Further it is submitted that there is no justification
for placing an intermediary bank in a more favourable position
than the beneficiary where a revocable credit is concerned.
As stated in the American case of Courteen Seed Co. v, Hong(34)
Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, the intermediary
"buys commercial paper relying on the credit of the drawer
and the security that is offered". If the intermediary has
merely been asked to advise the credit to the beneficiary,
notice of revocation is only necessary to the beneficiary
and while any revocation would normally be communicated
through the intermediary, the bank should for its own safety
ascertain the continuing availability of the credit prior to
negotiating drafts.
Although there appears to be no authority dealing
with this point, it would seem that the right to effectively
revoke the credit can only rest with the bank albeit acting
on the buyer's (the bank's customer in the normal case) (35)
instructions. If the theory expounded above ie accepted,
the notice of revocation must be conveyed through the bank
to the seller. To this extent the independence of the issuing
bank which is an important feature of the irrevocable credit
does not apply where the credit is revocable. In conveying
the notice of revocation it is suggested that the bank must
bel
(33) c.t. U.C.P. article 3.
(34) (1927) 245 NY 377.
(35) possible authorities: Lord Sumner in Sassoon [1927] 2 AC
at 724 also U.S. Case: Moss v. Old Colony Trust (1923)
140 NE 803.
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be regarded as the agent of the customer (buyer). Until,
however. this matter is the subject of judicial discussion,
there must remain some doubt which should be removed by a
(36)
clear statement in the letter of credit.
It is the position of independence in which the bank
is placed by the irrevocable credit that has given rise to
the considerable judicial comment on the terms "irrevocable"
and "confirmed" e.g. in Donald H. Scott and Co. v. Barclays
(37)
~ Scrutton L.J. said:
"the appellants gave a confirmed credit to the
respondents; that is to say. they entered into
contractual relationships with them from which
they could not withdraw except with the consent of
the other party";
(:38)
and in Sassoon v. International Banking Corporation,
Viscount Sumner said:
"Neither the letter of agreement nor the letter of
advice nor any document, which relates to them,
makes them in terms 'irrevocable', the term 'confirmed'
alone being used, yet both words were stipulated for
by M. Sassoon and Company 0 ••••• it is not easy to
see in what respect either word or both of them
together would carry the matter further than the word
'contract'/
(36) c.f. Davis's style at p.208.
(37) [1923J 2 K Blat 14.
(38) [1927J AC 711 at 724, a Privy Council decision.
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used (39)
'contract'/in its strict sense would have done,
for apparently a confirmed credit is something
formerly provisional,and now turned into something,
definite by way of promise, and the word irrevocable
simply closes the door on any option or locus
poenitentia~ and makes the agreement definite and
binding".
In both these learned judgments, there are indications
that the terms "irrevocable" and "confirmed" are indisting-
:uishable in that they both convey the contractually binding
and irreversible nature of the bank's undertaking. "Irrevocable:'
however, is a term properly applied to the credit as issued
by the issuing bank. "Confirmation" is the function of the
intermediary bank which is to assume a separate and additional
responsibility on a credit opened by the issuing bank. An
irrevocable credit may be confirmed or unconfirmed without
affecting the binding nature of the credit or the undertaking(39a)
of the issuing bank. Lord Sumner's statement that a confirmed
credit is something formerly provisional must therefore be
open to question. And there would seem to be no reason why
a revocable credit should not be confirmed though in such
cases the confirmation would not create irrevocability but
merely place the intermediary bank in the same position as
the/
(39) it is not clear what meaning is here intended by
Sumner L.J.
(39a) See Denning MR in W.J. Alan Ltd. v , El Nasr Co. [1972J
2 All ER 127 at pages 135 and 136.
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the issuing bank i.e. as having made an offer which may be
accepted on tender of documents prior to revocation. In the
unlikely event of a revocable credit being confirmed, the
intermediary is in a precarious position as its offer will
require to be withdrawn by notice to the beneficiary in the
same way as the issuing bank's offer; and as the issuing
bank is under no obligation to notify the intermediary of
its withdrawal of offer (although it normally would) it would
accept this role only if specifically requested so to act.
Professor Bennett Miller when considering the question
(40)
of revocability and confirmation takes the view that the
revocable credit is also a "contract to supply credit
facilities". It is respectfully suggested that the revocable
credit is an offer in distinction to the irrevocable credit
which has by itself a binding force.
The distinction between "irrevocable" and "confirmed"
may be illustrated by reference to the case of Panoutsos v.(41)
Raymond Hadley where the contract specifically stipulated
for the opening of a "confirmed bankers' credit". The seller
was subsequently advised of the opening of the credit; the
bank stated "we are acting merely as agents for our foreign
correspondents and cannot assume any responsibility for its
continuance". Irrevocable or not, the credit did not provide
the seller with the security of a bank in his own country
accepting!
(40) Casebook at pp. 6 and 7.
(41) [1917]2 KB 473.
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accepting a separate and additional responsibility for
payment, and as such the credit was not conform to contract
and the sellers held entitled not to deliver the goods. If,
however, the stipulation in the contract had merely been for
an irrevocable credit, confirmation, or the absence of it,. (42)
would have been irrelevant. And while Lord Sumner was
unwilling to grant the terms separate and legally individual
meanings, Panoutsos does show that the courts may have no
alternative, and on the basis of Mann Taylor and Company
and other authorities mentioned above, they would be given
their "normal business sense" in banking circles.
It is the contractual relationship between banker and
beneficiary that ensures the independence of the former and to
that extent displaces the duty of the banker (as agent) to the
purchaser (principal and customer):
"When a client induces a bank to give a letter of
credit to a third party, he cannot of his own will
compel the bank to cancel the letter, for the contract
does not exist between the client and the bank, but
(43)
between the bank and the third party".
The purchaser's remedy is by action for breach of
(44)
contract. The most recent statement of the independent
role/
(42) supra cit.
(43) Sovereign Bank of Canada v. Be11house etc. [191~ 23 QR
(KB) 413.
(44) Urquhart Lindsay & Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Bank Ltd. (1922]
1 KB 318 per Rowlatt J. at 323.
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role played by the bank is the judgment of McNair J. in
(45)
Soproma s P R v. Marine and Animal By-Products Corporation,
a case concerned partly with a second tender of documents
direct to the purchasers outside the period of the credit.
It was held that this second tender was to be disregarded.
The two-fold function of the bank was to be impartial security
on which both parties could rely, the one for payment on the
drafts and the other for professional vetting of the documents
of title. This case confirmed the decision of Newman Industries
(46)
Ltd. v. Indo-British Industries Ltd., at least the obiter
dicta in that case of Sellers J, to the effect that payment
under the credit was all that the seller was entitled to
but that this was not to be treated as payment by the purchaser
under his contract with the seller for which the purchaser
remained responsible should the bank not be able, for any
reason, to make payment.
The decision in Plastiymoda Societa per Azioni v.
(47Davidsons (Manchester) Ltd. raises an interesting question.
This case 'was concerned with the waiver by the sellers, for
their own purposes, of strict conformity with the purchasers'
obligations under the contract so far as establishing the
credito It was held that in the circumstances the sellers
were bound to notify the buyers when they wished to avail
themselves/
(45) [1966]1 Lloyds Rep. 367.
(46) [1956]2 Lloyds Rep. 219.
(47) [1952] 1 Lloyds Rep.527.
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themselves of the credit in order that the buyers might
then make the necessary arrangements. Arising as they do
entirely under the contract of sale, the bank is not concerned
in such matters. Once, however, the bank has been instructed
it is not yet decided whether a similar waiver so far as
operations under the credit are concerned would be effective.
At that stage the contract is between banker and beneficiary.
It is clear that the buyer can not impose more onerous
conditions under the credit. But is the buyer entitled to
waive strict compliance with the credit's terms even where
it would presumably have, or could obtain, the concurrence
of the seller! It is suggested that any waiver would require
the compliance of the bank. Variation of the terms might
well involve some possible prejudice to the bank's security
or the period of risk. The bank's contract with the buyer
fixes the bank's remuneration on the basis of, inter ~,
these factors. Assuming that both buyer and seller were
agreed on the modification, the bank would at least be
entitled to re-negotiate the terms of its contract with the
buyer. To that extent the two contracts are clearly inter-
dependent. The bank's independence is not, then, solely the
independence of a neutral; it is the independence of a
.party having separate, identifiable interests in the credit
and its subject matter. Both of these aspects are clearly
illustrated in a series of cases all dealing with the right
off
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of the bank to decline acceptance of documents rendered
under the credit.
(48)
In American Steel Co. v. Irving National Bank the
purchasers were unable, due to supervening legislative control,
to obtain a licence for the exportation of the goods for
which documents had been rendered to the bank. The bank
accepted the purchasers'instructions and refused the documents.
Roger J. stated:
"the defendant in effect seeks to read into the
contract a provision that the plaintiff's rights
under the letter of credit should be subject to the
superior right of the MacDonell Chow Corporation
(the buyers) to modify the contract which the bank
had made with the plaintiff. We do not so understand
the law".
This decision in fact asserts the complete independence of
the two contracts i.e. between buyer and banker and between
banker and seller. It would be possible to argue that the
two contracts are interdependent. The consideration (or causa)
for the latter is the buyer's expectation of receiving the
goods contracted for. If the contract of sale is frustrated
this consideration disappears. But when the credit has been
advised or communicated to the seller its terms (i.e. the
advice's) do not admit of any qualifications, and it is
difficult, therefore, to see how payment could be refused.
Questions/
(48) (1928) 266F 41. This situation is now at least in part
guarded against by the establishment of the Export
Credit Guarantee Department of the Board of Trade(in
"R'l'!'; tRi n ] _ _j
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Questions of bad faith do not arise. And the terms of the
credit bind the bank in like terms, even where the value of
the bank's security might be severely prejudiced. On the
other hand if the legislation were to prevent the shipping
of the goods it might be argued that any bills of lading
were prima facie false in that they could not testify to
the shipping of goods which was rendered illegal.
American Steel goes further than the similar authority
(49)
of Frey v. Sherburne and National City Bank, the ratio of
which was stated in the judgment of Greenbaum J. The form
of the credit in this case was more on the lines of the early
"traveller's letter of credit" and the interests of innocent
third parties were for this reason considered paramount. "It
would be a calamity to the business world engaged in
transactions of the kind mentioned in the complaint if for
every breach of a contract between buyer and seller a party
may come into a court of equity and enjoin payment of drafts
(49)
drawn upon a letter of credit issued by a bank".
Certainly not 'every' ;breach of contract should
provide a remedy; but the courts have recently acknowledged
that the degree in gravity of the breach is relevant. In
(50)
Malas v. British Imex Industries Ltd. the purchasers sought
to cancel the credit on discovering that an early shipment
of goode wae of defective quality. The ratio of that case
had /
(49) (1920) 193 App.Div. 849.
(50) [1958J 2 QB 127.
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had been established at least thirty years earlier in{51}
Urquhart Lindsay.
Narrower questions are raised by three American
(52)
cases. In O'Meara v. National Park Bank of New York,
the bank demanded proof that the descriptions in the
documents tendered were correct. It was held that the bank's
proper concern was with documents not the goods they
represented. The bank in the later case of Continental(53)
v. National City Bank of New York claimedNational Bank
to know that the goods were not conform to the documents to
be tendered. In addition to the stipulation for the documents
in the letter of credit there was the following statement:
"Cement to be of sound merchantable quality and
standard of same shall meet with the requirements of
the American Society for Testing Materials".
A certificate of quality was produced. The bank, however,
sought further proof of the cement's quality, and in its
absence refused payment under the drafts. In the course of
its judgment the court stated:
"To accept this contention would practically
undermine the general principle that the bank must
honour the draft if the documents comply with the
terms of the letter of credit" - with respect, it is
the terms of the letter of credit with which the seller must
comply, and in this resnect the terms of this particular letter
off
(51) [1922J 1 KB 318.
(52) (1925) 239 NY 386.
(53) (1934)69 F (2d) 312.
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'; of credit were highly unusual. The court's statement
continued: "for any description of the goods in such a
letter might quite as readily be interpreted to create such
a condition" - in fact, however, the advice of the letter of
credit does not normally contain such description. The ratio
of the decision is contained in the following sentence:
"Admitting that the issue of a letter of credit may
impose such a condition if it so wishes, it should
be required at least to make such an intention
perfectly clear".
With this statement at least, there can be little cause for
argument. And on the basis of the report available to me, it
is also difficult to question the court's interpretation. It
is submitted that the ratio would be applied by the British
courts. (54)
Professor Miller pointed out that this might force
the bank to accept documents it "knew" to be false, always
provided there was no statement sufficiently unequivocal to
allow proof of non-conformity. This is one of the risks which
the bank will require to accept. And even if the bank could
rely on an additional condition in the credit, it seems that
any such inspection would be carried out at the bank's risk.
If inspection facilities were refused the bank could, it is
submitted,/
(54) Casebook at p.39.
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submitted, only justify the refusal of the documents by
successfully proving the disconformity of the goods.
The obvious risk is that of fraud or bad faith.
Although this subject has been dealt with elsewhere in this
Paper under "Forged Documents" 'ithas particular relevance
in any discussion of the bank's entitlement and obligation
as to documents tendered.
Where forgery is discovered by the bank subsequent
to its acceptance of the draft, the bank is obliged to pay
to holders in due course although it is then entitled to
(55)
recover that payment from the buyer. And prior to
acceptance, the bank is under no obligation to enquire as to(56)
the genuineness of the documents tendered. As Bramwell B.
(57)
said in Woods v. Thied~mann the bank is not in a position
to make such enquiry. If the purchaser chooses to make
enquiry then that, of course, is his concern. In British
Imex Industries Ltd. v. Midland Bank Ltd., Salmon J. stated:
"I doubt whether banks are under any greater duty
to their correspondents than to satisfy themselves
that the correct documents are presented to them and
that the bills of lading bear no endorsement ••••••
which could reasonably mean that there was, or might
(58)
be, some defect in the goods or their packing".
It/
(55) Robinson v. Reynolds (1841) 2 QB 196.
(56) G. & Magrah at p.109.
(57) (1862) 1 H & C 478.
(58) [195~1 QB 542 at 552.
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of Bailhache J.
on this particular point should now be regarded as
(59)
authoritative:
"Now it is to be observed that the plaintiffs had no
better means of knowing whether the bill of lading
was a forgery than the defendants •••••• It was
not their duty but that of the defendants to satisfy
themselves as to the genuineness of the bill of
lading".
Although the facts in this case were special, the proposition
is capable of general application.
There are, then, these two instances where the bankls
obligation is clear. Where, however, the falsity of the
documents appears prior to their tender the position is by
no means clear. Davis "confidently submits" that where
forgery is alleged as the ground of the document's invalidity,
the case is "too clear for argument". He says:
itAforged bill of lading or policy of insurance
cannot be said to constitute a contract of any
validity whatsoever. The buyer would undoubtedly
be entitled to reject such documents tendered in
performance of a c.i.f. contract and equally, it
would seem, a banker would be entitled and indeed
bound to reject them when tendered in purported
compliance/
(59) [i91EO I KB 43 at 52.
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terms of a (60)
compliance with the/letter of credit".
With respect, the parallel drawn between the c.i.f. contract
and the tender under the letter of credit can not be taken
too far. In the former the contract is between buyer and
seller; in the latter it is between the seller and the bank.
In the former the subject of the contract is goods; in the
latter it is the documents of title. Davis purports to deal
with two issues - namely the entitlement of the bank and,
what must be considered separately, its obligation.
Let us first consider the bank's obligation. If
the bank declines to accept the documents tendered it can not
plead in justification merely the advice or "instructions" of
(61)
its customer. It would require to prove that the seller
was fraudulently presenting the documents knowing them to be
false. But even where forgery or falsity is concerned, there
are still questions of degree. In Kwei Tek Chao v. British
(62)
Traders etc., for instance, the forgery of the date of
the shipment did not go to the essence of the bill of lading
although one can envisage circumstances where it clearly
would. Moreover, how is the bank to be assured of the falsity;
its knowledge is not likely to be in any sense "absolute"
or first hand? It is probable that it will be advised
of the irregularity by the buyer who will, of course, be
anything/
(60) at page 150.
(61) see authorities referred to supra.
(62) [1954] 2 QB459.
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anything but a disinterested party. If the bank is to accept
its customer's instructions to reject the documents, it might
well be put to some expense simply to justify its rejection.
If the customer were to undertake to reimburse the bank not
only for these expenses but also for the consequences of its
failure to prove the falsity of the goods (and if the customer
was in a position to give such an undertaking and to honour
it), the bank would clearly have little to risk in adopting
this course. But is the bank obliged to run this risk? There
is no British authority directly in point although the
situation was commented on in the jud~ent in .S~te.in v.
(63)
J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation:
"However in the instant action Schroder had received
notice of Transea's active fraud before it accepted
or paid the draft. The Chartered Bank which stands
in no better position than Transea, should not be
heard to complain because Schroder is not forced
to pay the draft accompanied by documents covering a
transaction which it has reason to believe is
fraud ulent "•
In this case the Chartered Bank was simply the collecting
agent for the seller whose fraud was alleged; and the action
was raised not by the seller (or his agent) who failed to
obtain the bank's acceptance but by the buyer in a successful
effort/
(63) (1941) 31 NY Supp. (2d) 631 at 634.
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effort to restrain the bank from so accepting. Clearly if
the buyer in this situation was able to satisfy the court
of the falsity of the documents and that court was the one
having jurisdiction over the bank the decision would to all
intents and purposes be taken out of the hands of the bank.
Without such a court order, however, it must be doubted
whether the bank would be obliged to refuse acceptance of
the documents where it simply had "reason to believe" they
might be false. Consider, for example, the dictum of Salmon J.
(64)
in British Imex Industries Ltd.
As to t he entitlement of the bank, Gutteridge and
(65)
Magrah state:
"it would seem that he can refuse to accept or pay,
though direct authority is lacking on the point.
It is submitted that a banker cannot be compelled
to honour a credit unless all the conditions
precedent have been performed, and that he ought
not to be under an obligation to accept or pay
against doquments which he knows to be waste paper.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive the banker
of that security for his advances which is a cardinal
feature of the process of financing carried out by
means of the credit and must be within the
contemplation/
(64) supra cit at page 20.
(65) at page Ill.
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contemplation of anyone discounting drafts drawn
with reference to it. Moreover, the buyer, unless
otherwise agreed, cannot be deemed to have
authorised the banker to pay against documents
v which are known to be forged".
The "conditions precedent" to which the learned
writers refer are, however, the tendering of documents in
terms of the letter of credit as advised by the bank. The
seller would clearly not be entitled to benefit from his own
dishonesty if it were proved in court proceedings. But it
would be for the bank to justify its actions. It is certainly
true that the bank might, by accepting documents believed to
be false, be hazarding its security, and to this extent its
dilemma is highlighted; but it is not necessarily correct
to say that the bank's dependence on the security of the
goods is foreseeable by parties relying on the letter of
credit and it is not, therefore, thought that the bank's
entitlement can be justified on this basis. Nor, as has
already been discussed, can the buyer's authority qualify
or modify the terms of the letter as originally instructed.
Provided the falsity is not clear from the documents
themselves, the credit itself gives no guidance to the bank.
In conclusion, the bank's entitlement is not an
absolute one; it requires to be justified in each case and
the risk in proving such justification must remain the bank's.
It/
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It is certainly true, as a practical matter, that "the
principle of the independence of the bank's obligation
under the letter of credit should not be extended to protect
(66)
the unscrupulous seller" but this is assured not because
of any principle of law but because the bank can only be
held responsible for rejecting the documents tendered if
it fails to prove their falsity and the risk in such process
is outweighed by the bank's interest in the security subjects.
In each case, however, the decision as to whether or not to
reject, is the bank's and in so far as the judgment in Sztejn's
case goes further it should not be followed in the Scottish
courts.
If it is conceded that the bank may be called on
under the credit to exercise its own judgment and discretion,
it becomes a matter of debate to what extent this can and
must be so.
"I apprehend, that, whenever a man undertakes to
perform a duty he undertakes to perform it with a
reasonable degree of skill and care; and that, where
the performance bas reference to a particular trade,
necessarily involves an obligation on the party to
make himself acquainted by due inquiry with the usages
(67)
of that trade".
The relevance of this in applying it to the bank's position
under/
(66) Sztejn's case - supra cit.
(67) Russian Steam Navigation Trading Co. v. Silva (1863)
13 CB (NS) 610 at 617 per Willes J.
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under the letter of credit is obvious. The facts of the
case to which this judgment related were as follows: by a
bill of lading in respect of wool from Odessa, freight was
to be paid in London on delivery at a rate of eighty shillings
per hundredweight of tallow and "other goods in proportion as
per London Baltic printed rates". Extrinsic evidence was
held to be admissible to show the meaning of these terms
according to trade usage. The third party in this case was
a warehouse keeper who had released the goods in his custody
on receiving a sum which he thought to be equivalent to the
freight due. The plaintiffs, however, claimed a much larger
sum than this on the basis that the freight should have been
calculated, according to trade usage, by reference to the
price of tallow being but a standard against which the other
prices should have been reckoned.
The limitations inherent in the judgment of Willes J.
were to be seen elsewhere in the reports of the case: the
bills of lading were vague and the judgments seemed to regard
the duty of investigation as dependant on this; usage can
clearly not prevail to qualify or contradict specific written
(68)
provisions of contract.
Mere ignorance of a usage or trade custom is not, (69)
In Hudson v. Ede,per se, necessarily a sufficient defence.
thel
(68) See for Scots authority, the judgments in Steel Co. of
Scotland v. Tancred Arrol & Co. (1892) 19 R 1062 and, in
England, L. Butro and Heilbut Symons &: Co. (191'0 2 KB 348.
(69) (1868) LR 3 QB 412.
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the customs of a port were held to bind a shipowner who was
ignorant of them. Scrutton justifies this decision by saying
that the custom construed a word which can only properly be
(70) theunderstood in its surroundings. In applying/ratio of
this case and that of Russian Steam Navigation it may be that
Scottish courts would adopt a more lenient and flexible
attitude. Gloag and Henderson, when discussing custom as an
implied term (as distinct from custom as local law) maintained
that knowledge or notice of the usage must be brought home to
the party against whom it is pled, failing which the party
must be put on enquiry as to the usage of the term. An old
Scots authority admits:
"There can be no doubt that we have never in Scotland
gone so far as they have done in England in admitting
evidence of understanding or usage in order to
(71)
construe thereby a written contract".
(72)
In Holman v. Peruvian Nitrate Company it was observed
that where a usage is purely local it cannot be taken to
control the words of a written instrument unless it is known
to both parties. Lord Deas in this case inclines towards
the English construction, however, and as we do unfortunately
suffer from a dearth of modern authority, it is at least
arguable/
(70)
(71)
(72)
Charterparties (17th Edition) at p.28.
at 139
Mackenzie v. Dunlop (1853) 16 D 129/- LJC Hope.
(1877) 5 R 657.
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arguable that in this mercantile matter (like so many others)
we would now follow the English line of authority. Russian
Steam Navigation does not stand uncontradicted in English
(73)
law and the Privy Council case of Kirchner v. Venus, whose
decision is more easily reconciled with the older Scots cases,
concludes:
"It appears to their Lordships that it would be
inconsistent alike with the rules of law and the
convenience of commerce to affect the construction
of a negotiable instrument in the hands of a bona fide
holder for value by evidence of a local usage of
which he was ignorant and could not be bound to take
notice".
And while the position of the banker in a commercial credit
transaction is not that of a bona fide holder for value the
(74)
analogy may be helpful. Nor is the definition of custom
or usage in this sense particularly clear. In Postlethwaite v.
(75)
Freeland the House of Lords approved a direction to a jury
which described a mercantile custom as not meaning custom "in
the sense in which the word is sometimes used by lawyers, but(76)
(meaning) a settled and established practice of the port".
The standard of proof of such usage is less rigorous than
that/
(73) (1859) PC 12 Moore 361, at 399.
(74) although it can not clearly be pressed too far.
(75) (1880) 5 AC 599.
(76) ibid at p.616.
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that for legal customs. On the other hand, there is a danger
of inclining towards what Fletcher-Moulton L.J. describes as
the layman's attitude of confusing custom and "that which is
(77)
done". And in the Scots case of Strathlorne(78)
~S~.:S~.~Co~._v~.~Ba~i~r~d,Lord Shaw of Dunfermline repeated this
customarily
warning and distinguished the mere occurrence of instances
of a practice and a "settled and established practice which
amounts to the acceptance of a binding obligation of a
(78) (79)
custom". As Sir George Jessel pointed out, the
custom must be so notorious as to amount to an implied term
of the contract.
The precise issue of custom in the field of mercantile
letters of credit has only come before the courts on one
reported occasion, in the case of Dixon Irmaos and Cia Ltda v.
(80)
Chase National Bank of the City of New York, where the
facts were unusual. The custom in question was that of
accepting an indemnity from the seller where the latter was
unable to tender what was required under the credit, namely
"a full set bills of lading"; the issue was whether the bank
should be bound by their own custom, evidence being led to
the effect that this was notorious to banks, importers and
exporters/
(77) [1908J2 KB 907 at 919.
(78) 1916 se (HL) 134 at 141.
(79) Nelson v. Dahl (1879)12 Ch 568 at 575.
(80) (1944) 144 F (2d) 759.
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exporters alike. It was held that this custom was an implied
term of the contract between the banker and seller. This
decision has been attacked mainly on the basis that the
(81)
custom conflicted with the express terms of the contract.
There is much to be said for this argument as applied to
these particular circumstances; the principle, however, is
unaffected. And it is eubmitted that arguments based on
(82)
Rayner v. Hambros Bank are not strictly in pOint for there
the court was simply called on to construe terms used in the
(83)
credit. In Dixon's case there was no obvious prejudice
to the buyer in the bank'e acceptance of an indemnity. J.(84)
Honnold in an article supporting the decision admitted
that the bank would be justified in refusing an indemnity
where there was some suggestion or suspicion that the
documents did not properly conform with the goods. His main
argument ie precised ~s follows:
"to permit issuing banks to depart from fair-weather
practice in time of financial stress, when the
letter of credit serves its most important function,
would disappoint the reasonable expectation of
sellers who have relied on the custom and tend to
undermine the integrity and value of letters of
credit".
It/
(81) c.f. L.Sutro and Co. v. Heilbut Symons & Co~191TI2 KB348._
(82) [].943] 1KB 37.
(83) See Backus and Harfield's article in 1952 CLR 589.
(84) 1953 C.L.R. 504.
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It is certainly arguable that a British court would adopt (85)
a similar attitude to that of Bailhache J. in Cape Asbestos
where the bank's "customary" behaviour was considered merely
a matter of courtesy. And until some guidance is available
from the courts, one could not agree with Magrah that "it
(86)
looks like the thin end of the wedge".
Custom in the particular sense in which it has been
discussed above is imported into the contract in question on
the basis of the presumed intention of the parties; and,
subject to proof, such presumed intention was at least
relevant in so far as the contract between banker and seller
was concerned. Where, however, the terms of the contract are
as authorised in a further contract and the bank's right to
recover from the purchaser is based on that further contract,
the implication of presumed intention is less easily observed.
The difficulty is obvious: if the bank accepts or is forced to
accept the custom is the purchaser similarly compelled to
accept the custom? The terms of the contracts are associated
but distinct and it is submitted that unless the custom was
known to the purchaser or he could reasonably have been said
to accept it, there is no logical reason why the custom
should apply equally in both contracts.
In view, however, of the stringent tests which the
British/
(85) supra cit.
(86) Gilbart Lectures on Banking 1952 at po12.
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British courts are likely to apply before admitting custom,
such questions are not likely to arise frequently although
the increasing uniformity of banking practice exemplified
by the Uniform Customs may highlight this area of difficulty
in the future. What has already been discussed extensively
by the courts and academic writers is the discretion afforded
to the bank in accepting documents which may, at first sight
at least, appear to vary the terms of the letter of credit.
Statements of the broad principle are many:
"It is both common ground and common sense that in
such a transaction the accepting bank can only claim
indemnity if the conditions on which it is authorised
to pay are, in the matter of accompanying documents,
(81)
strictly observed".
Strict observance" and "exact compliance" are the two phrases
(88)
most popularly used. Rowlatt L.J. in South African
Reserve Bank v. Samuel draws attention to the 2-fold aspect
of the bank's duty:
"when one has discovered what exactly the letter of
credit means, then I think the person acting under it(89)
is bound to act under it quite literally".
Thel
(87) Equitable Trust Co. of New York v. Dawson Ptnrs (1927)
27 Ll LR 49 per Sumner L.J. at 52.
(88) English, Scottish & Australian Bank Ltd. v. Bank of South
Africa (1922) 13 L1 LR 21 at 24;Lamborn v. Lake Shore
Banking Co. (192l) 196 App. Div.504 at 507.
(89) (1931) 39 Ll LR 87,at 93.
---~--..~--~~..--..--,--.~.-.....-- ..-~- .•. --,.,-
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The two steps for the bank are, then, to ascertain its
mandate and thereafter to act strictly in accordance with
it. As Scrutton L.J. pointed out in L. Sutro and Co. v.
(90)
Heilbut Symons & Co. the first step may be complicated
by the fact that business men frequently do not choose
their words with the calculated precision which would be
necessary to preclude ambiguity and uncertainty. In fact
they may frequently be surprised by the meaning of what
they have said.
The raison d'etre of the rule of strict compliance
is the protection of the buyer who must, by the very nature
of things, deal at arm's length with the seller. The rule
has been laid down in cases where there was a danger of
prejudicing the buyer's protection; where this danger does
not exist, its application should not be over-stressed. This
view, best expressed by Scrutton L.J:
"business men will not be able to use the system ••••••
if they take objections which are at the best
(91)
technical"
was not well-received in the House of Lords. And just as
the buyer's interests are to be respected they must be
balanced/
(90) [1917J 2 KB348 at 364.
(91) Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Dawson Partners (1925)
25 L1 LR 90.
----_._-----_._--_ •..
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balanced against those of the bank dealing with documents
current in a trade with which it is unlikely to be familiar.
The significance of the interposition of the bank
is underlined in such cases as Moralice (London) Ltd. v. E.D.
(92)
and F. Man where the sale was of 500 metric tons (5000 bags)
of sugar, payment to be effected by documents in accordance
with a letter of credit which stipulated that "invoices
must describe the goods exactly as above". To satisfy the
contract the sellers themselves purchased "about 500 tons"
of bagged sugar and the bank to whom the documents were in
due course tendered accepted them only on the provision of
an indemnity. The decision itself was concerned principally
(93)
with questions arising under this indemnity but in the
course of his judgment McNair J. confirmed that the bank's
rejection was perfectly proper although the "de minimis"
(94)principle would have applied as between buyer and seller
in a normal c.i.f. contract. The safeguard in excluding
"de minimis" is two fold: it precludes any question of
k qualifying the buyer's clear mandate, superficially
maintaining the protection of the buyer and it ensures that
the bank is not obliged to consider the degree of any
discrepancy or prejudice to the buyer. To that extent it is
merely an example of the rule of "strict compliance" which
basi
lS
(92) [1954JLloyd's Rep 526.
(93) of which more anon.
(94) de minimis non· curat lex.
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has received almost universal judicial approval in
principle if not always in practice. It must be pointed
out, however, that its application may embarrass as well
as protect the buyer. If, for example, the discrepancy is
trivial and the bank for some reason is not offered or
refuses an indemnity the buyer may be deprived of goods
which he is awaiting to fulfil another contract. The bank
is not bound and may not be in a position to take instructions
when the discrepancy is brought to its notice - it may, for
instance, merely be acting as an intermediary; and there
are risks involved in accepting an indemnity. In these
circumstances the buyer will have no remedy against the
bank and any delay in obtaining specific instructions may
involve a deterioration in the goods or the loss of a market.
The alternative of giving the bank a discretion is clearly
unacceptable. It is not for the bank to consider whether
a discrepancy is material or not. An absolute discretion
would be insupportable and any other discretion would be
too easily challenged.
That is not to say, however, that the banks have not
been involved in using their discretion. The very problem
of discovering the exact meaning of their instructions in
terms of the letter of credit may dictate the bank's
involvement and discretion to an extent not envisaged in
opening/
- 44 -
opening the letter of credit. It is perhaps as well that
the banks have taken advantage of reasonably comprehensive
exclusion clauses protecting themselves against errors of
judgment etc. (95)
In Midland Bank Ltd. v. Seymour, Devlin J. stated:
"When an agent acts upon ambiguous instructions he
is not in,default if he can show that he adopted
(96)
what was a reasonable meaning".
It is obvious that it is in the interests of both buyer and
banker to eliminate ambiguity from the letter of credit.
This, however, is easier said than done. What if the
requirement is simply for "bills of lading"? Do these
require to be "shippedtt bills? Will "received for shi'Pment"
and "trans-shipment" or "thro~h" bills suffice? In Yelo v.
(97)
S.M. Machado and Co. Ltd., an irrevocable letter of
credit was issued in terms of which the bank undertook to
pay against, inter alia, "shipped" bills of lading. It was
held that there was no proof that shipments were made before
the due date and "received for shipment" bills only were
tendered, and these the bank was justified in rejecting. It
is thought that this case is an example of unambiguous
instructions and proof of shipment was to that extent
completely irrelevant. The bank is bound to accept or reject
the documents without the benefit of a legal "proof".
In/
(95) G955] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 147.
(96) ibid p.153.
(97) l].95~ 1 Lloyd's Rep. 183.
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(98)
In Diamond Alkali Export Co. v. Bourgeois, a case
concerned with tender of documents under a c.i.f. contract,
there was no specification of the type of bill of lading.
A "received for shipment" bill was tendered but refused by
the buyer. The court supported this rejection on the ratio
that in the absence of agreement or custom a "received" bill
is not good tender as it does not acknowledge shipment. The
bank operating under a letter of credit is concerned with
the documents normally tendered under a c.i.f. contract and
to that extent the decision is obviously pertinent. It
may be, however, that the ratio is too wide. In The(99)
Marlborough Hill parties sought to vindicate their
rights under a "received for shipment" bill on which they
were indorsees. The court held that the parties were
entitled to their remedy on the basis that the "received"
bills were proper bills of lading in terms of the Act in
question. This case was not, however, concerned with the
documents'sufficiency under a c.i.f. contract and it may be
reconciled with Diamond Alkali on the basis of the decision
(100)
in .iuzuki v. Burgett and Newsum, where the bills were
to be dated during the months of December 1919 or January 1920.
The goods were first shipped within the specified period
but thereafter they were transferred for shipment by
ocean-going steamer. A bill of lading in the form "shipped
or/
(98)
(99)
(100)
D-921] 3 KB 443.
~92l] AC 444.
(1922) 10 LI LR 223.
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or delivered for shipment" (equivalent to a "received" bill)
was issued and in due course tendered. In fact the goods
were not shipped till February 1920. Stating the decision
of the court, Bankes L.J. said:
"the documents were not in order, because the shipment
was not made in the contract time, and the bill of
lading, although it may have truly stated the facts
in reference to goods being ready for shipment, could
not alter the fact that the shipment was not a January
shipment but a February shipment".
Apart from the obvious distinction that in a credit
transaction the bank can only be concerned with the documents,
one principle is discernible from these three apparently
contradictory authorities: where the bill specified requires
to show a date of shipment a "received for shipment" bill is
not a good tender. It is not enough to stipulate the date
of shipment in the contract of sale if the tender is to be
a bank operating under a letter of credit. Diamond Alkali
and. The Marlsborough Hill may be reconciled on the basis that
whether or not a received bill is a good tender, acceptance
of such a bill will give the acceptor the normal remedies
(101)
of a holder. Diamond Alkali, of course, seeks to
decide/
(101) It is, with respect, suggested that the rule propounded
by Professor Miller in the Casebook p.74 is accurate but
unnecessary to distinguish these two cases. It is
submitted that the more restricted distinction is
supported by Bankes L.J. in Weis v. Produce Brokers Co.
(1921) 7 Ll L Rep.211.
- 47 -
decide the point whether the received bill can in any event
be a good tender and to this extent the decision may go too
(102)
far. It is certainly not binding on any court required
to consider the bank's duties where a "received" bill is
tendered under a letter of credit referring only to "bills of
lading" - this would be an example of ambiguous instructions
on which the bank would be entitled to put a reasonable
interpretation. If it rejected such a bill it is also at
least arguable that the seller would have a cause of action
in as much as the "received" bill is a bill of lading so far
as remedies thereunder is concerned. A specified date of
shipment would place the matter beyond doubt. This argument
(103)
has apparently received support in certain American cases.
Where a "received" bill was stipulated for, it would
seem that the bank could be compelled to accept a "shipped"
bill on the close analogy of National Bank of South Africa v.
(104)
Banca Italiana di Sconto where the court held that on a
construction of the credit contract the sellers required to
tender delivery orders ex warehouse. In as much as this
varied the original terms of the credit which called for
delivery/
(102) but see Yelo v. Machado [19521 1 Lloyd's Rep.183 which
appears to support it.
(103) Vietor v. National City Bank 200 App. Div. 557.
(104) (1922) 10 Ll LR 531.
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delivery orders and/or bills of lading, this part of the
decision must be considered to turn on the special facts
of the case and should not be taken as a precedent. The
Court of Appeal in rejecting the document tendered stated
that the document to have been acceptable would at least
have required to be "equivalent in the business sense" to
l 'a delivery order. Any notion of "equivalence", however,
introduces difficult questions for the bank particularly
where these may involve judgment on the legal effect of a
document and it is submitted that the bank would be entitled
to reject any document not bearing on its face to be of the
type required under the letter of credit.
"Trans-shipment" or "through" bills of lading have been
considered by the courts principally with reference to the
protection which they offer to the party or parties relying
(105)
thereon. In Landauer and Co. v. Craven and Speeding Bros.,
the contract between the parties stated that shipment should
be from one of several specified ports within a specified
period of time and the date of the bill of lading was to be
conclusive evidence of the date of shipment. The goods were
in fact shipped as required but they were trans-shipped at
Hong Kong and the bill then attached to the goods was dated
outwith the specified period, and related only to the passage
from Hong Kong to the eventual destination. Scrutton J.(as
he then was) held that tender of this bill was not acceptable.
The/
(105) [t9l2] 2KB 94.
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The learned judge indicated that the seller must, at the time
of shipment, procure a bill covering the whole journey; only
a bill of this nature will allow the purchaser on its receipt
to deal with the goods represented by the bill and to have
contractual rights (and not merely an expectation of a further
contract) in respect of losses at any stage of the voyage.
The Umpire who heard evidence in this case had previously
found that there was "no evidence ••• of any custom affecting
the Manila hemp trade or varying in any way the well-known
mercantile usage with regard to contracts of sale on cost,
freight and insurance terms ••• it is by mercantile usage,
unless otherwise agreed, the duty of the seller to provide
by a contract of affreightment for the carriage of the goods
from the port of shipment to the port of destination named in
the contract, and by an indorsed bill of lading, or otherwise,
to transfer to the buyer the benefit of the rights created
by the contract of affreightment between the shipper and the
(106)
shipowner for the entire voyage". This was treated by(106)
Scrutton J. as a finding on custom of trade that the
seller must obtain a "through" contract. And provided the
bill gave protection to the purchaser for the whole voyage,
trans-shipment would not be a reason for rejecting the
document. It is on the finding of custom that the earlier
(107)
decision in Cox McEuen and Co. v. Malcolm and Co. must
be distinguished.
Landauer/
(106) ibid at p.l06.
(107) reported as a note at the end of Mr. Justice Scrutton's
judgment.
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Landauer was followed by the House of Lords in Hansson(108)
v. Hamel and Horley Ltd. where the bill tendered was not
a "through" bill but only bore to relate to the voyage as
from a date of trans-shipment. Lord Sumner stated:
"the buyer is entitled to documents which substantially(108a)
confer protective rights throughout"
and that the bills of lading must be procured "on shipment"
in the sense, at least, that they cover the whole of the
voyage. And in an earlier case involving a letter of credit,
a banker was held entitled to reject a bill of lading which
not only indicated trans-shipment but also omitted to specify
that onward shipment to any of the specified ports was
(109)
included.
None of these authorities, however, justify Gutteridge
(110)
and Magrah' s statement that "through" bills of lading can
not be tendered at least unl~ss supported by custom of trade.
Judgments in both Hansson and Landauer seem to indicate that
there is nothing inherent in the nature of a "through" bill
which makes it unacceptable. That is not to say, however,
that instances can not arise where "through" bills should be
rejected because of some particular clausing which renders
the bill "unclean". For instance, in Aberdeen Grit Co. v.
(Ill)
Ellerman's Wilson Line, an action of damages arising out
off
(108)
(108a)
(109)
(110)
(Ill)
11922J 2 A.C.36.
ibid at 46.
Brazilian and Portuguese Bank (1868) 18 LT.823.
at p.73.
1933 S.C.9.
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of the delivery of goods which had been damaged by rain, it
was held that a clause in the bill of lading excluding
responsibility for lighterage was imported into the "through"
bill of lading. The banker receiving tender of such a bill
would be entitled to object that the bill did not cover the
whole voyage inasmuch as he would require to take delivery
not from the wharf but from the ship and that it was also
to this extent "uncleantt as it indicated a period of time
for which the goods were not covered by the provisions of a
bill of lading.
Nor would the bank be entitled to accept a bill which
disclosed the goods had been carried on deck unless there
was a specific provision allowing such shipment in the
letter of credit. It is suggested that the bank would be
obliged to refuse such bills as being "unclean". Article 21
of the Uniform Customs which states that "banks have the
right to refuse bills of lading mentioning the storage of
goods on deck" does not go far enough and it is submitted
that the practice of British banks of refusing such bills,
at least without an indemnity, is correct and is supported
(112)
by the American case of in re The Peter Helms.
The whole question of the cleanliness of a bill of
lading/
(112) (1938) A M C 1220.
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lading is one which may involve the bank's discretion. As(113)
Branson J. points out in N.V. Arnold Otto Meyer v. Aune:
"The characteristics generally required by the common
law to exist in a bill of lading, if it is to be good
tender under a c.i.f. contract, are so required because,
and only because, it is the general custom of merchants
of lading
that such a bill/shall possess these characteristics".
Quid juris if custom would appear to vary the requirement
for clean bills of lading? The rule is often considered to
be a clear one: the bill should be clean and usual in the
trade. But what if a dirty bill is usual? This question has,
I submit, never been decided. It arose in National Bank of
(114)
Egypt v. Hanne¥ig's Bank where the letter of credit
provided for, inter alia, "bills of lading". Now this is an
open term the construction of which could conceivably be
"unusual" or "clean". It is an example of ambiguous
instructions in a mandate. The bank paid against the tender
of drafts and bills of lading on each of which there was a
note to the effect that some of the bags containing the
shipment were dirty or torn, or that the contents had been
spilled. The buyers refused reimbursement on the ground that
the documents were not clean. At first instance Bailhache J.
accepted the defendant's contention that bills of lading
meant/
(113) (1939) 3 All E R 168 at 173.
(114) (1919) 1 Ll L. Rep.69.
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meant clean bills of lading. This point, however, was left
open in the Court of Anpeal, although the actual decision in
the case turned on different considerations - the terms of
corresnondence between the parties. Scrutton and Bankes L.J.J.
refused to accept Bailhache J.'s dictum on "clean" bills,
and there are indications that they preferred "usual" as a
criterion. If it had been necessary to decide the point in
HanneYig's case it might well have provided authority for
the acceptability of "usual" bills - there were averments
that the scarcity of wrapping materials in Egypt was such
that if the goods were not acceptable as shipped there could
be no trade at all - an excellent example of the prevailing
(115)
conditions of the trade. Bankes L.J. in considering the
importance of "usual" bills quoted the example of a business
disorganised by war. This is not an exceptional case, merely
(116)
another example of trade conditions at a given time.
The position has been complicated but not resolved
by the judgment of Salmon J. in British Imex Industries v.
(117)
Midland Bank. The learned judge noted that the
plaintiff's witness, a man of the "widest experience in the
exporting and importing business", "had never heard of a
bill of lading containing the clause in question being
objectedj
(115) supra cit. at p.70.
(116) cf. Gutteridge &: Magrah p.71: "each case must be
decided on •••••• the circumstances in which the
credit has been established."
(117) [1958J 1 QB 542.
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objected to on the ground that it did not contain a statement
that such clause had been complied with". Salmon J. accepted
this evidence of business usage. He goes on to say
"when a credit calls for bills of lading, in normal
(118)
circumstances it means clean bills of lading"
and approves Bailhache J. in HanneYig's Bank. I doubt whether
this really takes us much further; he does not expand or
contradict the judgments of Bankes and Scrutton L.J.J; he is
obviously much impressed by the evidence led as to banking
practice and this clearly had as much bearing on the judgment
as the more celebrated dictum quoted elsewhere. It is
certainly incorrect to assume that the difficulty is resolved
(119)
by this judgment.
It must also be pointed out that the two types of
bill - clean and usual - do not necessarily conflict, nor
have the judgments assumed them to. A clean bill has
generally been taken to mean a bill which contains no
reservation as to the apparent good order and condition of the
goods or packing. This is undoubtedly "usual" in most cases;
it is, however, with the exceptional that we must be concerned.
The conflict is highlighted by Hannevig's Bank but not in
the judgment of Salmon J. where the considerations of custom
and cleanliness follow each other as if intended to be
mutually re-inforcing. In Hannevig's Bank, on the other hand,
Scrutton L.J./
(118) ibid p~551.
(119) as Davis does - 1'.168.
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Scrutton L.J. said:
"There were two views put, one that the credit calls
for usual bills, the other that it calls for clean(120)
bills of lading",
and answers this by envisaging a merger of the two:
"The question is whether clean bill of lading is usual(120)
bill of lading in the trade at the time".
Similarly in National Bank of South Africa v. Banca
(121
Italiana di Sconto, Bankes L.J. said:
"this bill is in so unusual a form that it cannot be
treated as a good and sufficient tender of a clean
bill of lading".
And in Westminster Bank v. Banca Nazionale di Credito,
London bankers gave evidence to the effect that clean bills
(122)
were normally expected and that they would not without
authority pay against any others. But the questions put to
them did not appear to require them to consider the import
of usual bills, only the possibility of dirty ones. The
clauses in issue in this case disclosed that the wrappers
were wet and blood-stained, clearly implying that the bills
were neither clean nor usual.
"Cleanliness" of bills of lading may be re-defined
in terms of what is usual. This is clearly what Scrutton L.J.(123)
had in mind in Hannevig's Bank. The "usualness" of a bill
is/
(120) reported in Legal Decisions Affecting Bankers Vol. III
at 213.
(1922) 10 Ll L Rep. 531, at 534.
(1928) 31 Ll.LR 306.
(121)
(122)
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is not demonstrably unsuitable as a criterion of acceptability
provided the protection of both buyer and banker is not
prejudiced. The two standards may be merged on the basis
that the broader should include the narrower. It is incorrect
(123 )
to restrict "usual" to mean "usual form" as Davis
anpears to do; it also covers "usual terms" in the sense of
\
1,.1
those terms imposed as a usual condition of trade at any
(125)
particular time. As Professor Miller says:
"a 'clean'bill may yet be of any of the types in use in
trade •••••• closer examination of the transaction
will be required to determine which of the various
types may be regarded by the bank as sufficient
tender" •
If the definition of ".usual" causes some difficulty,
that of cleanliness appears to be well-settled. In Canadian
National W. Indies S.S.
Co., a case concerned with a c.i.f. contract the term
was taken to mean "that there was no clause or notation
modifying or qualifying the statement as to the condition of
the goods". On very similar lines the Uniform Customs and
Practice, article 18 states "a clean shipping document is
one/
(123)
(124)
supra cit.
at p.15? See also Atkin L.J: (1922) 10 L1 LR 531 at
536.
(125) Casebook p.?O.
(126) L194TI AC 46 at 54
---------
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one which bears no superimposed clauses expressly declaring
a defective condition of the goods or packing". It is
thought that the courts' practice of upholding the rejection
of documents which merely indicate some particular risk or a
circumstance creating an additional risk e.g. deck stowage
can only be justified on the basis of the "usualness" or
otherwise of the documents in question.
The importance of distinguishing the c.i.f. contract
and the credit contract is underlined by Romariz Pistacchini(127)
v. Zeyen and Co. where the seller tendered to the
purchasers' bankers dock warrants which were marked "cases
frail, not accountable for quantity of contents". These
were not clean or usual: they indicated that the shipper
was excluding his own responsibility for defective packing
observed by him and also that the goods themselves might
well be damaged or diminished. Bailhache J. appreciated
why such documents were refused by the bankers but did not
think that the actual contract (c.i.f.) called for clean
warrants, in that they contained special provisions for
dealing with defective goods. And while it is obvious from
a practical point of view that the documents called for in
the letter of credit will be those normally required in terms
of the c.i.f. contract the interposition of the bank is
crucial when the duty of investigation of documents is
considered./
(127) (1919) 35 T L R 299.
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considered. It is submitted that in several areas the
courts have clearly recognised the bank's duty to investigate
the acceptability of documents tendered e.g. in cases of
forgery, in cases where the type of bill may vary and where
the question of "usualness" is raised.
The argument against involving the bank in such
matters has, however, been forcefully stated by the courts,
(128)
particularly in the leading case of Rayner v. Hambro's Bank,
a decision of the Court of Appeal. The facts were briefly
that a credit was opened against the tender of documents
covering a cargo of Coromandel groundnuts; the bills of
lading in fact tendered related to "machine-shelled groundnut
kernels~ although the invoice was in order. Evidence was
later led to show that the two were identical commodities
and that a marginal note in the bills confirmed the goods
were Coromandel groundnuts. The bank, however, refused to
accept the documents. At first instance Atkinson J. held
that the rejection was unjustified because of the "universal
recognition" in the trade in question that the two
descriptions related to the same goods. In overturning this
decision the Court of Appeal emphasised that this "recognition"
was restricted to the trade, and in rejecting the argument(128a)
put forward for the plaintiffs that "if documents are
presented in the form customary in the shipping trade ••••••
they/
(128) (1942) 2 All E R 694; [1943] KB 37.
(128a) ibid at 39.
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they are good and sufficient tender", gave a decision not
only on the facts but also on the degree of knowledge which
it is reasonable and proper to ascribe to a bank.
So far as the decision merely followed (as it stated
itself to do) Lord Sumner's well-known dictum to the effect
that tlabanker acts at his peril if he departs from the
strict terms of his mandate" no exception may be taken to it.(129)
But Mackinnon L.J. went considerably further when he said:
"it is quite impossible to suggest that a banker is to
be affected with knowledge of the customs and customary
terms of everyone of thousands of trades for whose
dealings he may issue letters of credit •••••• it
would be quite impossible for business to be carried
on, and for bankers to be in any way protected in such
matters, if it were said that they must be affected
by a knowledge of all the details of the w~ in which
particular traders carryon their business".
It should be pOinted out that the custom in this case
was undoubtedly notorious in the trade. And it ia therefore
difficult to see how the situation differs from the tender
of "usual" documents except to the extent that the
description appears, at least on first inspection, to
contradict the requirement of the credit. Does not Goddard L.J •.
(130)
go too far when he says:
"It/
(129)
(130)
p.4l.
at p.43.
- 60 -
"It would be no answer for him (the banker)to say:
'Well)I got a receipt which in fact gives you all
reasonable protection'? My answer would be:
'You are not concerned with the protection you have
given me. You are concerned to carry out the orders(131)
which I give you and you have not done it'''.
Surely the banker is entitled to make a reasonable
investigation of what its instructions in fact mean. If the
bills in fact relate to the goods specified and the description
can be justified by a universal usage in the trade, the
banker would be entitled to interpret its instructions(132) .
reasonably. And Goddard L.J • IS comment that "for all
the bank knows, the customer may have a particular reason
for wanting "Coromandel groundnuts" in the bill" has obvious
limitations in application: the credit stated the goods to
which the bills must refer not the exact terms of the
reference and a detailed invoice description would not
normally and often could not conveniently be incorporated
in the bill. The clearest support for the general proposition
of principle in Rayner, as opposed to the decision itself,
is to be found in the analogy used by Warri~ton L.J. in(133)
Stein v. Hambros Bank of Northern Commerce:
"when two people are talking about a train leaving
Paddington/
(131) c.f. the view of Scrutton L.J. supra cit.
(132) Magrah: Gilbart Lectures 1951 at p.13.
(133) (1921)qLl LR 433.
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Paddington at 5 o'clock, they are talking about
something which is perfectly familiar to both, or
assumed to be familiar. But in the present case
the bank knew nothing whatever about the advertised
sailings of the Caboto. All they knew about it was
what they were told in their instructions".
Rayner, then, is certainly good authority for what
(134)
it decides; and the obiter dicta are unexceptional in
so far as they justify the bank's entitlement to reject the
documents in question. But where the bank's obligation is
concerned the judgments must be tempered with the view
subsequently adopted in Midland Bank v. Seymour by Devlin J,
where correct particulars were given by the set of documents but
not by the bill of lading itself, which omitted details of
weight and cleanliness. The learned judge indicated that
of two possible interpretations there was no way the bank
could be bound to anyone of them and that it was entitled
(l35a)
, to interpret its mandate reasonably. Nor did he feel that
this was contradicting Rayner, clearly considering that
decision to be restricted to a situation involving
(135)
contradiction rather than ambiguity. Unlike Rayner,
however, the Midland Bank decision is consistent with
Article 33 of the Uniform Customs and Practice which states
that/
(134) It does not settle the bank's obligation to accept or
refuse documents.
(135) see particularly p.l54 of the judgment.
(135a) See also Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney Ltd. v.
Jalsard Pty. Ltd. [1972] 3 WLR 566 at 570.
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that the description in the invoice must correspOnd with
(136)
documents, "description in general terms will be acceptable".
the description in the credit but that in the other
It is not clear from the reports of the Rayner case that the
documents required to refer in exact terms to "Coromaruiel
groundnuts" although that is the interpretation which the
court must be assumed to have adopted. And judicial support
for the decision in Rayner, seen in British Imex Industries
(137)
v. Midland Bank and in the judgment of Scrutton L.J. in
(138)
Hannevig's Bank, is restricted to the ratio stated by
(139)
Professor Gutteridge:
lithereal issue in the case was whether a banker
should be required to take upon himself the
interpretation at a moment's notioe of ambiguous
technioal terms in the documents presented to him".
In the recent case of Soproma PA v. Marine & Animal
(139a)
By-Products Corporation Mr. Justice McNair considered
whether bills referring to "Chilean fisbmeal" were adequate
where the goods were described in the credit as "Chilean Fish
fullmeal" and followed the guidance of article 21. It may be
suggested that where elements of "unusualness" and
"custom" are in issue the courts may now bel
(136) See also Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Van den
Berghs (1925) 22 Ll LR 58, 286, 447.
(137) supra cit per Salmon J.
(138) supra cit.
(139) Journal of Institute of Bankers (1943) Vol. 64. p.66.
(139a) [1966]1 Lloyd's Rep. 367.
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be more inclined to follow the "Uniform Customs and Practice"
and pre-1963 cases may require to be treated with care.
See also Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Van den
(140b)Berghs where Mr. Justice Roche was prepared to accept
evidence tending to show that "Manila cocoanut oil" and
"cocoanut oil" were interchangeable.
Whatever the obligation on the bank, its entitlement
in connection with "usual" or "ambiguous" documents has
also been discussed in a series of cases dealing with
insurance documents. In Wilson{ Holgate and Company v.
140)
Belgian Grain and Produce Co., Ba11hache J. said:
"I am not satisfied that since Ireland v. Livingston
was decided any custom has arisen which obviates the
necessity for a tender by the seller of a policy
of insurance if the buyer requires it ••••• 0 he is
entitled to have a document of the very kind which
he bas agreed to take, or at least one which does
not differ from it in any material respect". (141) .
This followed Manbre Saccharine Co, v. Corn Products Co.
where evidence of custom was rejected although it was
recognised by McCardie J. that "inasmuch as the meaning of
such a contract was created by custom, it may likeWise, I
presume, be altered by custom".
In the absence of custom, the right of rejection was(142)
explained in Diamond Alkali Export Co. v. Bourgeois by
McCardie J:/
"
(140b) (1925) 22 L1 L R 58.
(140) j!92Q] 2 KB 1 at 8, 9 and 10.
(141) ~91~ 1 KB 198 at 206.
(142) 1!-92~ 3 KB 443 at 456.
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McCardie J:
"I do not see how the buyer here could know whether
the document he got was of a proper character unless
he saw the original policy •••••• I feel that a
certificate of insurance falls within a legal
claSSification, if any, different to that of a policy
of insurance. The latter is a well-known document
with clearly defined features •••••• A certificate,
however, is an ambiguous thing; it is unclassified
and undefined by law".
It seems to be accepted in this judgment and in the judgment
(143)
of Scrutton L.J. in Scott v. Barclays Bank that it was
the fullness of detail which dictated the need for a policy.
And it must be considered very unlikely that any bank would
be forced to accept a certificate even on the proof of
custom so long as there is this absence of detail. This
surely explains the attitude of Bailhache J. towards the(144)
expert evidence led in Wilson Holgate and Co. to the
effect that it was the common practice for sellers to tender,
instead of a policy of insurance, a broker's cover note or
a certificate of insurance:
"These witnesses, however, could give no instance
in which there has been any contest as to the validity
of a tender of a cover note or certificate •••••• On
thel
(143)
(144) "witnesses of high standing •••••• to whose evidence
I give absolute credence" Q,92cD 2 KB at 7.
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the contrary those witnesses were all very careful
to explain that they were not prepared to say that
the buyer was bound to take a cover note or
certificate of insurance instead of a policy ••. All
that they would say was that so far as they know
these cover notes and certificates were constantly
(145)
taken and never refused".
An onerous burden of proving custom was obviously envisaged
by the learned judge as he accepted that the "practice" was
one at least prevalent during war-time conditions. The
acceptability of certificates in the United States is
probably explained on the basis that certificates there do
tend to contain terms more frequently ·only found in policies.
If the credit calls for "insurance policies" to be
tendered, then on the basis of Rayner certificates would
require to be rejected by the banker. It is only where an
insurance document is stipulated for with the consequent
ambiguity that the banker would be entitled to interpret his
instructions as permitting a certificate, and only where the
bank could justify its acceptance by showing a trade practice
or custom or that the document contained more than selected
r details of the policy that it would be safe in so accepting.
We have been considering the effects of custom in
modifying/
(145) supra cit.
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modifying or qualifying the bank's obligation to refuse
documents not falling within the express terms of the
credit. What of the converse situation where the documents
are in strict compliance with the terms of the credit but
those terms are understood in a special sense according to
custom? It is submitted that in these circumstances, it is
no part of the banker's duty to form and act upon an opinion
Where the terms(146)
are express and clear, custom can not qualify them.
as to the legal effect of the documents.
The fact that the documents are not acceptable in
terms of the letter of credit does not signify the end of the
bank's involvement, at least since the development of the
use of indemnities to cover discrepancies. The indemnity
given by a party tendering unsatisfactory documents raises
many distinct problems most of which may be considered on a
straightforward contract basis quite independently of the
letter of credit. This topic bas been discussed elsewhere
at some length. In considering the obligation and entitlement
of the bank within the credit system there are two particular
questions of special significance: the obligation of the
bank to accept an indemnity and the obligation of the bank
if it accepts an indemnity to advise the purchaser, its
customer. The problem was raised in the American case,
Dixon, Irmaos and Cia. Ltda. v. Chase National Bank of the(147)
City of New York where the court held that the bank was
obliged/
(146)
(147)
Midland Bank Ltd. v. Seymour supra cit. per Devlin J.
144 F 2d (1944) cert.denied 324 US 850,65 supra cit.687.
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obliged to accept an indemnity on the basis of a uniform
custom in New York banking circles. This indemnity was in
respect of the inability of the tenderer to produce a complete
set of bills of lading and the decision must be restricted to
that situation. The basis of the decision was the importation
of a custom into the contract between the seller and the
bank. The effect of such a custom, if supported, would be
to force the bank to enter a further contract the terms of
which may vary and under which the bank may incur further
expense in vindicating its rights. It also raises the
questions of what is an acceptable indemnity and in respect
of what defects must it be accepted. The difficulties are
many and it is submitted that the courts in this country
would not support any attempt to oblige a bank to accept
an indemnity. Notwithstanding the practice of bankers in
(148)
this country, Diamond Alkali Export Corporation quite
clearly shows that the courts will not enforce what is
practised merely as a matter of courtesy or mutual
convenience.
The second problem has not, as yet, been the subject
(149)
of judicial decision. Gutteridge and Magrah state:
"It is generally understood that where a bank takes
up documents under indemnity, its principals should
bel
(148)
(149)
supra cit.
at p.117.
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be advised. The paying banker has done something
for which he has no authority, and, unless his
action is ratified by the issuing bank, has to
rely on the goods and the indemnity. While there
may be no duty to advise that the indemnity has
been taken, it is submitted that there is a duty
to inform the principal that payment has been
made against defective or inadequate documents,
for the buyer ought to be put on guard".
An indemnity may, however, be given as a reassurance only,
where, for instance the parties may not be prepared or
inclined to insist on what they consider to be their
entitlements to the extent of going to arbitration or the
courts. An indemnity may be, and often is, the easy,
convenient remedy. It is suggested that although the bank
is authorised to accept only documents which are in strict
accord with its mandate, in accepting the documents it is
acting independently in terms of its contract with the
seller, and it is submitted that the bank is not obliged
to advise the purchaser either of the existence of the
indemnity or, pace Gutteridge and Magrah, the fact that
the documents are perhaps disconform to contract. If the
documents were accepted without an indemnity and some
disorepancy or disconformity in the documents later became
apparent surely it is not for the bank to draw the
purchaser's attention to his (the banker's) breach of
contract./
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contract. And if this duty is not supportable, any other
formulation of duty would seem fanciful being based only
on the banker - customer relationship, which the courts
have not been anxious to over-stress in the particular
context of the tender of documents under the letter of
credit. Moreover, the bank might insist on an indemnity
or in fact obtain one where the documents were prima facie
in order but there was some question as to the acceptability
(150)
of the goods. The bank might wish an indemnity to
cover risks created by its reliance on the security of
goods perhaps not in order. Is not the bank entitled to
put the documents to the buyer without mentioning this
fact - its right to recompense, after all, is based solely
on the documents? And it is difficult to see any reason
why the positions of the intermediary bank vis-a-vis the
issuing bank and the latter vis-a-vis the customer should
in any way be distinguished.
It is suggested that the device of the indemnity
is intended as a practical remedy and much of its usefulness
will be prejudiced if its use is hedged with a complicated
network of further obligations and duties to those who are
not parties to the indemnity agreement. The field of
indemnities is clearly one where the distinction between
the entitlement of the bank and its obligation is highlighted
although!
(150) Moralice (London) Ltd. v. E.D. & F. Man{:1954]
2 Lloyd's Rep.526 shows that a party might well in
practice obtain an indemnity where he was in any event
bound to accept the documents without one.
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although as in the other topics discussed in this Paper
many of the most difficult questions remain unanswered with
any certainty in the absence of clear judicial authority.
If, however, the bank takes an indemnity to cover itself
in accenting the tender of otherwise objectionable documents,
it is thought that the bank can not claim to have correctly
executed its mandate under the letter of credit.
